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The BZU Development Studies Programme
The Development Studies Programme (DSP) at Birzeit was established in 1997 as a specialized policy and
research-oriented programme for development issues which link the academic and policy-making communities.
The DSP grew out of the university-affiliated Human Development Project which produced the first Human
Development Profile on Palestine in 1997.
A committee of university academic and administrative personnel supervises the Programme’s activities.  In
addition to its own programme goals, DSP coordinates with local institutions and international agencies on
projects requiring research expertise in the development field. The Programme currently receives funding support
from the Government of Japan through the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP).
Mission
The DSP endeavors to provide and interpret developmental concepts and frameworks which will aid in
understanding the political, economic and social changes now taking place in Palestinian society and in prompting
sustain development planning.  The programme also aims to raise public awareness of development issues in
order to improve individual and institutional capabilities, to enable and empower the community to contribute
effectively to the development process.
Objectives and activities
To achieve these goals, the DSP:
* Conducts academic and policy-oriented research and studies;
* Prepares and publishes the human development report on Palestine;
* Provides library and outreach services through the DSP resource center;
* Encourages academic institutions to integrate development concepts into their curriculum by preparing an
academic programme in the field of development studies;
* Organizes a diversity of community outreach activities, including conferences, workshops and symposia
which bring together various sectors concerned with development issues.
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Objectives and Target Audience of The Current Report.
Challenges and Tasks Ahead.
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2Half a century on, the suffered continues unabated!
º The Palestinian Intifada erupted on September 28, 2000. Since then, Israeli
forces and settlers have committed ongoing and egregious violations of
established international law. 120 military checkpoints divide the West Bank
and Gaza Strip into 220 isolated, closely-guarded segments. Thousands of
kilometers of road are closed by concrete blocks and dirt barricades. Additional
examples of Israeli violations of international law through March 2002 are cited
below.
 º Palestinian deaths total 1,125, including 269 children and more than 25 women.
(Using population ratios, this figure is equivalent to the deaths of approximately
90,000 U.S. citizens).
 º More than 35,000 Palestinians have been injured, and 2,000 of those are now
permanently disabled. (This figure equates to the permanent disabling of
approximately 160,000 U.S. citizens.)
 º The number of settlers increased by 4.4% in 2001 alone. The increase in settler
population is accompanied by the confiscation of thousands of acres of land in
the West Bank and Gaza Strip. During this time, bulldozers guarded by army
personnel and the settlers themselves have uprooted more than 34,600 agricultural
trees in Palestinian orchards.
 º Home demolition claimed 580 houses, with an additional 6,534 homes sustaining
partial damage. Also, roughly 50 businesses and economic enterprises were
destroyed.
 º The entire physical infrastructure of the Palestinian security apparatus throughout
Palestinian-controlled districts was eradicated.
 º The new Palestinian airport in Gaza, an $18.5 million project, was destroyed.
 º The Palestinian harbor and port facilities under construction in Gaza were
destroyed.
 º The headquarters of Palestine Television and the buildings of Palestine Radio
in the West Bank and Gaza Strip were demolished.
 º Losses in the Palestinian economic sector are estimated at between $2.4 and
$3.2 billion, which does not include the costs of physical damage to public and
private property. Losses incurred as a result of halted agricultural activity exceeds
$60 million, and daily losses are estimated between $6 and $8.6 million.
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Section One:
Themes of the Palestinian
Human Development
Report
ºThe Palestinian Human
Development Report (PHDR) is
born of the conviction that active
pursuit of sustainable human
development must continue.
Despite the difficulties they
currently face, the Palestinian
people, like all the peoples of the
world, are entitled to live in
dignity within the embrace of
freedom, justice and peace.
º Palestinians have the right to
strive for sustainable human
development that expresses and
incorporates the unique cultural
and social characteristics of the
Palestinian way of life.
º The right to self-determination
must be fully realized before
sustainable human development
The Palestinian
people, like all the
peoples of the
world, are entitled
to live in dignity
within the embrace
of freedom, justice
and peace
Box (1 - 1) Quote from the speech of Mr. Yasser Arafat, President of the State of Palestine, at the sixth
conference of the Palestinian Legislative Council:
“We are determined to continue the reform process and internal development of our national institutions and
organizations of various responsibilities. I, from this forum, declare that our National Authority and I personally,
posit the issue of legislative and judicial reform and development at the helm of our priorities.  This includes
the law concerning the independence of the judicial system which has been proposed by the Legislative
Council, and is currently undergoing the three required sessions of legislative deliberation. Also under
deliberation is the law that will organize and harmonize the operations of our courts of law. Priority will be
given to all laws that are concerned with courts and judicial matters, as well as the law that forms a higher
judicial council invested with all authority and facilities necessary for proper performance. The rule of the law
and the independence of the judicial system are the hallmarks of our civilization and our state.  They underscore
our commitment to the principle of clearly delineated lines of governmental authority and enable all institutions
to work under the law. Therefore, we must ensure that the law receives the highest priority in reform and
development.
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can be achieved. The Palestinian
people have not yet secured their
right to self-determination in
accordance with international
declarations and UN resolutions.
º The establishment of a modern,
independent and democratic state
is a prerequisite for sustainable
human development in Palestine.
The Palestinian people are
entitled to live in security and
freedom within stable borders,
governed by institutions with a
comprehensive vision and
commitment to the human
development process based on
the principles of partnership,
institutional capacity building,
and justice for all.
º Future development efforts must
meet both the challenges and
opportunities that globalization
imposes and affords, and must
strictly adhere to recognized
international human law
conventions.
4Box (1 - 2) UN Resolutions:
- Resolution 194 (D-3,) issued on 11 December 1948, grants refugees the right
to return to their homes and live peacefully with their neighbors. It also
mandates fair compensation for those displaced persons who opt not to return.
The resolution proposed positing the city of Jerusalem under the active
supervision of the UN and called for disarmament within the boundaries of
the city.
- Resolution 242, issued on 22 November 1967, defined two primary principles.
The first principle states that the occupation of land acquired through warfare
is illegal.  The resolution called for the complete withdrawal of Israeli troops
from the land they occupied in the June 1967 war.  The second principle
asserts that the sovereignty of each state in the region must be recognized and
respected, and that each state has the right to political independence as well as
the right to live securely within internationally-recognized borders.
- Resolution 338, issued on 23 November 1973, called for an immediate truce
and demanded that both parties immediately declare a ceasefire and implement
Resolution 242.
- Resolution 3236 (D-29,) issued on 22 November 1974, included a declaration
by the General Assembly assuring that the rights of the Palestinians are non-
negotiable, especially the right to self-determination, the right of sovereignty
and national independence, and the right of refugees to return to the land from
which they were displaced. The General Assembly reiterated the resolution
several times, rendering it obligatory.
- In 1974, the PLO was invited to participate in the proceedings of the General
Assembly as an observer.
Development at
its core requires
freedom from the
shackles of
political, social
and economic
dominance
social and economic dominance.
º This report, like its predecessors,
strives to make a contribution to
the growing body of sustainable
and emancipatory development
knowledge in Palestine. The long
absence of functioning state
institutions created an
information gap that newly
established PNA ministries are
struggling to fill.  The PHDR also
endeavors to gather empirical
data concerning Palestinian
institutions in order to build a
º
Section Two:
Objectives and Target
Audience of the PHDR
   The PHDR covers the years 2000
and 2001, and chronicles an
important and sensitive period in
the history of the Palestinian
people. The report is shaped and
guided by the central premise
that sustainable human
development requires freedom
from the shackles of political,
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historical record for civil society.
º The PHDR recognizes that
societies learn from experience
and that this knowledge must be
employed constructively in
future development initiatives. It
is also designed to encourage the
creation of policies that will
foster a development atmosphere
in which the Palestinians can
concentrate their efforts on
building a civil society and on the
human development process in
general.
º The participatory methodology
of the PHDR encouraged
interactive dialogue regarding
development. It pushed political
parties to assume a proactive role
in the production of periodic
progress reports on human
development initiatives and
encouraged them to sponsor
workshops addressing these
issues. Widespread discussions
regarding sustainable human
development helped raise
awareness of the integral and
necessary connections between
the political and development
arenas.
º Despite attempts to isolate the
Palestinians and to stereotype
them as extremists and terrorists,
the PHDR positions Palestine as
one of several countries that
regularly produces human
development reports. The PHDR
also emphasizes the conviction
that sustainable human
development is a means to
achieve justice and dignity for
the Palestinians and all peoples
of the world. Many Palestinians
actively participate in open
discussions about sustainable
human development in Palestine
and throughout the world. The
PHDR gives voice to their
perspective and reinforces the
importance of their role in such
discussions.
º The PHDR catalogues the results
of a dynamic debate taking place
at all levels of society, and
attempts to present those results
objectively. The data and
analyses in the report are derived
from the discussions currently
underway within the Palestinian
society. The PHDR is but one
contribution from among many
worthy initiatives that deserve
attention. The data in the report
reflect the sum of professional,
public and local opinions;
hundreds of Palestinians have
offered their personal viewpoints
for inclusion in the PHDR
through workshops, research
projects, questionnaires and
newspaper articles, and
thousands participated via
opinion polls.
º The PHDR presents analysis that
strives for balanced honesty in
the interest of general national
welfare.  Its findings are set forth
with critical sympathy, and are
intended to strengthen the role of
the PNA and to support its many
achievements. The PHDR also
hopes to increase the visibility
and scope of both Palestinian
civil society and the private
sector, as well as to support
international institutions offering
aid to Palestinian human
development efforts.
  The target audiences of this report
are: the Palestinian people,
decision-makers at all levels, and
The PHDR
Provides a
Palestinian
prespective with
regard to
Development
efforts of the past
few years
6members of the public actively
involved in development work.
The participation of international
institutions, donor countries, and
non-governmental organizations
has had a great impact in shaping
the current Palestinian condition,
and this report will enable those
parties to more deeply understand
the Palestinian perspective with
regard to development efforts that
have taken place during the past
few years.
Box (1 - 3)  From the 1996 - 1997 PHDR:  De-development.
Palestinian Society is a victim of a process called “de-development.”  In general,
the forces which promote de-development seek to disrupt the development
process, with the eventual aim of halting it altogether.  De-development is
achieved by preventing a society from using is political and economic potential,
and by preventing rational structural transformation of the society through
indigenous means. In the case of Palestine, de-development mechanisms
include those originating from outside the society, the most important being
those employed by the Israeli occupation with its military mechanisms have
been extremely injurious to the process of social and political transformation.
From the 1998 - 1999 PHDR:  Sustainable human development is not
possible under occupation.
The transitional stage under which Palestinian society has been living since
1993 still continues.  Despite achievements that took place in recent years,
namely the establishment of the Palestinian National Authority (PNA) on
Palestinian land, and Palestinian takeover of responsibility for social and
economic development, the Israeli occupation continues to maintain its control,
in different ways and to varying degrees.  Over more than 85% of the lands of
the WBGS (about 90% of west Bank lands) remains under Israeli control, and
Israel continues to isolate the two regions from each other while closing off
Jerusalem to both regions.  Moreover, Israel continues to control natural
resources, including water and nature preserves.  Israel has also maintained is
military control over the borders and border crossings, thus perpetuating the
dependency of the Palestinian economy on the Israeli economy, and preventing
the building of an independent Palestinian economy, subject to responsible
and sound planning.  The achievement of sustainable human development in
Palestine is conditional on a crucial factor: putting an end to Israeli occupation
and Israeli control over Palestinian resources, and enabling the Palestinian
people to exercise their right to self-determination and the establishment of a
sovereign Palestinian state.
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Legitimate
governance
necessarily entails
wide participation
from all segments
of Palestinian
society
The Intifada and
its root causes
require
responsible
assessment of
performance since
1994 at all levels
Section Three:
Challenges and Tasks
Ahead
  The PHDR calls upon all
concerned local and international
parties to recognize that the
liberation of Palestinian society
from external control is a
prerequisite for the establishment
of a modern state. Only an
independent state can initiate a
comprehensive and balanced
development process that
broadens the range of freedoms
and choices available to the
Palestinian people.  The PHDR
also aims to strengthen the role
of the PNA in the development
process and emphasizes the need
for a strong national government
to deter any attempts to deprive
Palestinians of their rights in the
future.
º The second Palestinian Intifada,
which began on 28 September
2000, launched a public debate
about the current paths being
chosen to deal with political,
economic, and social matters. It
is clear that the most vital
precondition to the realization of
an acceptable level of human
development is broadened
opportunities for all Palestinians,
including the right to self-
determination and the right to
sustainable human development.
These goals cannot be achieved
under a military occupation
which systematically destroys
the capabilities of an entire
population.
º Sustainable human development
requires the presence of a
º
legitimate government with the
authority and resources that will
enable it to persevere in difficult
times.  Legitimate governance
necessarily entails wide
participation from all segments
of Palestinian society to help
erase the cumulative negative
impact of years of occupation.
º Emancipatory development
empowers a population to take
the initiative in defense of its
legal and civil rights and creates
a sense of  national belonging.
Striving for independence and
the establishment of an
independent Palestinian state are
certainly legitimate rights,
supported by international
resolutions.
º The Intifada and its root causes
require responsible assessment of
performance since 1994 at all
levels. Geographical, social and
administrative repercussions
from failed processes should be
the focus of such assessment in
order to catalyze a renewed
engagement in the struggle for
independence and the quest for
sustainable human development.
º Occupation has played a major
role in shaping the form and
content of development efforts in
Palestine. The emergence of the
Palestinian National Authority
(PNA), even if limited in its
scope of governance, has also
played an important role in the
development process. The
presence of a national authority
offered, for the first time in
Palestinian history, renewed
opportunity for public
participation in the struggle for
self-determination and the
8Box (1 - 5) Palestinian refugees
 The number of Palestinian refugees is estimated at 4.4 million persons living
in exile.  More than 1.5 million Palestinians live in Israel, 15% of them are
refugees. Registered refugees for the year 2000 totaled more than 3.8 million,
dispersed throughout the West Bank, the Gaza Strip, Jordan, Lebanon and
Syria. Most of the refugees are confined to 57 refugee camps. Numerous reports
have documented the dire social, economic, and political conditions of these
camps, especially those located in Lebanon.
Box (1 - 4)   Impediments to achieving peace and development:
- Israeli occupation of Palestinian land in violation of international resolutions.
- The inability of the Palestinians to exercise their right to self-determination
and development.
- The continuation of the Israeli-imposed siege of the Palestinian people,
destruction of the national infrastructure, obstruction of economic activity,
and the negative social and psychological ramifications of these actions.
- Deterioration of the overall economic condition, which has lowered living
standards and has led to an unprecedented increase in poverty.
- Inadequate internal institutional capacity building and the relative absence of
the rule of the law have increased levels of disaffection between the Palestinian
public and its institutions.
formulation of policies for
dynamic self-development.
These opportunities must be
maximized to the fullest extent
possible.
º The importance of the role of
non-governmental and private
sector organizations and its
impact on the development
process cannot be understated.
Civil society and its
representative organizations
interact with the local, regional
and international communities.
The regional and international
communities‘ ongoing provision
of financial aid to the
development process cannot be
ignored. The continuance of
Palestinian-Israeli conflict affects
the political outlook of
neighboring Arab nations as well
as the large Palestinian
communities that reside within
their borders.
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guarantee them freedom and an
independent state.
º The destruction of the Palestinian
infrastructure, which essentially
wiped out all Palestinian
governing institutions, and the
ongoing siege of Palestinian
cities, have resulted in
tremendous levels of human
suffering.  Moreover, repeated
attempts have been made to coax
the Palestinians to make further
concessions on their most
important issues, such as the
status of Jerusalem and the issues
of refugees and settlements. The
Intifada revealed clearly that the
Arab-Israeli conflict cannot be
resolved without a fair solution
for the Palestinian people,
awarding them the rights for
which they have struggled for
decades.
The Palestinians .. Continuing
efforts to build and develop
The Palestinians have worked
tirelessly during the past eight
years in an attempt to build an
independent state based on
democracy, the rule of the law,
and effective institutions.
Although the policies and
methods of occupation are
designed to extinguish those
Section Four:
 The Palestinian Intifada,
Characteristics and
Features
This section presents a short
analysis of the most notable
characteristics and features of the
Palestinian Intifada and the Israeli
occupation.
The results of a failed peace
process:
º Undoubtedly, the Palestinian
Intifada resulted at least in part
from a failed peace process.
Palestinians have never been
granted the rights promised to
them throughout the course of
political negotiations, including
the right to pursue sustainable
human development that would
Box (1 - 6) Isolated Jerusalem:
   Israel continues to enforce a policy that prohibits Palestinians from reaching
Jerusalem and its religious sites despite several Security Council resolutions
that have declared any attempt to change the status of Jerusalem unlawful. On
28 October 2001, Israeli forces seized and closed several service-related,
educational, political and research institutions, such as the Orient House, the
Arab Studies Organization, the Arab Chamber of Commerce and Trade, and
the Higher Council of Tourism. Others include the Palestinian Center for Small
Business, the Jerusalem Relief Agency, the Palestinian Prisoners Agency, the
Palestinian Political Prisoners and Former Prisoners Organization, and other
PNA institutions serving Jerusalem in accordance with ratified Palestinian-
Israeli agreements.
The Palestinians
have worked
tirelessly during
the past eight
years in an
attempt to build
an independent
state based on
democracy
The Palestinian
Intifada resulted
at least in part
from a failed
peace process
10
Poverty threatens
increasing
numbers of
Palestinians, and
has dramatically
increased levels of
reliance on
charitable
organizations
High fertility rates
lead to levels of
population
growth that often
exacerbate poverty
and
unemployment
dreams, national aspirations for an
independent, modern state remain
strong, and the justice of the
Palestinian cause will ultimately
result in the realization of that
objective.
Deterioration in human
development indicators
º The deteriorating political
situation has led to
unprecedented regression in
economic conditions, as
demonstrated by increasing
unemployment and poverty rates
extending to every segment of
society. Many Palestinian
families have lost their sole
breadwinners, and poverty
threatens increasing numbers of
Palestinians. Levels of reliance
on the United Nations Relief and
Works Agency (UNRWA) and
other charitable organizations
funded by Arab and international
countries have dramatically
increased, especially in rural
locales. Concurrently, the
phenomenon of begging,
especially among women and
children, has also risen markedly.
º The closures enforced on
Palestinian areas have negatively
impacted school attendance, with
checkpoints making the travel of
students from remote areas
increasingly difficult and
denying them the right to seek
an education. Also, the physical
occupation of many school
buildings by soldiers and the
shelling of school grounds have
led many families to believe that
schools are unsafe. A total of 163
students have been killed and
several elementary and
secondary schools have been
bombarded. Many university
students have been unable to
continue their academic studies
for the same reasons.
º The expanding economic crisis
and rising levels of poverty
prohibit many families from
sending their children to school.
Worsening economic conditions
have led to increased school
dropout rates as children are
forced to work to help support
their families. Instances of
negative social phenomena such
as child labor are on the rise.
Children are now at risk for job-
related injuries and exploitation,
and are subject to pressures that
can result in socially deviant
behavior such as crime and drug
abuse, especially among males.
º As for girls, increased school
dropout rates may lead to an
increase in early marriages, a
situation which frequently
deprives young girls of many of
their rights. Also, early marriage
often correlates with a rise in
serious health and social issues
related to teenage pregnancy.
High fertility rates lead to levels
of population growth that often
exacerbate poverty and
unemployment. In this scenario,
competition for already scarce
resources builds up and further
impedes progress towards
sustainable human development.
º The prevailing political
conditions have led to
deterioration in health care and
educational services, both
qualitatively and quantitatively.
The unprecedented rise in
poverty levels and the limited
resources of the Ministry of
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Social Affairs prevented the
Ministry from offering adequate
assistance to the needy.
Similarly, the effectiveness of
local charitable organizations
which rely heavily on foreign aid
also regressed. The Ministry of
Local Government practice of
dictating the appointments of
local council heads has
decreased the public level of trust
in those organizations. Finally,
decreased per capita income has
resulted in far fewer voluntary
contributions to support the work
of charitable organizations.
º The strength of social and family
ties has increased, as have
contributions by Palestinians
living abroad to cover the
expenses of families or
university students. A large sum
of direct financial aid was
donated by Palestinians abroad
to improve living conditions in
Palestine.
ºClosure of the Israeli labor
market to Palestinian workers
has driven many of those
workers to accept jobs in the
local market at very low rates of
pay that they would have rejected
under normal market conditions.
Many of them have started
independent endeavors, mostly
vending at checkpoints or
driving public transit vehicles on
treacherous roads to carry
passengers around the
checkpoints. It should be noted
that these types of business
enterprises are unregulated,
unpredictable and ultimately,
unsustainable.
º Women's participation in the
work force ebbed as men who are
no longer able to work in Israel
take up available jobs in the local
market. Women are left with the
choice of staying at home or
accepting menial jobs for low
pay. Unskilled laborers, owners
of small businesses, women and
children are the segments of
society most harmed by Israeli
closures.
ºThe number of Palestinian
casualties exceeded 1,000 in the
first 15 months of the Intifada.
More than 25,000 Palestinians
have been injured, 2,000 of
whom are permanently disabled.
The huge increase in the number
of disabled persons will clearly
impact the effectiveness of
existing rehabilitation programs.
ºThe Israeli occupation is leaving
psychological scars on the
Palestinian population. Many
individuals have sought
treatment for unusual levels of
emotional distress and chronic or
temporary states of depression.
Children are among the most
deeply affected in this regard.
Daily images of continuing
violence translate into a
decreased sense of security, as
parents seem no longer able to
protect them. Also, children have
lost confidence in their ability to
solve their own problems, with
increasing instances of violence
among children a growing issue.
Children are
among the most
deeply affected by
the ongoing
violence
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1.  For more on the condition of children and the challenges facing them, see: Thahab Misleh,
paper contributed to the Human Development Report 2002.
2.  Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics Survey: Effects of Israeli Measures on Palestinian
Children, Women and Families 2001, Ramallah, July  2001.
3.   DSP poll # 6, February 2002.
Box (1 - 7)  The Psychological Effects of the Siege and Violence1
   A field study conducted by the Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics between
11 April-15 May 2001 on a random sample of families revealed that 10% of
Palestinians were subjected to direct attacks in various forms at the hands of
Israeli forces (35% of those attacked were females and 65% were males).
Children made up 32% of the total number of people attacked.
  The survey showed that 41% of  children between the ages of five and 15
experienced uncontrollable bouts of crying during the Intifada and that 45%
felt "depressed".  A survey poll conducted by the Development Studies
Programme at Birzeit University (DSP) on 10 February 2001 regarding the
effects of the Israeli siege on Palestinian life showed that almost 70% of
children between the ages of four and 14 in the West Bank suffer psychological
disorders as a result of Israeli measures, rising to 72% in the Gaza Strip. Also,
78% of women surveyed said that the state of war and the siege have caused
them to experience unusual levels of emotional distress. In February 2002,
another survey by the DSP revealed that 66% of children in the West Bank
and 74% in the Gaza Strip suffer clinical psychological disorders.
   In addition, 51% of Palestinians reported being exposed to humiliation and
abuse, 42% were physically abused, and 20% reported their homes and other
property were damaged by the Israeli forces3.
º The displacement of Palestinian
families has led to intensified
economic, social and
psychological problems. Many
families have been forced to
abandon their homes to escape
incessant Israeli shelling or have
lost their homes altogether to
demolition. Also, several families
were broken up; their members
unable to gather even for religious
or family occasions.
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Box (1 - 8) Women and children: the victims of a failed peace process4
  Despite the poverty under which the Palestinians live, many are coping with the crisis in ways
that may prove to be positive or negative in the long run. One of the mechanisms employed to
alleviate poverty is the encouragement of uneducated or minimally-educated women and
children to work or seek assistance, with the support of male family members. The number of
women working as house maids or begging on the streets has increased noticeably, but the
real danger lies in the increase in the number of children begging or vending on the streets.
Farmers interviewed have stated that they have been forced to replace young male laborers
with children to cut costs.
  Although child labor is widely viewed as a threat to the future of the entire society, it appears
to be the only available way for a growing number of families to secure sustenance. Interviews
with women and children revealed that fathers, especially those previously working in Israel,
force them to look for work they themselves would not accept, considering it degrading for a
man.
  Women have employed other mechanisms to cope with poverty, such as cutting back on food
and clothing expenditures. Several women said they no longer use meat in cooking, and
others indicated they use firewood instead of gas stoves in order to save for more important
necessities, which has in turn encouraged women in remote villages to cut and sell firewood.
In Gaza, women are making mud ovens and selling them.
  Wives of men that used to work in Israel mentioned that they sold their jewelry to cover
family expenses and after that, came to rely on family aid or assistance from institutions. As
for clothing, many women said they no longer buy new articles, but resort instead to the old
habit of borrowing from sisters or neighbors when a special occasion arises. There is also a
growing trend toward early marriage and interfamilial marriage to cut family expenditures
and to save on wedding costs.
Achieving institutionalization
and participation
º Several social, economic,
institutional and cultural
phenomena surfaced or have
increased noticeably in the past
two years. These phenomena
serve as indicators that
Palestinian society possesses
certain behavioral resources that
might be capitalized upon in an
institutional manner and in the
context of clear and just
legislation. Examples of those
strengths are the ability to solve
problems, a high degree of
flexibility, and a marked
resourcefulness in facing unusual
4. This material was prepared by Itimad Mhana, member of the PHDR Advisory Committee, and is based upon data collected to
prepare a study on poverty that included hundreds of Palestinian families. The families were interviewed in order to understand
their comprehension and definition of poverty and the ways to handle it. The study was conducted in conjunction with the
UNDP,  the Ministry of Planning and International Cooperation, and the British Development Agency.
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challenges in a short span of time.
º Various data gathered during the
Intifada revealed the importance
Palestinians place on the
concepts of democracy and free
elections. The majority of
Palestinians are calling for
institutional change, especially at
the local government level.
Public, decentralized
participation in governance,
management and tax collection
could be effectively engaged to
achieve Palestinian rights. It is
obvious that participation
requires potent institutions and a
leadership in possession of a
vision, a strategy and defined
institutional standards to achieve
these goals.
º The Intifada also uncovered
weaknesses that must be
corrected, such as the failure of
leadership to communicate with
the people and the inability or
lack of preparedness of some
PNA institutions to help society
to resolve daily economic and
social problems.
º The Intifada led to a rallying of
the Palestinian people around
their cause and its objectives,
beginning with the
implementation of international
resolutions. Nonetheless,
national unity remains a social
rather than an institutional
concept, thereby preventing the
participation of large segments of
society. Among the factors
contributing to flagging levels of
participation was the widespread
use of violence.
º Vocal criticism against practices
that are in discord with
Palestinian aspirations such as
human development, human
has been weak. Civil society
institutions and human rights
organizations for the most part
stood silent, unable to criticize the
use of violence against civilians,
choosing instead to promote the
rationalization that the
continuation of occupation and
failure to honor international
resolutions were responsible for
violence.
º The PNA focus on the Palestinian
political agenda as the highest
priority resulted in the lack of
defined and coordinated
economic and social programs.
The absence of leadership and
direction led to a high degree of
chaos within governmental
organizations. Many agencies
ceased to function altogether. The
situation was also reflected in the
failed performance of
international institutions, which
were restricted by measures
enforced by the occupation
government or those which
existed primarily to advance their
own agendas.
º The absence of a long-term
development vision and the lack
of clear economic, social, and
cultural policies led to
widespread discord and the
exhaustion of resources. It also
served to weaken the bonds
between the public and its
representatives at various tiers of
government, such as the
Palestinian Legislative Council
and local authorities.
Regression in the rule of law
º The declaration of a state of
emergency by the PNA following
the eruption of the Intifada led to
regression in the implementation
Widespread use of
violence led to
lower rates of
participation
Participation
requires potent
institution and a
leadership in
possession of a
vision, a strategy
and defined
institutional
standards
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While removing
occupation is
necessary,
democracy and
sound institution-
building are
equally so
The weakness of
PNA institutions
in the face of
external
aggression
decreased people's
confidence in
them
Some institutions
stood completely
paralyzed in the
face of the crisis,
which will
necessitate serious
examination in
the future
created a sense of general distrust
in the rule of law. The siege and
a shortage of judges led to an
enormous backlog of cases in the
legal system, further weakening
the public's faith in its
effectiveness. Distrust of the
legal system has spilled over into
the banking system as well.  A
program must be created to
specifically deal with this social
phenomenon, and must be
incorporated into the cumulative
human development vision.
The regression of the role of
civil society
º The vital role played by non-
governmental organizations
(NGOs) was clearly underscored
during the Intifada, especially
those organizations offering
social, relief, and health services;
those specializing in expediting
agricultural distribution; and
those organizing cultural
activities. At the same time, some
institutions stood completely
paralyzed in the face of the crisis,
which will necessitate serious
examination in the future.
º The second Intifada was
accompanied by regression in the
performance and credibility of
political groups that comprise the
PNA and especially those that
call for “democracy, equality and
human rights,” while religious
and conservative parties seemed
to gain ground. This change
could seriously impact not only
the political direction of the
country, but also make the
process of implementing needed
changes in  the social, cultural
and democratic arenas more
difficult.
of the rule of law.  The weakness
of PNA institutions in the face
of external aggression decreased
public confidence in these
institutions and gave rise to
contradictory perceptions of the
concept of authority. On the one
hand, Israel had control of the
situation on the ground,
preventing the Palestinians from
leading normal lives, and on the
other hand, the people expected
the PNA to solve all their
problems, even those caused by
occupation.
º The convoluted Palestinian
perception of authority in any
capacity resulted from
continuing Israeli authority over
occupied land and was bolstered
as existing Palestinian
institutions failed to offer a
robust alternative in the areas of
personal security and public
services. Changing the political
status quo by ending occupation
and establishing a strong and
independent national authority
will lay the foundation for
reeducating the Palestinian
people regarding the role of the
state and public's relationship
with it with regard to rights and
duties. And while removing
occupation is necessary,
democracy and sound
institution-building are equally
so in reinforcing the meaning of
a state, especially during the time
in which the foundations of a
new state are being constructed.
º The inability of the Palestinian
security apparatus to protect the
Palestinians from danger and the
ineffectiveness of Palestinian
law enforcement bodies has
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º In the context of the current
crisis, the Palestinian political
leadership failed to offer any
meaningful political, social or
economic programs to the people
and have provided little active
guidance in addressing the
multitude of day-to-day
difficulties that the Palestinians
face.  The concerns of the people
were not relayed to the PNA,
although some political
representatives have expressed
sincere concern for and interest
in the need to integrate political
and development efforts.
Chaos in funding
development in light of Israeli
measures
º The connection between funding
and political agendas has
recently been made clear,
especially in the case of the
development process, as some
donors fulfilled their promises
and others failed to do so. This
uncertainty with regard to
funding streams has affected the
Palestinian political agenda and
posited great pressure on the
PNA in the negotiation process.
Some donors simply did not
understand the effects of the
situation on the ground, although
they did make attempts to amend
their programs and working
mechanisms to accommodate the
new realities. However,
increasing Arab financial support
played a major role in keeping
PNA institutions afloat and in
relieving some of the poverty
introduced by the siege and
destruction of the Palestinian
economic infrastructure.
Some donors
simply did not
understand the
effects of the
situation on the
ground
º Several questions arose regarding
donor funding from both Arab
and Western nations. Arab
funding, although vital to the
survival of the PNA, was random
and occasionally spent to further
the objectives of various political
agendas. This situation led to the
weakening of some PNA
institutions and the strengthening
of others. In addition, some
donors were more interested in
media attention than in poverty
relief and development of the
Palestinian society. Concerns
were also voiced regarding fair
distribution of international aid,
especially to remote and
neglected areas.
Section Five:
Report Methodology :
 A Participatory Approach
The preparation of the PHDR
involved the broad-based
participation of many segments of
Palestinian society. The following
mechanisms were employed in the
report preparation process:
Active partnership in steering the
preparation process was executed
by the three principal partners: the
Development Studies Programme
at Birzeit University (DSP), the
Department of Human
Development at the Ministry of
Planning and International
Cooperation (MOPIC), and the
Human Development Unit at the
United Nations Development
Program (UNDP). The
Development Studies Programme
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supervised the production of the
report. The DSP conducted
research and sponsored
organizational meetings of the
research and consultation
committees in order to arrive at a
qualitative, objective and balanced
final report. MOPIC assumed
responsibility for integration of the
principle of human development
into the national planning process
and also into the operations of
other ministries. MOPIC also
coordinated the activities of the
ministerial committee.  The UNDP
assumed the tasks of securing
funding for the project and
providing technical support and
consultation throughout the
process.
The Technical Advisory
Committee is a scientific
committee comprised of select
Palestinian scholars. The
Committee bore the responsibility
of monitoring the quality of the
report for content and objectivity.
The Committee members
presented papers that were
invaluable to the preparation of the
report, and they actively
participated in discussions and
follow-up efforts.
The Ministerial Committee
included 18 representatives of
Palestinian ministries from the
West Bank and Gaza Strip, who
Box (1 - 9) Strengths of the Palestinian people
- The inherent justice of their struggle and the legitimacy of their claims, which
are supported by international protocol and UN resolutions.
- The wealth of experience derived from the tasks of nation-building, and a
willingness to learn and benefit from the experiences of other Arab nations
and the international community.
- The formation of their own representative governing body (the PNA), and its
gradual transformation into an internationally recognized state government.
- The solidarity and support of other Arab nations and the international
community for the Palestinian struggle.
- The creation of an effective government infrastructure attuned to the principles
of human development.
- The strength of the experience acquired through the pursuit of sustainable
human development in an unpredictable and difficult environment.
- The relative strength of Palestinian civil society and its role in the development
process and the protection of achievements.
- The advances made in achieving transparency and accountability in Palestinian
civil institutions.
- The constructive growth of the education sector and the opportunities it affords
for future investment.
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discussed the report and reviewed
its content.  They provided insight
and perspective on the substance
and content of the report.
Workshops were conducted with
representatives from many
segments of Palestinian society.
More than 30 workshops were
organized, attended by more than
800 experts representing hundreds
of Palestinian institutions in the
West Bank and Gaza Strip. The
workshops discussed the central
themes of the PHDR, as well as its
objectives and priorities.5 The
workshops also served to formulate
the research plan for each chapter.
Box (1 - 10) Highlights of the results of selected workshops held in conjunction
with the preparation of the PHDR
Workshops attended by political parties:
- The need to issue a periodic report on the subject of sustainable human development
in Palestine is evident, as supported by the events of the Intifada.
- Increased attention must be given to health and social affairs in light of growing
poverty levels, as well as to key economic sectors such as agriculture.
- It is important to heed privacy issues when issuing the report; care must be taken
with the use of primary indicators to avoid subjective interpretation.
- It is necessary to reconcile the sometimes competing objectives of the political
struggle and other key initiatives, such as democracy, the nation-building process
and the rule of law.
Workshops with Palestinian women, in coordination with the General Union
of Palestinian Women and the Women‘s Affairs Committee:
- Focus on internal issues and emphasize equality between men and women, the
rule of law and achieving democracy.  Shift institutional priorities from relief to
development.
- Bolster a sense of individual initiative among the people by developing personal,
social and economic strengths.  Reinforce the concepts of strong public
management and raise the level of ability to adapt to various conditions.
Workshops in coordination with the Palestinian Network of Non-governmental
Organizations and the Union of Charitable Organizations:
- Focus on individual initiative and empowerment as means to achieve development.
- Shine light on primary concerns, such as participation and advocacy of democracy,
and furnish options to the people at times of elections.
5. A list of the workshops is available in Appendix (6).
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- Work to ingrain the concepts of self-reliance and the development of personal
abilities.
Workshops attended by institutions working in refugee camps:
- Obstacles continue to impede the formation of a meaningful relationship between
the development process and the interests of refugees.
- The developmental dimension inside refugee camps is absent as a result of the
political nature of the issue of refugees. The report must discuss the standing of
Palestinian refugees and ways to reconcile the national and political issues of
refugees in a manner consistent with their rights.
Workshop attended by institutions working in the human rights field:
- Include in the report a vision for the formation of new relationships that reconciles
human rights with the rule of law, and the rule of law with the judicial authority,
especially in light of the continuing dominance of tribal law and the undue powers
of the security apparatus in place of the judicial system.
- Discuss of the meaning of justice as a developmental pillar that neutralizes tribal
favoritism and political and social nepotism.  Expand upon development principles
that are concerned with the legal system and the equal distribution of justice
among the various segments of society.
Workshop with representatives from Palestinian media outlets:
- The report must include a message to encourage the pursuit of a better life that
would reflect on all societal institutions. To that end, a clear strategy must be
devised regarding promotion of development work in Palestine.
- Focus on the Arab and Islamic dimensions in the funding of the development of
Palestine and exercise care to guarantee that international relations concerned
with funding be clear and calculated.
- Focus on the importance of the humanitarian media message, which should be
organized, coordinated and well-documented.
Workshop with institutions specializing in the care of children:
- Extend the report‘s vitality by paying attention to qualitative studies and expressing
statistics not merely as such, but a meaningful analysis of the numbers and the
matters they address.  Integrate the issues and rights of children in various chapters
of the report in recognition of the importance of this segment of society and its
vital connection with the principle of sustainable development planning.
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Children's letters: Twenty-eight
Palestinian children wrote letters
to known personalities and
institutions that have an effect on
the children's economic, social and
political lives. The letters express
only the opinions of their writers.
Box (1 - 11) Selected quotes from Palestinian children's letters regarding
human development:
To Kofi Anan, Secretary-General of the United Nations:
“...I write to you this letter to ask that you consider the Palestinian cause with
more attention and pressure the Israeli government and its Prime Minister
into honoring agreements signed by the two sides and international
resolutions.”
Ahmed Waleed Hasan, 14, Nablus
To the members of the Palestinian Legislative Council:
“...I am a resident wishing to learn the nature of your work. You have promised
the people so much-we will...and will...and will...and will do! I want to ask
what it is you have done....? I see the siege and the poverty and the fear and
am still patiently waiting. I know you condemn and admonish and explain
things to officials, and no one listens. What should we do?”
Dina Sharaf Bakr, 13, Qalqielya
To the Minister of Education:
“...I hear that physical punishment is banned at schools, but we are being beaten
and humiliated if we forget something or the like...is it true that beating is
banned? And if it is, are you aware of what is happening at schools? Also,
there are too many of us in one classroom; students cannot take in the material.
In addition, why has headwear been forced upon female students when donning
is the choice of the girl? I hope you will examine these issues and reconsider
them.”
Areej Abu Huloub, 15, Gaza Strip
Opinion polls: The DSP worked
to amplify the voices of the
Palestinians, especially
communities on the periphery,
through opinion polls that
interviewed 8,400 Palestinians of
varying age groups and from
different locations regarding topics
discussed in the report.
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Box (1 - 12) Wide support of the process of reform
- 81% of Palestinians believe that reform within the institutions of the PNA is
necessary.
- 97% of Palestinians believe in the need to fight corruption, employ on the
basis of merit, and achieve an active and just judicial system.
- 89% of Palestinians support the use of democracy in decision-making, and a
similar percentage called for wider public participation in formulating and
executing government policies.
- 92% of Palestinians believe that the role of municipalities and village councils
should be more active.6
Research: A team of qualified
professionals wrote specific
research papers, some of which are
included in the report while others
were incorporated in its
preparation.
Case studies: The research team,
in cooperation with the field
research crew, prepared 20 case
studies regarding the living
conditions of the Palestinians,
especially the disadvantaged and
those living in remote areas. The
case studies concentrated on the
quality of life, opportunities
available to Palestinians, and their
perspectives. The data revealed
great regression in human rights as
defined by international law.7 The
importance of public participation
in discussions regarding the social
development was also revealed. In
this area, the opinions of the public
proved to be responsible and
6. Results of an opinion poll, Development Studies Programme; 18 February 2001.
7. A list of the case studies is available in Appendix (3)
8.  The articles were handed out at the conference announcing the PHDR.
thoughtful.
Expert opinion: Twelve experts
wrote summaries evaluating and
expanding upon the most important
priorities in their fields of expertise.
The papers were integrated in
various parts of the report and were
distributed at the conference
announcing the release of the
PHDR.
Committee and expert review:
After examination by all concerned
committees, the report was
evaluated by developmental
experts from a wide range of areas.
The media: The PHDR, its
implications, its usefulness and
utility, and its related activities
were discussed in local newspapers
and on several television and radio
shows.8
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Box ( 1 -13) From articles addressing human development:
-   From the article “The Palestinian Human Development Report and What
is Needed of Fateh Before, During and After Statehood.”9
 “So the upcoming Human Development Report evades the usual traps of
repetition and redundancy, I call for surrendering generalizations and instead
allowing for the exploration of specifics in the Palestinian civil society burdened
by occupation.  We must allow research to deduce the needs of the Palestinian
society in its current state.  Awareness leads to the proper execution of plans,
beginning with simplicity of vision and planting of the seeds for the assimilation
of sustainable development plans... In order to guarantee success for sustainable
human development, Fateh must work to unite human resources and announce
the formation of a team entrusted with designing that role (the role in sustainable
human development.)”
-  From the article “Preliminary Reading into the Structure of the Palestinian
Human Development Report 2000-2001”10:
“The importance of this report lies in recommendations and deductions that could
come from it, but most importantly, those recommendations must have execution
mechanisms in order to be of tangible value. Thus, it is important that some
benchmarks be established to measure the extent to which the recommendations
and their execution were achieved in the next PHDR.”
- From the article “Regarding the Vitality of Empowerment and
Development”11:
“Many Palestinian voices with different directions agree on the importance of
empowerment and the bolstering of development in anticipation of the long
battle, underscoring the need for the activities undertaken by the Development
Studies Programme at Birzeit University. The DSP is preparing the third
Palestinian Human Development Report with a primary focus on the issue of
empowerment-a word that still carries influence in our current condition.”
Difficulties:
Preparing the PHDR was not a
simple undertaking under the
current conditions. It was not easy
to monitor field changes in the
political arena and their effect on
economic and social life; the
9.   Naser Damj, Fateh Supreme Council, Al-Ayyam Newspaper, 9 May 2001.
10. Ahmed Majdalani, Al-Ayyam Newspaper, 2 May 2001.
11. Muhsen Abu Ramadan, Civil Work (monthly publication issued by the Palestinian Network of
Non-Governmental Organizations), 30 April 2002.
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changes were radical, almost daily
in frequency, and certainly not
patterned. Also, it was difficult to
speak about human development
under the weight of the deterioration
of the basic infrastructure of society
and the subjection of the rights of
the people and their collective
future to danger. Nevertheless,
those involved in preparing the
PHDR and many others gave voice
to the message that resistance,
building, and stopping the
deterioration should be joined in
one complete effort to achieve
emancipation on the political, social
and economic levels.
The difficult conditions require
larger efforts and the continuation
of deliberation, discussion and
establishment of plans. Sustainable
human development is a long-term
endeavor comprising individual
initiatives whose specific goals and
achievements are viewed in the
aggregate.  Each component of the
human development effort is critical
to the effort to secure a better future
for the children of Palestine.
Preparing the PHDR was a
challenging attempt to reach an
understanding of a highly complex
situation.  The PHDR confronts and
documents honestly many
contradictions, a task which
required great determination and
devotion. A multitude of challenges
arose from the political status quo
and the suffocation of Palestinian
society as a whole, including
universities, research centers and
governmental and non-
governmental organizations. The
siege and reoccupation of parts of
Palestinian cities impeded work on
the PHDR. Following are some of
the most notable obstacles:
1. The inability of the members of
the Advisory and Ministerial
Committees in the West Bank and
the Gaza Strip to meet to discuss
the PHDR and exchange opinions
about the content and focus of
their respective contributions.
Further, several members of each
Committee were unable to attend
meetings, denied entry by soldiers
at checkpoints. Electronic mail
was used extensively, and later
video-conferencing was employed
to unite the members.
2. It was difficult for research crews
to confer or even reach their posts
at appointed times. The majority
of the researchers were incapable
of reaching Jerusalem, home of
the UNDP headquarters. The
MOPIC building and offices of the
DSP were occupied, and a curfew
was enforced for an extended
period of time. Crews had to meet
outside headquarters on several
occasions.
3. The closure of the road to Birzeit
made use of the university library
and other venues impossible and
obstructed managerial and
financial matters associated with
the PHDR.
4. Field work was fraught with
danger at many times, and
amendments to work plans were
needed to enable field researchers
to reach their homes at a suitable
hour after work.  One of our field
researchers was struck by a
rubber-coated steel bullet while
returning home from work, .
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Box (1 - 14) Cultural life despite the obstacles
The city of Ramallah, with its many cultural and artistic centers, produced
hundreds of cultural events (exhibitions and literature and poetry forums,)
artistic affairs (plays and films,) and activities for children and youth. Many
of the cultural and artistic events were organized by non-governmental
organizations in public spaces and courtyards, where Palestinian and
international art and theater groups performed. The activities were patronized
by thousands, despite the siege and air raids the city endured. In spite of the
importance of such activities under the current circumstances, they were
confined to Ramallah.
   necessitating hospitalization, and
others were subjected to physical
abuse or harassment. Regardless,
we were able to conduct field
research in 75 Palestinian
locations, including villages,
neglected refugee camps, and
locales under curfew.
5. Conflicting data at times led to
difficulty in selecting statistics
that best represent the changes
and losses incurred by the
Palestinian society in recent
times. The multiplicity of
information resources, especially
regarding economic loss and the
number of victims were the
primary motivation behind using
additional means of achieving
accuracy before representing the
available data.
  Despite it all, the participants
were determined to fulfill their
tasks and produced the PHDR in
 spite of the obstacles and
frustration. The report came to
represent the steadfastness of a
people that turn challenges into
hope and yearn for a better future
for their children. The message of
the PHDR is a civilized, humane
one, positing Palestine among the
ranks of nations that place human
rights above all other
considerations. The PHDR strives
to present Palestinian society for
what it is: a society that embraces
peace and life and strives to achieve
equality between men and women;
a society that works to integrate its
neglected segments, including
persons with special needs, the
elderly, and the underprivileged in
a development process that they
created and from which they will
benefit; and a society that longs for
freedom and excels at all aspects
of life-intellectual, artistic and
literary.
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1. Several studies prepared by Palestinian and international institutions provide additional
information on this topic.
Forward
This chapter is a study of the environment that defines the
possibilities of the development process in Palestine.  Analysis
of the most significant environmental indicators serves to
illustrate development conditions in the West Bank and Gaza
Strip during the past two years and to place them within a
historical context.  This chapter also enumerates the external
factors and obstacles that endanger the Palestinian
development process and threaten it with potentially imminent
collapse. The attainment of human development goals, as
defined by the United Nations, is a process that assumes added
dimensions in a country under military occupation. It is also
a process which requires correlation between a society‘s dual
pursuit of the right to self-determination and its quest for
sustainable human development.
Section One looks at the overall deterioration in Palestinian
human development indicators for the period of time covered
by the PHDR.  The second section of this chapter examines
the impact of occupation as a hindrance to the development
process and in the regression of development indicators.
Section Three discusses relationship between international
funding and Palestinian development, and the fourth section
provides an overview of various aspects of Arab-Palestinian
relations. The fifth section evaluates the performance of the
PNA in the development arena during the past eight years,
specifically with regard to its handling of available resources.
Sections Six and Seven offer observations on the role of the
Palestinian private sector and civil society in development.1
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Section One:
Deterioration of Human
Development Indicators
The primary components of the
Human Development Index are: 1)
living standards as measured by
income, 2) health standards as
represented by average life
expectancy at birth, and 3)
educational standards as
represented by illiteracy and
school attendance rates.
Examination of these components
reveals both qualitative and
quantitative deterioration in every
area. Before presenting the PHDR
findings in its analysis of Human
Development Index indicators, the
following must be noted:
1. The destruction that has befallen
the Palestinian political,
economic and social
environment during the past two
years cannot be adequately
expressed in strictly numerical
terms. We recognize that
statistics cannot effectively
capture the impact of recent
events on the collective human
psyche. The current regressive
trends are long-term in nature
and indicate widespread damage
to the infrastructure of
Palestinian society. The
destruction of the hard-won
accomplishments of the past few
years will obviously impact the
pace of future development
efforts. Deteriorating living
standards, a decrease in per
capita income, inadequate health
care, early marriage, and
psychological oppression
generally result in shortened life
expectancy, increased child
mortality rates, and a general
retrogression in health standards,
all of which are expected to
become evident in the near term.
2. A similar prediction can be
applied to educational standards.
School dropout rates are on the
rise. Educational funding
allotments have decreased.
People are increasingly unable to
pay taxes that fund the building
of schools and support education.
These trends, coupled with the
general degeneration of the
economic sector, are expected
dramatically increase Palestinian
illiteracy rates in the coming
years.
 3. Current data may not reflect the
true scope and nature of the
regression of Palestinian human
development. Data cannot
accurately depict conditions in a
community that has been almost
completely stripped of its civil
rights as defined by international
law. Statistical institutions have
been unable to agree on data
quantifying the decrease in
average life expectancy and
illiteracy levels. This situation
can be partially attributed to the
difficulty of gathering data under
the present circumstances.
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Box (2 - 1) A Palestinian gender index: A larger gap than expected
   Within a study prepared by the Development Studies Programme for unifem, a group of Palestinian
researchers suggested gender index by which to gauge the gap between men and women. After
intensive deliberation, the group produced an indix comprising four basic indicators that reveal
the gap between men and women. The survey used for the study revealed the following:
* Early marriage is the most significant problem: from amid the indicators, early marriage was
selected as the best indicator to represent the conditions of Palestinian women. The choice was
not surprising; early marriage is, as mentioned earlier, releated to with several other indicators.
Early marriage leads to a series of regressions in the lives of women, their health and education
conditions, participation in political activity (elections and decision-making,) and their economic
participation (level of participation in the labor force) This indicator also carries general social
repercussions connected with fertility rates, population increase, and the health and educational
standing of family.
* Education as necessary for the advancement of women: There was great attention paid to
educational indicators in response to voices that stress the role of education in achieving a higher
degree of equality between men and women. Among the top five indicators, three were educational:
enrolment rates; illiteracy rates, which are higher among women than among men; and the level
of dropping out of school abandonment, especially in the secondary level of schooling.
* Economic participation: Among 11 indicators considered of priority, four were of economic
nature, especially those concerning discrimination against women in the labor force, which rated
third in the list of 11. Next came the indicator of unemployment rates, and in seventh place the
discrimination in salaries between men and women and the poverty rates in families headed by
women.
* Political participation: There was great focus on women's participation in Legislative Council
elections, in which the type of participation was not defined according to actual participation,
voting, or candidacy. There was also focus on the representation of women in top government
positions and in Councils.
   The following table shows that the gap is severest at the level of women's participation in elections
as the gap is at  -0.959; early marriage, - 0.941 (meaning that 94 out of 100 steps must be climbed
to achieve equality between men and women.) As for participation in the labor market, the gap
registered - 0.826, dipping in the area of education to - 0.604 (60 steps needed to achieve equality.)
Based on the results of proposed index, it appears that women's march toward equality with men
does not exceed a fifth of the road (0.177) leaving a distance of about 82 steps on a scale of 100
to reach equality. Clearly, what the Palestinian community achieved in the area of equality between
men and women in the field of education is the clearest; according to enorllment in higher education
indicator, women have crossed 40 percent of the road, while in the in labor market they only
crossed 18 steps.
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Early marriage 19999 36.9% 2.2% -0.941 0.85 0.267 -0.251
Participation in the labor 12.3% 70.7% -0.826 0.77 0.242 -0.199
 force 1999
University education 2.5% 6.3% -0.604 0.78 0.245 -0.147
Participation in elections 3.7% 96.3% -0.959 0.7 0.236 -0.266
Total value of gap  - 0.823
Value of gender index (1 - 0.823)  0.177
2. The Palestinian Independent Commission for Human Rights, Fifth Annual Report (1999)
Ramallah, 2000.
Table (2-1) A gender index for the West Bank and Gaza Strip
Women
Adjusted
weight
Gender
gap
Nominal
weight
Value of
contribution
to the index
MenIndictor
signing of the Oslo Accord in 1993.
The occupation continues to isolate
the West Bank from the Gaza Strip
and Jerusalem from both. The
internal and external siege imposed
on the West Bank and Gaza Strip
segregates cities and villages from
one another. It also prohibits the
travel of individuals and transport
of merchandise among them.
Israeli control of borders and all
points of entry and egress
effectively dictate Palestinian
trade. Israel controls most of the
water resources of the Palestinian
people and large areas of their land,
in addition to the Dead Sea.
Continuing settlements
despite the peace process
The Oslo Agreement grants Israel
direct control over 60% of the land
of the West Bank and about 26%
of the land of the Gaza Strip, which
accounts for close to 61% of total
Palestinian land.2 Israel also has
security control over 21% of the
territories. At present, it has
extended its control over more
Although human development
indicators are important, the
Palestinian condition is
exceptional. It requires
clarification and expansion in the
presentation and analysis of
indicators, especially those
connected with the development
environment. The rest of this
chapter will examine additional
indicators concerned with the
abilities of the Palestinian
community and its capacity to
develop.
Section Two:
 Israeli Occupation and
the Systematic
Destruction of
Palestinian Human
Development
The West Bank and Gaza Strip
remain under Israeli occupation,
despite the passage of seven years
and the emergence of a Palestinian
National Authority following the
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Palestinian areas through a formal
policy of reoccupation of all major
urban centers. At the end of 2000,
Israeli settlements erected on
Palestinian land totaled 150 in the
West Bank and 17 in the Gaza
Strip. In the same period, Israel
built 65 bypass roads on
Palestinian property, confiscating
a total of 16,250 acres, in addition
to constructing several new
military installations.
Israel continued to build and
expand settlements after the
establishment of the PNA, raising
the number in the West Bank by
49.52% to total 49,940 units at the
end of July 2000. Concurrently, the
number of Israeli settlers in the
West Bank and Gaza Strip rose by
72% between 1994 and the end of
2000 to 390,039 settlers. In the
year 2000, Israel confiscated 1,250
acres of Palestinian land.
The environment and natural
resources
Israel occupation controls most
Palestinian natural resources and
poses a serious threat to the
Palestinian environment. Israel
controls 81% of Palestinian water3,
denying the Palestinians use of it.
Since 1967, Israeli authorities
uprooted more than one-half
million trees, 70% of which were
olive trees. In the current Intifada,
and by the end of 2001, Israeli
authorities uprooted or destroyed
35,000 fruit trees for the purposes
of settlement expansion, building
bypass roads, and for alleged
security considerations.
Internationally banned pesticides
and fertilizers enter the Palestinian
territories by way of settlements
without supervision, reflecting
negatively on the quality of crops
and the health of Palestinians.4
It should be noted that no effective
regulatory system is employed by
the PNA, which is considered
responsible for monitoring the use
of such pesticides. Current
conditions make it difficult for the
PNA to establish and implement
effective environmental policies.
 A distinct need exists for more
careful examination of the
environmental practices of some
industrial enterprises, especially
quarries, given their potential for
polluting the environment and
endangering the lives of residents.
3. The Palestinian Independent Commission for Human Rights; The State of Palestinian Rights,
Sixth Annual Report (2000), Ramallah, 2001.
4. Khalil Tofakji; Israeli Settlement in Palestinian Territories: Reality and Problems; Jerusalem,
2001.
Palestinian land
in the West Bank
confiscated in the
first year of the
Intifada totaled
6,130 acres, more
than double the
area confiscated
in the year
preceding the
Intifada (2,847
acres.)
The number of
Israeli settlers in
the West Bank and
Gaza Strip rose by
72% between 1994
and the end of
2000 to register
390,039 settlers. In
the year 2000
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5. Jad Ishaq and Abeer Safar; Applied Research Institute; paper presented to the PHDR, 2002.
6. Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics, External Trade Tally (1998,) Basic Results, Ramallah,
2000. Also, see the United Nations Special Coordinator Office report for the spring of 2000.
7. UNSCO, The Results of Clashes, Restrictions on Movement, and Border Closure on the
Palestinian Economy; 1 October 2000-31 January 2001; 2001.
8. See the statistical appendix.
Box (2 - 2) Depriving the Palestinians of water
- The Oslo Accord dictated that Israel supply the Palestinians with 28.6 million
cubic meters of consumable water from cisterns in the West Bank, but Israel
only supplied about 15 million cubic meters (about half the quantity.) The
Palestinian Water Authority has warned of the possibility of severe shortages in
the West Bank and Gaza Strip, especially in remote areas inaccessible by water
trucks.5
   Palestinian water consumption does not exceed 65 liters per person per day,
compared to more than 274 liters used by the average Israeli settler in Palestinian
territories).
Destroying the infrastructure
Israel continues to restrict the
Palestinian economy and impede
its growth, dictating that the
majority of Palestinian trade must
take place with or through Israel.
For example, Israeli exports to
PNA territories in the year 1999
were valued at $1,759.3 million,
excluding power, water and
telephone utilities and agricultural
products. Palestinian exports were
valued at $454.2 million,
discounting agricultural products
and Palestinian labor in Israel,
which translates into a huge
advantage for Israel.6 The skewed
trade relationship that has evolved
throughout years of occupation has
greatly hindered balanced
economic growth the West Bank
and Gaza Strip.  The population in
the Palestinian territories has
developed an over-reliance on
Israeli goods and, for lack of other
employment options, serves as
asource of cheap labor for the
Israeli market.
The Palestinian economy has
suffered devastating losses since
Israel began its policies of closure
and curfew in September 2000.
UNSCO estimates Palestinian
daily losses during the Intifada at
$10.9 million, a figure which does
not include destruction of private
property and the infrastructure7.
Virtually every sector of the
Palestinian economy has been
affected, including tourism (hotels
and restaurants), construction,
agriculture, social and health
services, and the financial and
manufacturing sectors. Losses in
the agriculture and fishing sectors
registered (73%, hotels and
restaurants -89%, construction -
78%, and social services at (68%).8
Economic losses in the first year
of the Intifada are estimated at
$2.4-$3.2 billion.
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9. For more, see: Adel Al-Zagha, paper presented to the PHDR 2002, and Mueen Rajab, paper
presented to the PHDR 2002.
10. See the statistical appendix.
11. UNSCO, The Results of Clashes, Restrictions on Movement, and Border Closure on the
Palestinian Economy; 1 October 2000-31 January 2001; 2001.
12. The PCBS cautions against relying on the data as absolute figures, because the data was
offered by families estimating their standing compared to the poverty line.
13. See the World Bank report, which relied on the poverty line established by the National
Commission for Alleviation of Poverty and on the Family Expenditures and Consumption
Survey conducted by the PCBS: The World Bank, Poverty in the West Bank and Gaza Strip,
February 20, 2001 (table 1.2.)
The political situation, the collapse
of negotiations, and the eruption of
the Intifada also disrupted the
investment environment, making it
particularly unattractive to potential
foreign investors. Under these
Box (2 - 3) The most significant economic changes during the Intifada9
- The closing of the Israeli market-the principal labor market-to Palestinian workers
-  A decrease in local work opportunities for Palestinians
- Increased fragmentation of Palestinian markets.
- The surge of ad-hoc, unregistered and unregulated Palestinian business enterprises
- A widening economic gap between rich and poor in Palestine
-  A dramatic increase in the number of Palestinian families living below the poverty
line.
circumstances, the Palestinian
private sector has been unable to
stimulate economic productivity,
particularly in terms of
manufactured and agricultural
exports.
Unprecedented poverty rates
The siege imposed on the
Palestinian territories during the
second Intifada has led to a sharp
increase in unemployment levels.
For the first nine months of the
year 2000, unemployment stood at
11%. Between October and
November 2001, the
unemployment figure skyrocketed
to 38 percent.10 An estimated
82,000 people lost their jobs
locally due to the effects of Israeli
closure, in addition to the 100,000
who lost work inside Israel, and the
71,000 who were already jobless
prior to the Intifada.11 Increases in
unemployment levels typically
correlate with rising rates of
poverty. In April 2001, a Palestinian
Central Bureau of Statistics (PCBS)
report documented the effect of the
siege on the economic standing of
Palestinian families. According to
survey data, an estimated 64.2% of
Palestinian families now live below
the poverty line. The percentage
rises to 81.4% in the Gaza Strip, as
compared to 55.7% in the West
Bank.12 The dramatic increase in the
number of disadvantaged families
in the West Bank and Gaza Strip is
especially discouraging in light of
the fact that the Palestinian poverty
rate had been steadily declining in
recent years, falling from 23.6% in
1996 to 20.2% in 1998.13
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Loans made up
12.5% of the
pledges of donor
countries to the
PNA. The loans
totaled $414
million
14. Detailed numbers available in the statistical appendix.
15. Ministry of Planning and International Cooperation, MOPIC‘s 2000 Fourth Quarterly
Monitoring Report of Donors Assistance; Ramallah, 2001.
16. For further details, see: Ali Shaath, paper presented to the PHDR, 2002.
Box (2 - 4) Poverty of Capabilities
A survey conducted by the DSP at Birzeit University in March 2001 revealed
that income levels had dropped in 73% of Palestinian families during in the
first four months of the Intifada. In 46% of Palestinian families, at least one
member of the family lost his income entirely. Another survey conducted by
the DSP in February 2002 showed that the 11% of Palestinian  heads of
households indicated that their children had dropped out of school, 52% attended
school irregularly, and 76% of Palestinian families had difficulty obtaining access
to health services.
Further analysis of the data for that
period reveals that aid was
allocated to projects as follows:
water and waste water
management, $863 million
(17.8%); building institutions,
$713 million (14.7%); education,
$466 million (9.6%);
infrastructure, $376 million
(7.7%); and health, $360 million,
(7.4%).15 Gradually, the amounts of
aid being pledged as well as funds
received began to decrease.
Pledges decreased from $821
million in 1994 to $506 million in
1996 and $364 million in 2000
(27%). Since 1996, the execution
of development projects had
greatly improved.  In addition,
while infrastructure improvements
accounted for only 10% of total aid
in 1994-1995, by 1998 they
accounted for 57% of total aid
expenditures.16
Section Three:
International
Funding and Palestinian
Development
International aid has served as a
primary source of income for the
PNA since it was established.
Donor countries pledged a total of
$4,847 million in aid to the
Palestinian people in the West
Bank and Gaza Strip through the
end of the year 2000.14  $3,314
million has actually been received
(68.3%).  Loans make up 12.5%
of the total aid received
(approximately $414 million), and
the remaining funds are considered
as grants. Between 1994 and 2000,
the majority of international donor
aid was spent in three areas: 37.2%
on general investment, 20.5% on
technical assistance, and 14.5% on
the general budget.
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Funding Non-Governmental
Organizations (NGOs)
International aid for Palestinian
NGOs peaked in the years
immediately preceding Oslo, with
estimates of total aid ranging from
$140-$220 million annually. After
the establishment of the PNA, the
amount of aid earmarked for
NGOs declined steadily to an
average of 10% of incoming aid
revenue. In 1994, NGOs received
$60 million from foreign donors.
Between 1995 and 1998, NGOs
were receiving an average of $45-
50 million annually. This decrease
occurred in spite of the fact that
roughly one-third of the NGOs that
exist in Palestine today were
started after the establishment of
the PNA.
Foreign aid to NGOs is allocated
across a variety of programs, most
notably health and education.
Education received 23.3% of
international aid offered to NGOs
in the period in question, followed
by the health sector at 19.6%,
social and cultural services at 8%,
and agriculture at 7.4%. The vast
majority of the funding was
distributed among a relatively
small number of larger NGOs with
wide outreach capabilities.17
UNRWA, a vital role
The United Nations Relief and
Works Agency (UNRWA)
provides direct assistance to
targeted groups of Palestinian
refugees. In 1997, the agency
budgeted $140.7 million for
refugees in the West Bank and Gaza
Strip.  The budget for 2000 totaled
$133.8 million and for 2001,
$137.9 million. The lion‘s share of
the budget goes to the education
and health sectors; in 1997, almost
50% of the budget was spent on
education, with 22% spent on
health, 13% on services and relief,
and 7% each on general and
employment services. In 2000, the
education budget was raised to
57%, but despite the increased
budget, UNRWA spending on each
student in its schools dipped from
$348 in 1997 to $324 in 2000 due
to the increase in the number of
students.18 The budget for general
services and employment services
decreased to 5%. The health sector
budget witnessed a slight decrease
- from 22% to 21% - which meant
that spending on each registered
refugee dropped from $23 to $2119,
while social services and relief
remained unchanged. These figures
reveal that UNRWA budgets have
not kept pace with the rise in the
total number of Palestinian
refugees in the West Bank and Gaza
Strip.
While the number of registered
refugees increased from 1,308,438
in 1997 to 1,428,891 in 2000, the
UNRWA budget decreased from
$140.7 million ($100.75 per
registered refugee) in 1997 to
$133.8 million ($90.36 per
17. Ibid.
18.UNRWA‘s education budget in the West Bank and Gaza Strip was $69.6 million in 1997 and
$75.6 million in 2000. The number of students registered in UNRWA schools was 200,886 in
1997 and 223,258 in 2000.
19. The UNRWA health expenditures for 1997 represented 30.6% of the total budget, and 28.3%
in 2000.
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registered refugee) in 2000.20 The
decrease in the budget of UNRWA
and the subsequent decline in its
services were discouraging to the
residents of Palestinian refugee
camps and institutions working in
the refugee sector. Despite well-
intentioned efforts by the agency,
it is still unclear whether its
programs measurably help
refugees to realize their individual
and collective rights or to
significantly strengthen the overall
effectiveness of refugee assistance
organizations.
Box (2 - 5) The Deficit Facing UNRWA
The UNRWA Commissioner, Peter Hansen, said that the agency needs $150
million to cope with the growing level of need in Palestine, noting that the
agency is currently facing a deficit of $70 million which must be immediately
addressed.  Hansen indicated that UNRWA services are seriously threatened as
a result of the deficit, adding that part of the funds to be collected by UNRWA
would be used to rebuild destroyed homes in the southern districts of the Gaza
Strip. The UNRWA Commissioner said that calls for increased levels of
assistance have failed so far to generate a significant response from the
international community, with the exception of medicines provided by Saudi
Arabia. He also stressed that Arab countries have shown sympathy and solidarity,
saying that in Syria alone, students and teachers donated more than $500,000,
and Syrian women have donated valuable personal effects such as jewelry.21
20. In 1997, refugees registered with UNRWA totaled 3,469,109, with 1,308,438 residing in the
West Bank and Gaza Strip.  In 2000, registered refugees numbered 3,806,055, with 1,428,891
of these residing in the West Bank and Gaza Strip.  It should also be mentioned that UNRWA
budgets did not keep pace with the increases in the numbers of refugees in all its areas of
operation. The aggregate number of refugees registered with UNRWA in its operation areas
(Jordan, Syria, Lebanon, and the West Bank and the Gaza Strip) rose from 3,417,688 to
3,806,055, while the budget dipped from $342.9 million ($100.14 per registered refugee) in
1997 to $310.39 million ($79 per registered refugee) in 2000.  UNRWA devised an emergency
plan to aid the Palestinian people after the Intifada erupted on 28 September 2000.  UNRWA
operational budgets were provided courtesy the Public Information Office, UNRWA
Headquarters (Gaza,) UNRWA in Figures (1997-2000.)
21. Al-Ayyam, 31 May 2001.
22. For more, see: Mohammed Shadid, paper presented to the PHDR, 2002.
UNRWA budget
dropped from
$100.75 per
refugee in 1997 to
$90.36 in 2000
Evaluating international aid 22
Gauging the effectiveness of
foreign aid on development
programs in areas under the PNA‘s
jurisdiction is challenging for
several reasons. The aid was
received during an interim period
during which an independent
Palestinian state was to be
established. However, that period
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was marred by instability and
confusion, and negotiations with
Israel came to an abrupt halt in July
2000. The interim period also saw
a rise in Israel‘s use of collective
punishment measures, which
closed the Israeli labor market to
Palestinian workers and imposed
curfews on the local Palestinian
labor force. These Israeli practices
effectively served to divert foreign
aid resources away from
development efforts and into
welfare and relief efforts.  The
economic, financial, security and
administrative penalties imposed
on the PNA by Israel have
seriously harmed the foreign
investment environment in
Palestine and brought several
investment and infrastructure
projects to a complete halt. Future
foreign aid will almost surely have
to be directed first toward the
rebuilding of Palestine's physical
infrastructure and rehabilitation of
the Palestinian economy. It may be
advisable in the future for donor
23. See  : Development Studies Programme, Birzeit University, The Impact of the Palestinian
Intifada on International Funding: Reality and Prospects, November 2001.
countries secure a commitment
from Israel that it will not inflict
damage on any buildings funded by
donor nations, and require financial
compensation for future damages.
These commitments should be
enforced through international
courts.
Levels of international aid to
Palestine were not established in
accordance with a comprehensive
development plan created by the
PNA. Instead, the donors worked
according to studies they prepared
themselves, based on a list of
potential projects prepared by
MOPIC. The decline in levels of
PNA spending on health and
educational services and the claims
of chronic financial distress may
indicate that the international
community is not willing to
compensate the Palestinian people,
even partially, for the losses and
suffering associated with Israeli
occupation.
Box (2 - 6) Workshop on the Intifada‘s effects on levels of international
        funding
The Development Studies Programme organized a workshop held on 22
November 2001 on the Intifada‘s effects on levels of international funding.
Participants from international aid organizations and representatives from
MOPIC offered assurances that donor funding had helped build many effective
administrative, service-related, and political institutions for the Palestinian
community. Most of the participants agreed that sustainable development is
difficult to achieve under occupation, therefore, the bulk of foreign aid would
be directed towards efforts to rebuild the Palestinian infrastructure and economy,
now in ruins.23
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Perspectives on the Effects of the Intifada on Funding Levels:
“I believe the events during the Intifada influenced funding negatively. It became
extremely difficult to complete projects, especially those that require travel
among the various cities or the transportation of supplies from one place to
another. Unfortunately, some cities are completely closed off and impossible to
access.”
Jean Breteche, European Union Representative
“I would like to confirm that the USAID program for the West Bank and Gaza
is considered a priority by the U.S. Government, reflecting particular interest in
the region. We are determined to exert all necessary effort to realize the program
despite the obstacles we are facing, but we must reevaluate how the funds allotted
for the program are used in order to ensure proper spending and guard against
wastage.”
Larry, Garber, USAID
“We believe that people living and working within the crisis are more able to
define how funding should be spent and determine the needs of the community.
We are now listening to those receiving funding through the Ford Foundation
and asking them how we can help offer them more.”
Steven Lawery , Ford Foundation
“It took us some time to adapt and devise a new vision to move forward. One of
the faces of adaptation was the direct contact with local councils to ensure
promptness in providing funds and a timely provision of assistance to the
unemployed.”
Sufian Mushasha, UNDP
“At this time the development process faces major obstacles, and we are studying
the available options with our colleagues at Palestinian ministries and donor
agencies.”
Hisham Mustafa, Ministry of Planning and International Cooperation
The preceding quotes confirm the
need to reevaluate international
funding as a primary means to
alleviate the suffering caused by
the Israeli occupation. Despite
international aid to the PNA and
NGOs, the interim period failed to
liberate the Palestinian economy
from its almost complete reliance
on Israel. The interim period did
not yield a final settlement, and the
living standards of the Palestinians
There is a need to
reevaluate the role
of international
funding
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dropped. Signs of improvement
appeared only after 1998, and then
quickly disappeared as Israeli
military, economic,
administrational and security
measures were imposed after the
eruption of the second Intifada.
The GNP dipped sharply between
October 2000 and January 200124,
which indicates how integrally the
economy of the West Bank and
Gaza Strip is linked to Israel.
For those reasons and others, it can
be concluded that international
funding did not facilitate
decentralization, as most aid was
directed through PNA and NGO
programs. Similarly, international
funding did not encourage
economic growth nor did it increase
the outreach or effectiveness of
Palestinian social service
organizations. International donors
generally failed to engage or
support the efforts of smaller, more
specialized groups, choosing
instead to focus on the work of
PNA institutions, international
demonstration projects, and large
NGOs.
24. UNSCO, The Results of Clashes, Restrictions on Movement, and Border Closure on the
Palestinian Economy, 1 October 2000-31 January 2001; 2001.
25.  The World Bank, Aid Effectiveness in the West Bank and Gaza, 2000.
26. Israel received $5.5 billion from the U.S. Government in 1997.
International aid,
in general, did not
create the
conditions
necessary to
achieve
sustainable
human
development
Undoubtedly the Palestinian people
deserve international aid as partial
compensation for years of
occupation and alienation.
International aid should not be used
as incentive to continue
negotiations with Israel, regardless
of the bases and goals of
negotiations.26
International aid to the PNA, in the
form of grants and loans with
lenient repayment provisions, are
certainly an asset to development
efforts. However, the growing
trend to convert grants into loans
may have negative effects on the
Palestinian economy and place a
large financial burden on future
Palestinian generations.
Box (2 - 7) Return on aid investment as compared with neighboring
        countries
A World Bank report for the year 200025 on the effectiveness of aid in the West
Bank and Gaza Strip indicated that aid has had limited success in improving the
Palestinian economy.  According to the report, foreign aid raised the Palestinian
GNP only 1%-2% above what would most likely have been achieved had aid
not been available. The report also indicated that general investment as a
component of GNP rose by 5.7% in the period between 1997 and 1998, as
compared to 2.9% between 1990 and 1992. Foreign aid played a limited role in
the improvement of health and education services, but the gains were low relative
to the size of investment when compared to similar efforts in Egypt and Jordan.
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foreign aid.  A demonstrated need
exists for a sustainable human
development strategy whose
priorities have been established
with the participation of all
segments of the Palestinian society,
and which reflects a democratic
vision for the future of the
Palestinian state.
Section Four:
The Impact of Arab-
Palestinian Relations on
the Palestinian
Development
Environment
The contributions of Arab nations
to sustainable human development
efforts in Palestine are still
extremely limited. Official Arab
support for the second Palestinian
Intifada did not extend far beyond
repetition of the demand that UN
resolutions concerning the conflict
with Israel be implemented.
Relatively small amounts of
financial assistance were provided
by Arab governmental and non-
governmental organizations to the
Palestinian people.
Historically, Arab nations have
contributed to the funding of
Palestinian NGO activities in the
education and health care sectors,
prior to the establishment of the
PNA. Palestinian NGOs received
fairly limited support until 1976,
when aid levels were significantly
Some Arab NGOs
launched
important
initiatives to offer
financial and
moral support for
the Intifada
International aid failed to create the
conditions necessary to achieve
sustainable human development
largely because of the continuance
of Israeli occupation. The
occupation created an environment
where Palestinian dependence on
foreign aid and its continuance
actually increased.  Very little
progress will be achieved in the
absence of external financial
support from donor nations at this
stage.   Sustainable human
development requires the creation
of an institutional and physical
infrastructure that will encourage
"investment in the peace process".
International aid has not been
distributed consistently in
accordance with a comprehensive
development plan with clear
priorities and objectives.
Reduction or cessation of aid will
almost certainly result in
immediate further decline in the
living standards and health and
educational welfare of
Palestinians, especially children
and impoverished or marginalized
segments of society. Also, a
reduction in aid levels will affect
the performance of many non-
governmental development
institutions, especially those
working in the areas of preschool
and post-high school education,
health care, and agriculture.
Perhaps an increased level of
awareness will characterize the
years that follow the second
Intifada.  The PNA may take a
more responsible role in defining
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More than three
million
Palestinian
refugees live in
Arab countries
increased through the efforts of the
Joint Palestinian-Jordanian
Committee. A number of relief
funds established by Arab NGOs
and educational and social
institutions were created, and
sister-city programs began to
spring up throughout the region.
Arab support to Palestinian NGOs
reached $33 million in 1978,
jumping to $118 million in 1982.27
After the establishment of the
PNA, Arab support remained low
as a percentage of total foreign aid.
Between 1993 and 2000, financial
support from Arab nations did not
exceed $277 million, only 8% of
total aid for the Palestinian people
from the other countries of the
world.28
After the eruption of the Intifada,
Arab countries held an emergency
summit in Cairo in October 2000.
At the summit, participating
countries pledged $1 billion in
support of the Palestinian people
through the creation of two funds.
The "Al-Aqsa Fund" dedicated
$800 million to the preservation of
the Arab and Muslim identity of
Jerusalem. The "Jerusalem
 Intifada Fund,” allocated $200
million to assist the families of
Palestinian victims.29 However,
follow through on pledges to these
two funds was weak.  Many who
failed to honor pledge
commitments blamed a lack of
spending oversight mechanisms for
the two funds. At the second Arab
summit, held in Amman in March
2001, Arab countries promised
Palestine an additional $40 million
in loans with lenient repayment
terms, to be paid to the PNA over
six months.
It should be noted that many
citizens of Arab nations voluntarily
pledged assistance to support the
Intifada and the Palestinian people.
Arab leaders at the Cairo summit
called on the Arab people to donate
one day's work in support of the
Intifada.30 Some Arab NGOs
launched important initiatives
providing financial and moral
support for the Intifada, including
a very significant effort by the UAE
Red Crescent Society. Despite the
undeniable value of these aid
efforts, public commitment has
remained limited and sporadic.
28. Ministry of Planning and International Cooperation, MOPIC‘s 2000 Fourth Quarterly
Monitoring Report of Donors‘ Assistance, Ramallah, 2001. Ensuring the accuracy of these
numbers is not easy, because a large portion of the funds is distributed without the supervision
of the PNA.
29. See the final statement of the Arab summit held in Cairo in October 2000.
30. See the final statement of the Arab summit held in Cairo in October 2000.
27. Nidal Sabri, The Palestinian Commission for Citizens‘ Rights, Financial and Legal Aspects of
the Palestinian Budget, Ramallah, 2000.
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opportunities for Palestinian
workers. In the Gulf countries
alone, close to 250,000 Palestinians
are employed, mostly in
professions in the public and
private sectors that require
specialized skills. Many economic
and political factors affect
employment opportunities for
Palestinians in Arab countries,
including the host state's
relationship with the PLO and the
PNA, market demand for labor, oil
prices, income levels, and the
restrictions placed on foreign
workers.32 Creating work
opportunities for Palestinians in
Arab countries in coordination
with the PNA would help decrease
Palestinian economic reliance on
the Israeli economy and would
furnish a better and more stable
development environment.
Unquestionably, Arab countries
are able to play an influential role
in improving the Palestinian
human development environment.
They can also contribute actively
to securing the rights of the
Palestinian people in accordance
with international agreements.
Admittedly, there are political
concerns that limit the flexibility
of some countries, but their failure
to support Palestinian human
development in a more significant
way is difficult to understand. At a
minimum, Arab countries can open
their work markets to Palestinians
and offer positive incentives for
their business communities to
invest in the Palestinian territories.
The labor markets of some Arab
nations offer significant job
Box (2 - 8) Refugees in Arab states
More than three million Palestinian refugees live in Arab countries.31 The living
conditions of Palestinian refugees span a wide range, with some enjoying full
rights of citizenship while others are marginalized and suffer from extreme
levels of poverty and deprivation. In some Arab countries, Palestinian refugees
are forbidden to engage in certain lines of work and have been subjected to
isolation and discrimination. Most refugee camps in Arab countries suffer from
overcrowded conditions and lack of vital facilities, in addition to reliance on
services provided by the fluctuating budget of UNRWA.
32. Abdul-Jaber Tayseer, Employment Opportunities for Palestinians in Gulf Countries, paper
presented to the International Conference on Employment in Palestine, Ramallah, May 1998.
31. Badil Resources Center for Palestinian Residency and Refugee Rights, The Right of Return,
Bethlehem, 2000.
priorities and methods for directing
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Arab-Palestinian trade relations
are insignificant when compared to
the level of Palestinian economic
dependence on Israel and to the
volume of trade that takes place
between Israel and Jordan and
Israel and Egypt. Israel controls
Palestinian ports and delays the
transfer of Palestinian goods at
border crossings.34 The Paris
Economic Protocol signed on 29
April 1994 imposed significant
restrictions on Palestinian external
trade. Palestinian trade relations
with Arab countries have
demonstrated no noticeable signs
of improvement in spite of the
existence of a number of ratified
free trade agreements. Trade
agreements with Jordan specify tax
and customs exemptions for a wide
range of Palestinian imports to
facilitate trade. Also, agreements
signed with Egypt to encourage
Egyptian investment in Palestine
and to facilitate transfer of
technological and informational
expertise from Egypt to Palestine
have been only partially
implemented.
Section Five:
The PNA-Caught Between
Developmental and
Political Agendas
Since its inception, the PNA has
faced challenges relating to its
authority, its sovereign boundaries
and its performance. In addition,
the PNA's ability to coordinate
political and development concerns
in light of the continuing Israeli
occupation, settlement expansion
and the siege of its major cities has
been stretched beyond its limits.35
Box (2 - 9) Data on Trade with Arab Countries
Palestinian external trade statistics indicate that registered trade transactions with
Arab countries totaled $75 million from an aggregate $2,620 million in 1997
and $97 million out of $2,769 million in 1998.33 In 1997, Palestinian exports to
Arab countries did not exceed 5% of total exports, and in 1998 exports to Arab
countries registered only 3%. As for imports, Palestinian purchases from Arab
countries amounted to 2.5% of total imports in 1997 and 3.6% of total imports in
1998. Total Palestinian exports to Gulf countries in 1997 registered a mere 9%,
rising in 1998 to 20%. Jordan is by far Palestine‘s largest trade partner, importing
90% of Palestinian goods produced for export (to Arab nations) in 1997 and
70% in 1998.  The Egyptian market accounted for a very modest percentage of
Palestinian exports in 1997-1998, not exceeding 1%.
Arab-Palestinian
trade relations are
still limited
Since its
inception, the
PNA has faced
challenges
relating to its
authority
33. PCBS, External Trade Statistics, 1998 (Main Results), Ramallah, 2000.
34. Tons of perishable produce and cut flowers spoil at border crossings as a result of delays
imposed by the Israelis on Palestinian exporters.
35. External challenges are detailed in several places in the PHDR. .
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36. The full statement of the president of Labor Unions, Mr. Shaher Saad, Al-Quds, 5 January 2002.
Box (2 - 10) Implementation of the Labor Law
Despite adverse conditions, the Palestinian Labor Law was enacted and implemented after being published in the
official PNA newspaper. The law's provisions were deliberated upon for eight years by representatives of the
Labor Ministry, labor unions, and employers. Although labor unions stated publicly that the law met only the
minimum demands of employers and that it was “backward compared to labor laws in neighboring countries,”
they appreciated that it at least existed. Employers objected to implementing the law at this difficult time and
demanded a chance to “organize their affairs.” However, the law was executed in spite of these protests.
Improvement in the working conditions for Palestinians will be the deciding measure of the law's ability to
protect them36.
important legislation and
regulatory policies has been
established to create an orderly
environment for the Palestinian
people.
The PNA and Legislation
Clear delineation of the lines of
authority among Palestinian
ministries and organization of
inter-ministry relations have been
pressing concerns of the PNA since
its establishment. The constitution
remains unsigned by the PNA
president although it has been
approved by the Legislative
Council. The law governing
political parties, which provides for
plurality and grants the freedom to
form political affiliations, is still
being debated. The law of
publications and printing was
enacted, as well as a law that
permits foreign ownership of real
estate in Palestine. The judicial
system law, the administrative
structures law, the court system
law, and laws concerning
investment and finance have all
been passed. However, in the
absence of a ratified state
constitution, they cannot be
effectively implemented.
Additional obstacles include
limited PNA control over its own
natural resources, including land
and water, and a complete lack of
control over ports, as well as the
geographical discontinuity of the
PNA territories.
These impediments and
restrictions, given the relatively
short existence of the PNA and its
limited governing experience, did
not prevent it from achieving
tangible progress in many areas.
The PNA has created functioning
ministries, specialized
commissions, and a legislative
council.  It provides basic services
to the Palestinian public especially
in the areas of health care and
education, and maintains an
acceptable level of civil order. A
number of successful
infrastructure projects were
completed, although they relied
heavily on external funding. The
PNA improved its relationship
with civil society organizations
after a period of tension and mutual
accusations. It has laid the
foundations of a working
relationship with the Palestinian
private sector.  A wide range of
Laws have not
been effectively
implemented  due
to the absence of a
ratified
constitution
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The absence of a Palestinian
constitution is a central obstacle
impeding real progress in
legislative affairs. Without a
constitution, separating the three
branches of government is
impossible. Human rights and
citizens' rights remain unprotected,
subject to ad-hoc and arbitrary
decision-making. It is also difficult
make progress towards sustainable
human development in the absence
of truly democratic institutional
structures through which popular
participation, political plurality, and
the freedom of organization and
expression are facilitated. The
failure of the PNA to open a
meaningful dialogue between civil
society and the political community
on the issue of sustainable human
development cannot be overlooked.
This formative development
dialogue must become a PNA
priority if sustainable human
development is to be achieved.
PNA Institutions and
Adaptation to the Challenges
of the Intifada
The Intifada presented an additional
challenge to the PNA, as it
struggled to simultaneously
advance its social and economic
development strategies,
communicate effectively with the
public, and to provide political
leadership. Many PNA institutions
experienced performance failures,
and weaknesses in planning and
regulatory abilities in times of
emergency appeared. The PNA was
perceived as out of touch with the
needs and the problems of the
population, especially in remote
locales. The conditions introduced
by Israeli occupation policies
required a resistance strategy to
enable PNA institutions to continue
operations. Official institutions
needed to redirect and reprioritize
their efforts in order to meet to the
changing needs of the population.
The Palestinians looked to the PNA
for guidance to help them to cope
with the burdens of the siege and
persistent military attacks, the high
number of casualties and injuries,
and material damage to buildings,
roads, and businesses. Fifteen
months into the Intifada, little
guidance has been provided. Most
PNA institutions continue to work
without an emergency plan and a
civil defense program, despite the
pressing need to unite the efforts of
institutions to defend citizens and
encourage their participation in
activities of the Intifada removed
from chaos37. Generally, the
following notes are made
concerning the performance of PNA
institutions:
º Most PNA institutions lacked an
emergency plan and failed to
establish one even after the
sustained period of Israeli
aggression.
º The highly centralized nature and
ineffectiveness of many ministries
led to the squandering of available
resources.
º The siege of the Palestinian
territories effectively shut down
37. See the results of the seminar organized by the Ministry of Planning and International
Cooperation in May 2001, which were broadcast in some local newspapers (See Al-Ayyam, 15
May 2001.) For further details, please see paper presented to the PHDR by Riyadh Al-Hasan,
2002, and a paper presented by Sameeh Shabeeb, 2002.
Fifteen months
into the Intifada,
most PNA
institutions
continue to work
without an
emergency plan
The Intifada
presented an
additional
challenge to the
PNA
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inter- and intra-ministry
communication.   Without
emergency or contingency work
plans, ministry personnel were
left without guidance.
º The ministries had never
established self-contained and
Box (2 - 11) The lack of an economic and social plan
An opinion poll38 revealed that 10.7% of those polled believe that the PNA
possesses an economic plan to face the current crisis and 58% believe otherwise.
As for a social plan, 18.7% believe the PNA has a plan to address social problems,
while 58.5% believe it does not.
38. Birzeit University, the Development Studies Programme; Appendix No. 1, results of a survey
about the Intifada, institutions, and the future; (#4,), 31 May-2 June 2001.
39. The PNA, Ministry of Finance, The 2000 General Budget Plan; Ramallah, Palestine, and the
Palestinian Legislative Council, Budget and Financial Affairs Report on the General Budget
for 2000, Ramallah, Palestine.
40. The PNA, Ministry of Finance, The 2000 General Budget Plan, Ramallah, Palestine.
The PNA Budget
The PNA budget for 2000 indicates
that government spending was
concentrated in five fields: police
and security (35.14%), education
(18.36%), health (9.8%),
presidency (6.1%), and social
affairs (5.5%). The 2000 budget
included a three-year development
plan valued at $1.28 billion, of
which $445 million was
designated to be spent in the year
2000. Development spending was
noticeably weak, and its
geographical distribution was
disproportional. In the West Bank,
development spending was
concentrated in five cities:
Bethlehem (the Bethlehem 2000
Project  (18.5%), Hebron (15.9%),
Nablus (12.4%), Ramallah (7.3%),
and Jenin (6.4%). Other cities
received far less, such as Jerusalem
(4.7%), Tulkarem (3.9%),
Qalqielya (2.6%), Jericho (2.4%),
Salfeet, (1%), and Tobas (0.25%).
As for the Gaza Strip, Gaza City
received 43% of the development
budget, followed by the Central
District (21%), Rafah (14%), and
the northern districts (10%). Khan
Younis received no more than 5%;
Deir Al-Balah, 1%, and 6% was
allotted to several other areas in the
Gaza Strip39. It should be noted that
the year 2001 witnessed a deficit
of $371 million40 as a result of the
decline in PNA revenues during the
second Intifada and the decrease in
foreign aid for development
projects.
The grim financial conditions
faced by the PNA have paralyzed
spending, which should logically
prompt an immediate search for
Development
spending was
noticeably weak,
and its
geographical
distribution was
disproportional
self-sustaining management
systems, even for normal work
conditions. They depended too
heavily on centralized authority,
and had underdeveloped and
poorly managed human and
financial resources.
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new revenue sources and a
reprioritization of the available
resources in a manner that will not
negatively affect human
development or the quest for
independence.
The PNA stressed
the importance of
the private sector
in the
development
process
Section Six:
The Palestinian Private
Sector
Although the PNA has adopted a
positive stance towards the private
sector, recognizing its ability to
propel economic development, the
business community in Palestine
still faces many internal obstacles.
The legal environment remains
inadequate.  Restrictions imposed
by the Paris Economic Protocol,
whose provisions Israel selectively
implemented, still impose barriers
to economic growth. Discussion
between the PNA and the private
sector is an important step on the
path to creating the proper
atmosphere for a more effective
role for the Palestinian business
community. However, the PNA is
still faced with the challenge of
reconciling the needs of the
Palestinian people and the
development process on the one
hand and the aspirations and
interests of the private sector on the
other.
The PNA stressed the importance
of the private sector in the
development process in a series of
presidential declarations issued in
2000. At the same time, the PNA
asserted its commitment to free
trade as an economic policy.
Demonstrations of that
commitment included forming a
Higher Economic Development
Council, founding a Palestinian
investment fund, activating the role
of the High Commission on
Investment with the participation of
the private sector, and establishing
prospects for privatization. The
declarations, if fulfilled, will bolster
the role of the private sector in a
transparent and mutually beneficial
partnership with the public sector.
Box (2 - 12) People - Centered Health Programme
The development process in Palestine must be comprehensive, taking into
account the relationship between education, health, agriculture, and local
government. Our modest experience in developing the health care sector in
Palestine has proven that developing human resources should head the
development plans for the health sector. Dedicated people are the decisive factor
that enabled us to take on the additional burden of 35,000 injuries in 15 months
despite the scarcity of resources.... The Palestinian people, who remain keen to
increase knowledge and hone their abilities and are capable of creativity at
difficult times, are at the heart of the development process.
Dr. Riyadh Al-Zaanoun, Palestinian Health Minister
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Box (2 -13) Select recommendations from the discussion forum between the
         public and private sectors
Among the most important recommendations resulting from the inaugural
discussion forum between the public and private sectors, held in May 2000, are
the following:
First: enacting economic laws, especially funding laws, with the participation of
the private sector in an effort to bolster the role of the private sector as a catalyst
of the Palestinian economy.
Second: limiting bureaucracy in the public sector and working to establish clear
lines of authority in order to prevent unnecessary administrative intervention.
Third: activating the rule of law and improving the functions of Palestinian courts
of law, especially concerning trade and financial matters.
Fourth: organizing Palestinian trade relations with Israel to protect the Palestinian
private sector from Israeli economic control and working to activate trade
agreements signed with several Arab countries.
Fifth: guaranteeing cooperation between the public and private sectors in
establishing a national plan to market Palestinian merchandise and working to
establish trade centers and offices abroad to market products and attract foreign
investment to Palestine.
Sixth: working to restructure the Palestinian tax system (Value Added Tax and
Income Tax) to encourage private sector investment.
Seventh: prohibition of monopolies in either sector unless clearly justified for
national or economic reasons.
The period after 1997 saw
increasing private sector
investment in the Palestinian
economy. In 1999, 1,841 new
companies were registered,
compared to 1,517 in 1994. New
business registrations dropped in
1996-1997, but rose noticeably in
1998 and again in 1999. In 1996,
registered businesses totaled
1,269, decreasing the following
year to 1,198. The number rose to
1,370 in 1998 and 1,841 in 1999.
The investment encouragement
law of 1998 was one of the factors
that contributed to the rise in the
number of registered businesses.
Public companies of those
registered totaled four in 1999, five
in 199841.
41. Information about the number of registered companies in the West Bank between 1994 and
2000 provided courtesy of the General Department of Statistics and Policies, Ministry of Trade
and Economy, and in the Gaza Strip courtesy of the Business Registration Department, Ministry
of Justice.
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The number of registered foreign
companies also increased, with 20
registering in 1999 compared to
nine in 1998. However,
comparison of registered foreign
companies in 1999 with those in
1994 and 1995 reveals a sharp
drop; there were 31 registered
foreign companies in 1994,
increasing to 37 in 1995.
Generally, registration of foreign
companies is considered an
indicator of the level of trust in the
Palestinian economy and in a
reasonable level of political and
legal stability. However, the
figures should be considered with
care, because many of the foreign
investors are Palestinians with
foreign citizenship. Also, the size
of the investment and the area in
which the investment is made are
also important factors in gauging
their relative significance. In the
wake of the Intifada and
subsequently, the Israeli siege in
2000, investment in the Palestinian
economy slowed. The number of
registered companies dropped to
1,603 in the year 2000, including
14 foreign businesses, compared to
1,841 in 1999.42
Since 1995, the PNA has actively
encouraged domestic and foreign
investment.  The PNA issued a law
to encourage investment, offering
tax incentives for development
projects depending on the size and
type of the investment. The value
of projects approved after the law
was enacted increased from $190.3
million in 1997, of which $61.2
million (32%) was foreign
investment, to $298.1 million in
1999, of which $229.7 million
(77%) was foreign investment.43
The period after
1997 saw
increasing private
sector investment
in the Palestinian
economy
42. It should be noted that the number of registered domestic and foreign companies does not
necessarily correlate directly to increased investment by the private sector, because several of
the companies that were registered in the specific period did not begin actual operation.
43. Information about development projects receiving tax incentives courtesy UNSCO, Report on
the Palestinian Economy, Gaza, 2000, and UNSCO, Report on Economic and Social Conditions
in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, Gaza, 1999.
Section Seven:
Palestinian Civil Society
and its Role in
Reconciling Resistance
and Development.
The second Intifada brought new
interest in the performance of
Palestinian civil society. Strengths
and weaknesses in addressing
current priorities and strategic
community needs were revealed
through activities designed to
achieve national objectives and
through its capacity to organize
services and activities, made
difficult by the siege and military
aggression.
The emergence of the PNA brought
additional responsibilities for civil
society, including a demand for
simultaneous participation in
occupation resistance and in the
human development process. Civil
society was called upon to care for
disadvantaged and neglected
citizens.  It was also expected to
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The emergence of
the PNA meant
additional
responsibilities on
civil society
bolster the functioning of
democracy in public life as well as
in the internal affairs of
institutions, unions and
community organizations. In
addition, existing programs needed
to be adapted after the emergence
of the PNA, which began to handle
certain economic, political and
social affairs in areas under its total
or partial control. Civil society‘s
responsibilities were not restricted
to the provision of services, but
also extended to the promotion of
democracy and sustainable human
development.
There was no need for a second
Intifada to uncover gaps in the
performance of institutions and
civil society organizations
characterized by a diverse range of
abilities, programs, internal
structures, and target audiences.
The gaps had already been
identified in several reports and
conferences, including previous
PHDRs and reports and surveys
published by various research
centers. They were also revealed
in the findings of periodic opinion
polls, seminars and workshops.
Directing attention to areas of
weakness is only a part of the
important role undertaken by
institutions and representative
organizations of the Palestinian
community in its effort to improve
performance levels. It is also an
opportunity to raise awareness
about what is possible.
Civic organizations in the West
Bank and Gaza Strip interact with
the Palestinian community because
they are a part of it, influenced by
the same factors-military
occupation, geographical division,
and low levels of economic and
social integration. The
contradictions afforded by the
concurrence of occupation with an
existing national authority,
combined with conditions of
inequality and deprivation, create
an environment that limits the work
and influence of civil society.
NGOs
A tally of NGOs indicated that 881
organizations were operating  in the
West Bank and Gaza Strip in the
middle of 2000. The organizations
were spread geographically
between the West Bank (76.6%),
and the Gaza Strip (23.4%).
Distribution according to
community type was as follows:
60.2% in urban areas, 29.3% in
rural areas, and 10.6% in refugee
camps.
Most of the NGOs relied on more
than one source of funding, but
78.6% of them relied on one
primary source of funding to fund
at least 50% of the operating
budget.  About 39% received some
funding from Arab and
international institutions. through
internal income-generating
activity.  The PNA provides partial
funding to 29.2% of NGOs.
Slightly more than 19% received
donations from the Arab
community living in Israel.
In terms of performance
assessment, 27.4% of NGOs
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10% of the NGOs
received 60% of
the total funding
maintain that they always meet
their strategic goals, 70.3% said
they do so sometimes, and 2.2%
admitted they rarely achieve their
goals.44 Close to 10% of the NGOs
received 60% of the total funding.45
Box (2 - 14) The national campaign to boycott settlement goods and encourage
national industry
"The Palestinian Observatory" was established in 1999, comprising several
Palestinian NGOs and private sector institutions, to support boycotting of settlement
merchandise, considering that settlements are illegal under international law. The
Observatory established commercial relationships with several European companies
to activate the boycott effort. In the second Intifada, efforts to boycott Israeli
merchandise grew, especially those products for which there is a locally- produced
alternative. The Popular Committee for Boycotting Israeli Goods established the
middle of May 2001 as the deadline for emptying the Palestinian market of all
Israeli goods for which there is a Palestinian substitute. An opinion poll conducted
by the DSP in February 2001 indicated that 91% of those polled are aware of the
boycott campaign; 57% said that boycott is attainable, and 74% said their use of
Israeli goods has decreased during the Intifada.
In the past two decades, and
particularly during the 1990s,
professional organizations
advancing development strategies
in the fields of education, health
and agriculture appeared.
Institutions specializing in the
defense of human rights,
democracy and women's and
children's rights were also
established. The organizations
achieved a significant level of
outreach, which broadened the
scope of beneficiaries throughout
the West Bank and Gaza.  In
general, their financial,
administrative and human
resources were superior to those of
traditional charitable organizations
operating in the region.46
Although NGOs deserve praise for
the quality of their efforts, some
areas of weakness in their
operations do exist. The enactment
of the NGOs and Charitable
Organizations Law of 2000
afforded NGOs a high degree
independence in managing their
affairs, soliciting funding, and
establishing strategic plans and
outreach efforts. However,
44. Palestinian Economic Policy Research Institute  (MAS), NGO Census in the West Bank and
Gaza Strip, 2001.
45. World Bank, Aid Effectiveness in the West Bank and Gaza, June 2000.
46. See: Census of Palestinian NGOs in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, 2001 (previous reference.)
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47. Palestinian Economic Policy Research Institute (MAS,) Relationships among NGOs in the
West Bank and Gaza Strip, prepared by Hasan Ladawdeh, Jibreel Mohammed, and Jaber Azzam,
Ramallah, 2000.
relatively few NGOs have
succeeded in the development of
comprehensive strategic plans and
visions for the future.
The NGOs and Charitable
Organizations Law indicates
that Palestinians have the right
to engage in social, cultural,
professional and scientific
activity freely. They also have
the right to establish and operate
institutions and non -
governmental organizations.
Most Palestinian NGOs, with the
possible exception of the larger,
more technically and
technologically advanced players,
lack transparency, accountability,
and effective regulation of their
internal operations. The failure to
achieve acceptable standards in
these areas prevents NGOs from
effectively building upon their
experience. Many have failed to
establish effective financial and
management systems and to create
sustainable ties to the communities
in which they work. A few NGOs,
particularly larger ones, rely
heavily on foreign aid.  This
reliance has the potential to
discourage long-term planning and
may stifle creativity and innovation
in program development and
resource management. Research
shows that the relationship
between NGOs and local
government institutions is "weak"
in all but a few municipalities.47
ManyNGOs were confused
regarding their responsibilities
during the second Intifada. Most
were unable to introduce the
necessary changes at the
infrastructure and policy levels to
cope with the changing
environment. There were some
exceptions among organizations
active in health, agriculture, and
relief work. Levels of confusion
were exacerbated by the lack of a
comprehensive strategy that should
have been discussed and agreed
upon by the PNA, political groups,
the private sector, and NGOs.
The relationship
between NGOs
and local
government
institutions is
"weak"
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48. Ishaq Diwan and Radhwan Shaaban (editing,) Development Despite the Difficulties-the Interim
Track of the Palestinian Economy (summary,) Palestinian Economic Research Studies center
(MAS,) and the World Bank, undated, page 20.
49. More details in the paper presented to the PHDR prepared by Izzat Abdul-Hadi and Tayseer
Mheisen about the role of NGOs in the Intifada, 2002.
50. Izzat Abdul-Hadi, Palestinian NGOs-a Congested Work Schedule; paper prepared for the
PHDR, Birzeit University, 1998.
Charitable
organizations,
which comprise
the majority of
NGOs, contributed
to poverty
alleviation
Box (2 - 15) Partnership between NGOs and governmental organizations
It would be useful for the public sector to enter into partnerships with NGOs and
benefit from their managerial expertise, especially in the areas of education and
health care. Those partnerships that do currently exist are in fact found in health
care, education, and childcare. It is important that the PNA develop a framework to
organize the establishment of NGOs as tax-exempt non-profit organizations. NGO
activities, which are considered special interest groups, could conceivably come
into conflict with political agendas. The challenge lies in encouraging competition
and the free exchange of information while fostering accountability. True competition
among NGOs may continue if performance evaluation mechanisms are introduced,
such as competitive bidding. Also, public disclosure of funding sources and spending
patterns through surveys conducted with NGO beneficiaries and through media
investigation and public supervision, which are all effective guarantees of
accountability48, should be practiced.
participated in creating an
atmosphere that successfully linked
resistance and human development
efforts in the West Bank and Gaza
Strip, but the effort was confined
to professional and specialized
organizations.50 Charitable
organizations, which comprise the
majority of NGOs, contributed to
poverty alleviation by offering
assistance to needy families. Their
activities expanded to include
youth activities (sport clubs) and
cultural activities (performing arts
centers) at the local level.
Palestinian NGOs are considered
highly active compared with their
counterparts in neighboring
Undoubtedly, the PNA policy
concerning NGOs showed weak
understanding and appreciation of
the importance of such
organizations, which had gained
the trust and support of the
Palestinian public before the
emergence of the PNA. Official
institutions, such as the Ministries
of Health and Agriculture, the
Legislative Council, and the
Palestinian Children's Secretariat,
to name a few, called on
experienced NGOs to cooperate
with them, and the endeavor
proved surprisingly successful.49
Palestinian NGOs actively
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authority be transferred peacefully
through free, organized elections.
Also, it is impossible to achieve
plurality in power bases within the
community if they do not enjoy
reasonably high levels of public
support and if they fail to enjoy
political, organizational, and
financial independence. Political
interest groups and organizations
were unable to achieve any
significant shift toward democracy
in the Palestinian political system.
This is true even though most of
them adopted, in addition to the
ideology of Palestinian
independence, the concepts of
democracy and human
development and folded them into
their social and economic
programs, along with their political
goals. Popular support of these
groups, therefore, remained very
limited.
Discussion of democracy in the
absence of freely formed groups
and organizations that represent the
political aspirations of the
community is difficult. However,
it is fair to say that despite the
relative decline in the influence of
political parties since the Oslo
Accord, more than half the public
in the West Bank and Gaza Strip
continues to support one of the
seven political organizations that
continually appear in opinion polls.
Although the percentage of truly
active political organizations is
small, not exceeding 1% of the
total, their limited size does not
necessarily translate into limited
influence, because some of them
possess great outreach and impact.
Institutionalizing
democracy
requires
separation of
power
Palestinian NGOs
are considered
highly active
compared with
their counterparts
in neighboring
countries
countries and elsewhere in the
world.
Political groups, labor unions,
and professional federations
The second Intifada did not
generate the levels of popular
participation that characterized the
first Intifada, particularly in its
early stage. The presence of the
PNA as a representative
government and legitimate
negotiator on the people's behalf
may be considered one of the
reasons behind the limited
participation. Opinion polls
indicate that a general decline in
the relative influence of political
parties and unions, as well as
decreased public support for them,
were also factors.
The PNA needs to forge a
relationship with the NGO
community that respects its
autonomy, understands the
demographics of its varied
constituencies and clearly
delineates lines of authority and
jurisdiction. The Palestinian
political system calls for political
plurality, but mere plurality is not
enough to create a functioning
political democracy.
Institutionalizing democracy
requires separation of powers to
prevent the executive branch from
controlling the political landscape.
It also requires the presence of a
multiple power bases in the
community, such as unions,
federations, public interest groups,
NGOs, chambers of commerce and
trade associations. These players
must abide by the rules of the
political game, which specify that
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General evaluation of the role
of civil society
The role of community groups
regressed after the first Intifada and
the rise of the PNA in light of the
continuing occupation and the
division of Palestinian territories
into isolated areas. Many
community leaders were employed
at PNA institutions, which reduced
community organizations‘
independence from official
institutions. It also expanded the
distance between their activities
and the public, which perceived
them as subject to PNA
intervention.  In fact, the rise of the
PNA may be assessed by looking
at the chance that was missed.  The
PNA had the opportunity to
introduce radical changes to the
structure of political parties and
social movements, to bolster the
practice of democracy through
conferences and periodic elections,
and to strengthen internal
regulation and management.
Implementation of these changes
would also help promote
independence and apply pressure
to unify the laws of the West Bank
and Gaza Strip and implement a
national constitution in accordance
with new political and social
realities. Of equal importance is
the new critical awareness that has
begun to appear among political
organizations, unions and NGOs
and is repeatedly voiced in
seminars and workshops. It calls
for democracy and adoption of
development strategies to be
integrated into the resistance
strategy. However, a big gap still
exists between awareness and
practice.
The revival of unions and
federations will require democracy
and independence. It will also
necessitate a reexamination of
protocols, programs and internal
regulations in accordance with the
aspirations and interests of the
public. Resistance programs of these
groups will need to be revitalized.
Lobbying groups must be formed to
support the work of the PNA in
achieving national goals. It is
perhaps necessary for the unions to
cultivate self-reliance in funding
through investment projects,
membership fees, and unrestricted
aid from individuals and institutions.
It may also be necessary for
members of Palestinian civil society
to create a coordinating body
entrusted with the task of presenting
a unified vision that supports the
PNA and its fight for the rights of
the Palestinian people, supporting
local, regional and international
initiatives to that end. They must, at
the same time, pressure responsible
institutions to widen civil and
political freedoms and practice
democracy.  Finally, they must
formulate a sustainable human
development strategy that conforms
to the requisites of building a
modern democratic state and a vital
Palestinian community
characterized by equality and
justice.
Many community
leaders were
employed by PNA
institutions, which
reduced
community
organizations‘
independence
from official
institutions
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Forward
This chapter addresses participation, delegation of
authority, and advancement of human development
in local communities under the current conditions
in Palestine. Delegation of authority in the context
of the PHDR means the full involvement of local
councils and institutions as decision-makers in the
development process.  Those who have followed
the general course of Palestinian development
during the past seven years and specifically the
progress made in building and empowering local
government councils will notice that new
challenges have arisen. The development process
still faces many difficulties, some of which are
caused by political instability and others caused by
the management methods employed by the
Palestinians to address them.
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Section One:
A General Framework of
Participation in Local
Government
This chapter, like the rest of the
PHDR, assumes that resources are
available to resolve problems
faced in the process of enjoining
local councils to advance the cause
of sustainable human development
under the current conditions.
Development requires the
activation and enhancement of the
abilities of Palestinians. The
Palestinians must help to
determine the course of their own
lives, and make maximum use of
available freedoms and mobility.
Palestinians must resist not only
the occupation, but also many self-
imposed hindrances to their active
participation in the development
process.
This chapter also discusses the
factors that weaken Palestinian
community participation,
especially in local government.
Levels of community participation
in the activities of official
institutions and local councils are
explored.  Case studies illustrate
the role of local councils and
NGOs currently active in areas of
PHDR research. The chapter
concludes with an analysis of the
importance of community
participation in local government
organizations and its relationship
to the success of the development
process.
Palestinians need to increase their
participation in the securing of their
rights more than ever. Under the
pressures of the continuing Israeli
occupation, many institutions
stopped providing services and
some fell into a state of general
chaos.  Potent, professional
governmental institutions derive
legitimacy from the public,
directing assets and organizing
human and institutional resources
to advance sustainable human
development in the full
emancipatory sense.  An equitable
partnership cannot be achieved
without the presence of local
government institutions whose
operations are based on the rule of
law and democratic work
mechanisms. The degree to which
centralized institutions are
desirable is a topic of debate. PNA
institutions have been strongly
encouraged to amend their
operations to conform to
recommendations embraced by the
PNA before the Intifada.
Local government in the fullest
sense includes various
development, democratic, and
institutional aspects. It requires a
high degree of delegation of
responsibilities to local councils in
matters of making decisions,
executing them, and assessing
results. The work of local councils
requires them to engage in the
social, economic and political
arenas. It also demands a high level
of community participation, public
lending of legitimacy to councils,
and accountability of local council
representatives.
Development
requires the
activation and
enhancement of
the abilities of
Palestinians
Local government
in the fullest sense
includes various
development,
democratic, and
institutional
aspects
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Bank, but not in the Gaza Strip due
to complexities in its legal system.
The next elections, held in 1976,
provided a better chance for local
and political participation
(National Steering Committee,
High Council of Education, and
others). In 1980, the Israeli
authorities prevented new
municipal elections, and actually
dismantled some municipalities
and appointed alternate councils,
some of them headed by Israeli
military commanders.
Section Two:
The PNA and Community
Participation
The role of the PNA in achieving
sustainable development is
positive, but generally modest and
greatly affected by external
circumstances. Self-imposed
factors influenced both the
successes and failures of
government and civic
performance. The Oslo Accords
limited the authority of the PNA
in the eyes of most Palestinians.
The agreement weakened PNA
control over the future of the
Palestinian land.   Oslo tipped the
balance of power largely in favor
of Israeli interests, and gave Israel
the chance to create new realities
on the ground1. The PNA failed to
build a relationship based on
confidence and mutual respect
with the Palestinian community,
local councils and NGOs. Support
withered for the positive aspects of
the Oslo Accords. The PNA’s
Reclaiming part of the
initiative
The Palestinians invested a large
portion of their limited resources
in the restoration of their social,
political and economic fabric. The
Palestinians, after 1967,
established a network of human
relationships, economic activity,
and political efforts in the occupied
territories. They also established a
network of NGOs that provided
services to the people in the fields
of human rights, education and
health care. These efforts
reinforced the concepts of
patriotism and the Palestinian
identity. Partial autonomy was
achieved, and the community
began to participate in decision-
making. In addition, community
interest in education and cultural
activities was raised. Efforts in
these areas became increasingly
flexible and adaptable to changing
conditions. The results paved the
way for limited Israeli withdrawal
under the Oslo Accords and laid the
foundation for the establishment of
the Palestinian National Authority.
Factors affecting local
government and participation
The Israeli occupation of
Palestinian land in 1967
represented a time of marked
inconsistency. The Palestinians had
political representation in the
occupied territories (the PLO), but
they enjoyed no legal rights,
political influence or decision-
making ability. Two sessions of
local council and municipal
elections were held in the West
In 1980, the Israeli
authorities
prevented new
municipal
elections, and
actually
dismantled some
municipalities
The PNA failed to
build a
relationship based
on confidence and
mutual respect
with the
Palestinian
community
1 . Mustafa Al-Barghouthi, NGOs and their Role in the Future, paper presented at a conference at
Birzeit University on 13-15 May, 1994.
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mandate to negotiate of behalf of
the people eroded in subsequent
years.
One of the PNA’s self-imposed
obstacles was the failure to provide
policies of good governance and a
balanced framework under which
to organize key Palestinian
initiatives. A number of Palestinian
ministers accepted their
appointments solely for the sake of
prestige. Many lacked any relevant
experience in the areas of
governance for which they were
responsible
The PNA similarly failed to
recognize the relationship between
development and resistance.
Government officials separated
development from politics and
both from community
participation. The political agenda
consumed the lion’s share of
human resources and available
assets. Decision-makers at the
PNA failed to assess the
Palestinian condition. They did not
grasp the concept that to a large
degree, resistance efforts take
place at the local community level.
This failure is partially attributable
to inexperience in local
community affairs. Decision-
makers did not establish defined
and institutionalized tools to
arrange the priorities of the
community. The professional
experience needed to properly
address those priorities was at
times absent. Decision-makers did
not exhibit ample understanding of
the practical aspects of human
development and in general, did
not take it seriously2.
As a result, Palestinians in the
occupied territories expressed
disparate levels of satisfaction with
the national authority’s
governance, and were dissatisfied
overall with their quality of life.
The mixed feelings were
intensified with the eruption of Al-
Aqsa Intifada at the end of
September 2000 and the
widespread failures of official
institutions. The leadership
exhibited in the handling of
ensuing legal, security, service, and
supply crises was inadequate to
nonexistent. The community
demonstrated its dissatisfaction by
demanding increased democratic
access and permission to guide
their own community affairs. A
general call was raised to resolve
the political and developmental
crises and to abolish the central
control of the PNA over local
affairs. Demands were made to
stimulate the relationship between
local government institutions and
NGOs to empower the latter to
perform. Criticism was leveled at
the increase in the number of local
councils, such as municipalities
and town councils.  Few receive
adequate funding to allow them to
assume their tasks and most are not
delegated sufficient authority to
participate in decision-making.3
Demands were
made to stimulate
the relationship
between local
government
institutions and
NGOs
2 . Mustafa Miree, Legislation in Palestine: Mechanisms, Objectives and Priorities;  Ramallah,
Palestinian Independent Commission for Human Rights, May 2000, pg. 49.
3.  See for example: Abbas Abdul-Haqq, Urban Schemes and Building Permits in Palestine;
Development Affairs, Volume Ten; first and second issues, pg. 52.
Decision-makers
did not exhibit
ample
understanding of
the practical
aspects connected
of human
development
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Local government in practice
The official local government
system includes development
planning institutions, including the
Higher Council for Urban
Planning, regional planning
committees, local planning and
building committees, and other
permanent and temporary bodies
entrusted with addressing issues or
executing specific tasks. At the
community level, the local
government system includes local
councils and NGOs of various
types.
A consensus appears to exist on the
philosophical basis and the
desirable organizational structure
for local government and its
relationship with the central
government. Various constitutional
provisions lay out a framework for
this structure. Article 176 of the
Temporary Palestinian
Constitution Project 4 provides for
“organizing relations between the
administrations of local units on the
basis of non-central democracy in
managing units of local
government.” Article 168 provides
that “local councils should enjoy
authority, be elected according to
the law, and practice their legally
established authorities. Local
councils shall not be forced to sign
commitments or agreements
except in their area of specialty and
in coordination with the Ministry.”
Article 95 of the Constitution
Draft5 provides that the law shall
establish “the tasks of local
councils, their financial resources,
and relation with the central
government, as well as their role
in preparing and executing
development plans and supervising
various activities. Distribution
shall be based, as much as possible,
on the number and distribution of
residents.”
In practice, Palestinian
governmental institutions and local
councils remain subordinate to a
central management system in
which decision-making is made at
the highest levels. Thus, the
legislation delegating authority to
local councils and administrational
entities mentioned in the three legal
texts above and accountability
concerning their performance in
the governmental framework is
moot. A constitution that defines
the boundaries between the
legislative, judicial, and executive
branches of government and
organizes relations among them
has not been ratified. Legislation
to delegate authority and allow for
accountability has not been passed.
Community participation is
therefore restricted to receiving and
executing decisions, without the
right to participate in making them.
Strengthening the institutional,
political, judicial and executive
infrastructure of the PNA is a first
step toward achieving competent
local government, bolstering
participation, holding elections,
and following professional
methodologies in making
decisions, planning, and appointing
personnel.
A consensus
appears to exist on
the philosophical
basis and the
desirable
organizational
structure for local
government
Strengthening the
institutional,
political, judicial
and executive
infrastructure of
the PNA is a first
step toward
achieving
competent local
government
4 . Issued on 1 Septemper 2000 by the drafting committee formed by the Central Council in
October, 1999.
5 . The Fourth Draft of the Constitution for the Interim Status Stage, a document prepared by the
Palestinian Legislative Council and published on 22  January, 1996.
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No constitutional provision
designates the body or bodies
responsible for making
development decisions within the
PNA. After the PNA arrived in the
West Bank and Gaza Strip, the
only call for the establishment of
a development planning council
was the Presidential decree issued
on 10 January 2000, calling for the
establishment of a high
development council headed by
the President. The decree was
issued after the publishing of the
“Rokar Report,” which was widely
embraced by the donor
community. It is difficult to gauge
the performance of the
development council in light of the
lack of information about its
activities.
Preparing plans and budgets
There are indicators that point to
the absence of a development
vision to guide the work of
Palestinian governmental and non-
governmental organizations.
These indicators also highlight a
lack of community participation,
a recognized and enforceable
system of laws, management
systems, and ample monitoring
provisions and follow-through.
The role of the Legislative Council
and local councils in creating plans
and establishing priorities and
distributing budgets is inadequate.
Guidance from the Ministries of
Finance and Planning is noticeably
absent. For example, the
Palestinian Development Plan for
1999-2003 was not presented to
the PLC for deliberation and
approval, and the presentation of
the 2001 budget was delayed until
five months after the established
October deadline, which is a
violation of the third article of the
budget law. Also, the year-end
budgets for 1998, 1999, and 2000
were never presented. This, of
course, assumes that the budget law
is a legal framework for the
development plan, and requires
that the PNA, community
development organizations, and
donors adhere to it in their work.
Community participation,
however, in the review of the year-
end budget and establishment the
general budget was practically
nonexistent. The general budget for
the financial year 1996-1997
presents an example of flawed
development decision-making
processes within the PNA. The
third article of the law provides that
income in the form of grants and
foreign aid can be used to fund
development initiatives only after
“prioritized projects funded by
external aid receive Cabinet
approval, based on
recommendations from the
Finance Minister. The aid should
be distributed fairly according to
sector and geographical
distribution.”
In addition, there are several
examples of disregard for
provisions of the general budget
law despite enforcement
mechanisms the law provides. For
example, the Ministry of Finance
is still unable to cover the budgets
of ministries and fails to publicize
local council budgets, as the law
requires. Ministries that do not
have budgets fund their activities
from loans granted by the Ministry
of Finance. The situation is
different for other ministries; the
62
There is a gap
between the stated
objectives and
what was actually
implemented
Ministry of Education, for
example, has operated with an
established annual budget since
1996, covering expenses incurred
in the prior period (1994-1996)
with Ministry of Finance loans. It
is interesting how loans provided
by donor countries and other
financiers are handled; in most
instances, the loans are transferred
between donors and the
governmental institution without
the oversight of the Ministry of
Finance or the Ministry of Planning
and International Cooperation and
without commitment to the
provisions of the development plan
and the budget law.
Community awareness of the
importance of budgets is still weak.
Civil society institutions and
various interest groups fail to
follow up on the preparation of
budgets. They do not attempt to
influence them in favor of
neglected segments of the
community, or advocate the
importance of investing in
sustainable human development.
Section Three:
The Relationship of Local
Government Councils
with the MOLG
The Ministry of Local Government
(MOLG) was formed by a decision
from the Palestinian leadership in
Tunisia on 25 February 1994. The
Ministry was to implement a
limited version of a local
government structure and to ensure
that “local government consists of
local councils in the form of
municipalities, town councils, and
joint service councils that work for
the benefit of the residents. Each
local committee has an area of
jurisdiction within the boundaries
of the state”.6 The Ministry adopted
a general policy based on the
following four basic objectives:
1.  Advancing the concepts of local
government and decentralized
management, and to create local
government institutions that
support the national objective of
building Palestinian local
communities that embrace
democratic elections.
2. Raising the quality of services
in the Palestinian rural
community to bridge the gap
between rural and urban areas.
3. Developing the abilities of local
councils.
4. Reviewing the performance of
local councils established before
the inception of the PNA in order
to arrive at a local government
vision concurrent with the
Palestinian agenda.
Nevertheless, there is a gap
between the stated objectives and
what was actually implemented.
The recurrence of terms such as
centrality, decentralization, and
participation in the literature of
Community
awareness of the
importance of
budgets is still
weak
6 .  The PNA, MOLG, no publication date.
7 .  Local Government, Issue 1, September 1999.
8.   See for example: Hasan Al-Araj, Deputy Minister of Local Government; The Development of
the Palestinian Local System.
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local government is interesting8, in
the absence of a clear context for
interpretation. The legal system’s
references to local government are
marked by a high degree of
ambiguity. Some officials at the
MOLG objected to the phrase
“appointing members of local
council,” explaining that forming
the local councils was
accomplished not through
“appointment” at President’s
orders, but rather through
“selection meant to steer the affairs
of the residents and with the help
of the residents themselves.” The
officials also insisted that the
terminology represented a middle
ground between “election and
appointment”.9 Regardless of the
words used, the phrasing did not
agree with any legal texts or with
the publicly avowed commitments
to decentralization, which were
designed to ensure free elections
and professional basis for
“selection,” or with the concept of
community participation. In
addition, the Minister of Local
Government issued decisions
regarding internal policies that
conflicted with the authorities
delegated to local councils by
law10. Also, the appointment
mechanism revived and
strengthened tribal system and
favoritism.
It can be said that the
circumstances surrounding the
inception of the PNA and its failure
to implement human development
in the broader sense, in addition to
the absence a national policy of
local government within a
comprehensive political vision
explains the lack of planning,
allotment of funds, and delegation
of authorities11.
The Intifada affirmed that
implementation of the principles
with which most Palestinians agree
and which the MOLG supports -
decentralization, local and
community participation,
strengthening of local councils, and
others - was and still is a decisive
factor in empowering the
Palestinian community to resist
and develop.
Box (3 - 1): A comprehensive approach to local government
“The MOLG pursues the general goal of developing, uniting, and achieving
comprehensiveness in local government and realizing high quality local
government, thereby nurturing democracy and the participation of citizens in
the building and development process. It is responsible for organizing regional
planning and drafting laws and regulations for local councils and developing
the councils to the level of securing infrastructure services to all areas.”
Saeb Ereqat, Minister of Local Government7
9.  In an interview with the Local Government magazine, “Ereqat confirms the formulation of a
national strategy for urban planning that challenges settlement;” Local Government; Issue
No. 1, September 1999.
10.  Previous reference, pg. 12.
11. Tareq Toqan, Report on Decentralization and Local Government in Palestine; Ramallah, the
Independent Commission for Human Rights; May 2001; pg. 23-30 and 35-37.
The legal system‘s
references to local
government are
disabled by a high
degree of
ambiguity
Appointment
mechanism
revived and
strengthened
tribal system and
favoritism
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12. Consultation Group for Rural Development (ARD Decentralization in Local Government in
Palestine; Study of the Opportunities and Possibilities of Implementing Decentralization in
Local Government in the West Bank and Gaza Strip (draft;) February 2000, pg. 13.
Box (3 - 2): The Higher Planning Council
The Higher Planning Council and its affiliate bodies are considered vital to the
work of local councils. The Council was established by presidential decree issued
on 21 August 1995 and is headed by the Minister of Local Government. Council
membership comprises representatives from the Ministries of Planning, Public
Works, Transport, Housing, Health, Labor, Tourism and Antiquities, Industry,
Agriculture, Trade, Culture, and Environment, in addition to the Attorney
General, the Jerusalem Custodian, the Chief Engineer, and the general director
of Urban Planning at the MOLG. The council works to enforce the modified
temporary (Jordanian) Law No. 79 issued in 1966. The council is noted for
“centrality, especially in financial affairs12.” Examining the composition and
performance of the council, the absence of community participation is evident,
especially considering that the “Jerusalem Custodian” does not actually exist
and that the Chief Engineer is the only elected member from the engineering
community as per the law. Also, the Executive Council plays a dominant role in
formulating planning policies that directly affect the community. Preserving
the laws that restrict the role of local councils and their desire to develop,
especially those concerning the responsibilities of governors, further
strengthened the centrality of the Executive Council and limited community
participation. The administrative structures law reinforced centralization and
failed to clarify administrative policies. Although Articles 12 and 13 of the law
suggest that the authorities of the governor focus on security affairs, Article 15
nonetheless grants the governor authorities that should be delegated to local
councils.
The Intifada
affirmed that
decentralization,
local and
community
participation,  are
decisive factors in
empowering the
Palestinian
community
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Section Four: Local
Government in Practice
The law defines a local council as
a financially independent entity,
but it does not define its level of
independence. In practice, the
financial independence of local
councils is limited, as will be later
shown, and the same applies to the
level of administrative
independence.
Comparing the condition of local
councils under occupation to their
condition under the administration
of the PNA, a positive change
appears. Under the PNA, local
councils have been freed from the
numerous Israeli policies that
worked to weaken their ability to
serve the community13 and from
the unfairness inherent in the
Jordanian law. The rise of the PNA
protected areas under its control
from Israeli settlement expansion,
but the PNA, despite its other
accomplishments, failed to involve
the community in local
administration and in development
efforts. The PNA did not delegate
authority or create mechanisms to
enable local councils to fulfill their
potential role in the development
and administrative processes.
Central PNA institutions currently
find themselves unable to work
harmoniously with local councils
and other community institutions
and appear increasingly
bureaucratic in their outlook and
function. The people find
themselves confused as to
institutional jurisdiction issues, as
authority remains vested in high-
level officials and in specific
geographical areas, such as
Ramallah and Gaza, both
according to the law and in terms
of actual practice.
An analysis of indicators helps
introduce a discussion of the
relationship between local councils
and the performance of the PNA.
Foremost among those indicators
is the great discrepancy in living
standards between rural areas and
urban centers, between the West
Bank and Gaza Strip, and among
the north, center, and south of the
West Bank. Also, the status of the
council, its relationship with
official governmental institutions,
its authority, and its source of
income as defined by the local
councils law of 1997 are important
indicators, as is the relationship
between living standards and the
authority of the council in
addressing them. Available
information shows that 25% of the
West Bank suffers lack of local
representation. The percentage
varies from the north of the West
Bank, and to its center and its
south; while 25% of locales in the
Jenin district are not represented,
only 6% of Ramallah locales are
not represented, rising to 44% in
Hebron. The same applies to
education; 74% of locales in Tobas
in the northern West Bank lack
elementary schools, compared to
25% in Ramallah, 17% in
The law defines a
local council as a
financially
independent
entity
Central PNA
institutions
currently find
themselves unable
to work
harmoniously
with local
councils
13. Anthony Cone, Urban Israeli Planning of the Cities of the West Bank-+the Law and the Bulldozer
in the Service of Jewish Settlement; Palestinian Studies Center; January, 1995. Also see
Addendum No. 2 of Military Order No. 418 concerning the urban planning and building code,
issued 23 March 1971.
Great discrepancy
in living
standards
between rural
areas and urban
centers exists
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Jerusalem, and 61% in Hebron in
the southern West Bank. This
situation also applies to water and
power utilities.14 Case studies,
which will be presented later,
reveal strong correlation between
the power of the local council and
the power of civil community
institutions, meaning that the
strength of one also strengthens the
other.
Another noteworthy indicator,
albeit titular, is that most local
councils use the letterhead of the
MOLG, which promotes the
perception of the ministry’s
dominance. Other local councils,
especially bigger, richer ones
connected politically with
decision-makers, do not use
Ministry letterhead. Also, the
presence of several mayors and
local council heads in high-level
posts at legislative and executive
institutions lends their councils
greater weight in political and
economic decision-making and in
obtaining funding compared to
their counterparts.
Box (3 - 3): The relationship of local councils with the MOLG, residents,
and project implementation
In a study of the relationship of the MOLG with ten local councils and the
residents, it was revealed that meetings with the MOLG usually invite the
minister, the deputy minister, the assistant deputy minister and the ministry
director. The visits of the minister and the deputy minister differ from the others;
while the attendance at meetings of the first two were marked as “several” and
“never”, attendance of the assistant deputy minister and local council director
were marked as “often”. As for the Allar Municipality, the assistant deputy
minister never visited it, while the local government director visited “often”.
Local council contact with the residents differs, ranging from periodic meetings
to invitations to limited meetings or open meetings with limited objectives.
According to polled residents, the best ways to initiate projects are to attend
official and non-official meetings, to make continuing requests, and to foster
personal relationships with decision-makers. In Turmusayya, the residents
believed that “nothing was useful”.15
14 . World Bank 2001 (Ibid)
15. From: Nasr Yaqoub, Hussein Al-Araj, and Suheil Khalileh; The Palestinian Experience in
Formed Municipalities; Schedule No. 6, Arab Thought Forum, February 2001 (Beit Lahia, Al-
Qarara, Tammoun, Al-Sumua, Allar, Burqeen, Aseera Al-Shamalieh, Turmusaa, and Abasan.)
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Local councils, as per Article 2 of
the law, are obliged to conform to
general policy defined by the
MOLG and to abide by its
financial and administrative
supervision. According to the law,
the council does not have the
authority to represent the interests
of the town, directly or indirectly,
at the Higher Planning Council,
although it must abide by its
decisions. As for the relationship
with governors, local councils
must heed the administrative
structures law. Often, the authority
of the council and that of the
governor entangle, and authority
extended local councils is unclear
due to the vagueness of governor
authority. The administrative
structures law, in its form
presented to the PLC for a second
reading, added to executive
centrality by diminishing the role
of councils in bolstering
community participation in
decision-making, shrinking the
role previously extended them by
the law. The administrative
structures law “obliterates the
council and strips it of all authority,
turning it into an employee of the
district”16.  The law diminishes
local councils’ authority and
prevents them from exercising
authority spelled out by the law.
The abilities of local councils to
play a partnership role in decision-
making vary according to council
reliance on self-sufficient funding
and on its relative influence within
the ranks of the executive
authority, decision-making
powers, and donors.
Some larger municipalities, whose
reliance on executive authority
ministries, especially the Ministry
of Finance, is limited, are able to
overcome obstacles that seem
insurmountable for smaller
municipalities, aided in doing so by
their great ability to influence
decision-makers and donors, which
enables them to avoid
complications. On the flip side,
smaller, weaker municipalities,
especially newer ones, do not enjoy
such influence and resources,
increasing the gap between them
and their bigger counterparts.
Also, the overlapping of the roles
of ministries and other institutions
regarding their relationship with
local councils confuses the latter,
causes conflict within the
authorities of the ministry itself,
and also wastes resources because
of the lack of ample coordination.
Financial revenue of local
councils
Article 22 of the local councils law
defines three sources of revenue for
local council income: taxes and
fees determined in Palestinian
laws, donations and grants, and the
budget of the executive authority.
However, local councils do not
have the authority to collect taxes
and fees or determine spending;
they are obligated to obtain
Ministry approval to do so
according to the law. Municipality
budgets are subject to the approval
of the Minister of Local
Government. Articles 8 and 11 of
the financial system of local
The law
diminishes local
councils‘
authority
Local councils do
not have the
authority to
collect taxes and
fees or determine
spending
16. Nasr Yaqoub and Hussein Al-Araj, previously cited reference, pg. 63.
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Residents and residents living
abroad offer monetary donations as
well as non-financial contributions,
such as land, schoolrooms, clinics
and mosques. In a study about
municipalities, the researchers
urged the municipalities to
cooperate with the Ministry of
Waqf to regulate mosque building,
to decrease the high cost of
constructing them and using the
savings to build schools or health
centers.18  Participation is not
possible in absence of raised
awareness of these issues. It also
necessitates diligent work by the
media, NGOs, and governmental
organizations to spread
information about development
and participation and its
mechanisms.
councils issued on 4 March 1999
provide that the council does not
have the authority to amend budget
articles without the approval of the
Minister. Local councils also do not
receive their share (90%) of local
property taxes and professional
Box (3 - 4) : Failure of residents to pay fees
Municipalities suffer budget deficits due to the failure of residents to pay their
dues from time to time and from town to town. Before the Intifada, no more
than 70% of the people paid their bills, dipping to 30% during the Intifada.17
The regression is attributed to worsening economic conditions and negligence
caused by other factors, such as the belief of some that taxes and fees are not
invested into development projects for the benefit of the residents and the
dissatisfaction of some with the structure or performance of the municipal
council.
licensing fees collected by the
Ministry of Finance. As for
donations, they come from four
sources: the residents, residents
living abroad, sisterhood projects,
and other donors.
Media, NGOs, and
governmental
organizations are
to spread
awareness about
development and
participation
17 . Meetings with municipality officials.
18. Previous reference, pg. 62.
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Box (3 - 5): Community participation
Community participation is a characteristic of the Palestinian local communities,
and many of them proved they are able to cooperate in building schools, donating
land, and providing funds, equipment and labor. For example, in 1999-2000,
the local community in Hebron and the area to its south donated 483 classrooms,
compared to 187 offered by the Ministry of Education. In Nablus, the
municipality offered 34 classrooms, and a city resident donated  $1 million to
build a school, with other donations coming from “education taxes.” Several
municipalities in the West Bank collect donations from students at instructions
from the Education Ministry as per a Jordanian law that is not implemented in
the Gaza Strip. One shekel (less than 25 cents) was collected from every student
monthly in Hebron and Nablus. The money collected is used to buy land,
maintain buildings and buy equipment. However, the system is not employed
uniformly across the West Bank, and everybody needs to exert more effort to
raise the standing of education in the territories. Also, official institutions must
revitalize the cooperative community spirit among residents, which develops
with the belief in belonging and partnership in the responsibilities and rewards
of development work.19
Box (3 - 6): UNDP Local Rural Development Programme
The philosophy of this program relies on community participation in determining
needs, establishing priorities, and planning and execution. To that end, regional
planning committees were formed that included representatives from the local
community and the MOLG. Community participation covered 17.6% of the
cost of 123 projects executed in the West Bank. Communities of 39 villages
also participated in determining the development needs of their villages by way
of questionnaires.21
“Twin cities” programs with cities
abroad are not a significant source
of income, usually restricted to
cultural exchange and exchange of
technical expertise. Because most
local councils are not involved in
these programs, they do not benefit
from this resource.20
19. Dag Aarnes, Ibrahim Dakkak, Romi Khoslam, and Amjad Yaaqba; Joint Review of School
Infrastructure, Development Programme in the West Bank and Gaza, Commissioned by the
Education Sector Working Group; Ramallah/Oslo, 2000; pg. 33.
 20. Workshop: The Geographical Relationship of Municipalities in the Bethlehem District with
the MOLG and Refugee Camps; Bethlehem, 10, July, 2001.
21.  Drafted by LRD - MOLG.
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Members and
heads of local
councils are
appointed by the
PNA
In an opinion poll focusing on
community participation in the
work of local councils, only 21%
of those polled believed that local
councils involved the community
in decision-making, while 56%
thought the opposite (67% in the
Gaza Strip). Dissatisfaction with
the performance of local councils
seems higher in the Gaza Strip than
it is in the West Bank.
Table (3-1): Participation in Local Government according to Public Opinion
1. Do you believe that the local council in your community represents more the
interests of the residents or the government (PNA)? (Percentages)
1) Represents the interests of the community     33.6 37.4     27.7
2) Represents the interests of the government     15.6 13.5     18.7
3) Represents the interests of segments or     36.4 36.1     36.8
     individuals
4) Undecided     14.5 13.0      16.8
2. Does the local council in your community involve residents in making decisions
regarding important projects that affect your community? (Percentages)
1.Yes   20.5 23.6      15.6
2.To an extent   14.5 17.8      9.3
3.No   55.9 48.5      67.5
4.Undecided    5.1 5.0      5.4
West Bank
and Gaza
West
Bank
Gaza Strip
 A possible explanation for the
levels of dissatisfaction indicated
by the opinion poll may be that
members and heads of local
councils are appointed by the
PNA, and appointment is reliant
more on tribal and factional
interests than on the input of the
average citizen and is not based on
professional standards. Although
no elections were held for local
councils as per Law No. 5 for the
year 1995 since the inception of the
PNA, there is a level of satisfaction
with the performance of the PNA
in terms of community
participation.
Assessment of the performance of local councils
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Box (3-7): The MOLG and the participation of women
There is some indication that the MOLG is keen to involve women in its operation and in local
councils, although only limited participation was achieved, and in general membership, not
positions of leadership. The Ministry established the Women’s Program in order to involve women
in the planning process and its programs and to increase women’s membership in local councils.
As a result, the number of women in local councils totaled 52, compared to 3,535 men, with one
of the women occupying the post of head of the village council of Khirbet Qais in the Salfeet
District, which was an unprecedented occurrence.
It should be mentioned that some local councils refuse female participation, basing their rejection
on religious and cultural reasons. Also, many councils in the Gaza Strip and in several locales in
the West Bank do not have female members. The manner in which women were appointed to
local councils was inappropriate and frustrating for many women, because tribal and factional
connections superseded merit and the desire to represent neglected segments of society, as there
was clear preference to appoint people of certain clans that made up a robust percentage of the
local community. Many appointments were made amid disputes and struggles in which women
could not engage for social and political reasons. Although men were appointed directly, without
the need for consensus and the approval of the Minister of Local Government and the President,
women needed the approval of the local council members to become members, and a single
objection could result in the rejection of membership. In many instances, women were required
to hold elections among themselves to choose a candidate.
From a practical standpoint, women were faced with obstacles and impossible conditions meant
to keep them from becoming members. Some officials play a negative role in appointing women
because their interests are connected with those of residents opposed to the idea of involving
women. For example, most of the women in the village of Kufr Ein signed a petition demanding
that vacant posts at the village council be filled by women they had chosen, but the appointment
was never made because several members of the council disapproved and the council director
agreed with them. Generally, women’s participation remains limited due to the absence of a clear
and enforceable decision on the part of concerned PNA institutions.
As for employment, female employees of the Ministry make up 19% of the total workforce, 52%
of them working as housekeepers, switchboard operators, and secretaries, with a visible lack of
female representation in leadership positions and middle and high administrative posts.22 Most
local councils have no female employees.
22. See the statement of the Minister of Local Government on 10 February 1999, in which he said
that “work must be done to involve women in the membership of local councils in order to
activate the role of women in the Palestinian society.” Refer to Local Government, Issues two
and three, first year.
Many
appointments
were made
amid disputes
and struggles in
which women
could not
engage for
social and
political
reasons
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development process.
º The donors did not adequately
support the process of developing
the capabilities of local councils
in order to maintain the pace of
progress on existing projects,
sustain results, and launch new
projects. The same applies to
resources.
º The donors should have
coordinated their poverty relief
efforts and developed a unified
strategy.
º The donors overemphasized the
funding of projects with tangible
results, such as infrastructure,
and while these projects are
important, they often came at the
expense of needed improvements
in health and social services.
  The problem is not caused only
by the factors listed by the World
Bank. There are other reasons
that play a role in creating the
defect, such the difficulty of
cooperation between the donors
and the recipients due to
differences in culture, values, and
work style, and the discord in the
work mechanisms of the donors
themselves and their inability to
unify them.
The absence of a unified, consistent
legal fabric to govern the various
activities of the Palestinian
community adds another problem.
Matters are further complicated
because the PNA failed to adopt
standards, which allowed donors to
The role of donors in
community participation
Donor countries are the most
important source of funding to
local councils. In many cases, the
councils are restricted to the
agendas of the donors themselves.
In some cases, the conditions of
donors do not correspond with the
priorities of local communities. In
many instances the donors require
the participation of residents in
funding projects at a rate of 10%-
25% of cost.23
Government grants, when
available, are a source of income
for local councils. The grants are
few and are not distributed
according to the number of
residents, the size of the town, or
the demonstrated need for it.
However, the PNA President, by
virtue of his authority, provides
support for some local councils
based on local or national political
considerations24 concerned with
protecting certain areas from
Israeli settlement expansion or
aggression.
A World Bank report25 about the
flaws in the donor performance
indicates weakness concentrated in
four areas:
º Allowing beneficiaries to play a
more active role in sustaining
projects in addition to involving
them in determining their own
needs and making them believe
that they are part of the
In some cases, the
conditions of
donors do not
correspond with
the priorities of
local communities
There is a need to
develop the
capabilities of
local councils
23. Source: MOLG.
24. Consultation Group for Rural Development (ARD)  Decentralization in Local Government in
Palestine, a study to examine the chances for implementation of - decentralization in local
government in the West Bank and Gaza Strip (draft;) February 2000, pg. 14.
25. See: The World Bank, West Bank and Gaza-Social Analysis of the Rural Sector within the
CDF Framework (unpublished mimeographed draft.)
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push their own agendas to the
forefront, without heed for
Palestinian priorities.26
Section Five:
Participation and
community development
(case studies)
Five local councils were selected
as cases representing, to a degree,
the patterns of local government in
the West Bank and Gaza Strip.
Although the sample studies do not
offer details about similar cases,
they do provide important insight
about other councils and about
local government in general. It was
obvious that local councils
suffered due to the unclear
relationship with the central PNA
institutions. Most of them suffered
lack of funding and inequity in
allocated budgets. Consultation
between the public and local
councils was limited in all cases,
and discrepancy in the ability of
councils to make decisions clearly
relied on their size, years in
operation, experience, managerial
and political aptitude, and
influence at the level of Palestinian
decision-making. Mechanisms of
strengthening participation depend
greatly on the effectiveness of local
community institutions working in
the locale and their influence and
ability to move projects. There was
no effective framework, in almost
every case, to institutionalize the
participation of the local
community and its organizations in
local government, both in terms of
consultation and execution.
Additionally, women, the segment
of society most affected by the
work of the councils, were far from
represented, and youth and
children were ignored to a large
extent in the planning and
execution of projects. Several
Palestinian institutions emphasized
the need to integrate the opinions
and interests of children in the
work of local government councils
in order to push forward
participation and sustain
development.
First: larger councils with
influence (Gaza Municipality as a
model)27 Gaza City is one of the
biggest Palestinian cities, with a
population of close to 400,000,
57% of them under the age of 19.
The city is renowned for political
and hierarchical diversity and
population variety.  A large
majority of its citizens are refugees
from 1948 Palestine, and it is home
The PNA failed to
adopt clear
standards, which
allowed donors to
push their own
agendas
26 . The President‘s Adviser for Economic Affairs, Maher Al-Kurd, said the following, “The economic
goals of the international aid program were modest (or realistic from the standpoint of the donors,)
limited to rehabilitation of economic conditions to restore them by 1998 (at the end of the five-year
interim period) to the indexes of 1987 that preceded the first Intifada.... More than 25% of the
funding offered for infrastructure projects was spent on research, as was the case with the housing
sector, which received $110 million, more than half of which spent on studies and consultation.
Likewise, half the spending on the production sector went to research and studies, and most of the
funding allotted for developing the industrial sector ($32 million) went to studying industrial zones.”
Al-Quds, 9 July, 2001. Also see the first part of the study published in Al-Quds on 8 July, 2001.
27. Data about the priorities of children presented in box No. (3-9) and about the Gaza Municipality
obtained from a study about children and local council budgets prepared by Nader Said for the
Palestinian Children‘s Secretariat in 2000. The indicated workshops involved 48 children from
Gaza and Salfeet.
Strengthening
participation
depends on the
effectiveness of
local community
institutions
Youth and
children were
ignored to a large
extent in the
planning and
execution of
projects
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Lack of focus,
weak
coordination,
conflicting
authorities lead to
ineffective and
waste of resources
to one refugee camp. The city of
Gaza was among the most
attractive cities for Palestinian
returnees because of the abundance
of PNA institutions in it.
The Gaza Municipality receives
the largest share of allocated
budgets because of its size and
because of the power of the
municipal council in reaching
decision-makers. In 1998, the
development budget of Gaza City
reached $14 million.
The municipal council was
appointed in 1994 by presidential
decree and included personalities
that represented the most notable
families in the city. Gaza is the
center of the PNA and is home to
all ministries and PNA councils.
Also, many international institutions
make headquarters in Gaza City,
most notably UNRWA, and the
majority of NGOs in the Gaza Strip
are concentrated in Gaza City. This
leads to many advantages terms of
the scope of activities in the city and
the potential for interaction among
institutions, but lack of focus, weak
coordination, conflicting authorities
lead to ineffectiveness and waste of
resources.
The Gaza Municipality undertook a
limited number of activities to
involve the community in assessing
priorities. Nine meetings were held
in 1999 with prominent citizens of
the community to discuss problems
and determine priorities, and despite
the value of the meetings, they are
not considered an institutionalized
manner of interaction. Also, the
majority of the members of
neglected segments of society, such
as women, children and youth, have
little access the municipality and do
not participate in decision-making.
The municipality does not discuss
the budget with the residents,
instead determining its operating
budget internally and development
budget with the donors. NGOs have
no role in this process.
Second: Councils connected
geographically (Bethlehem District
municipalities as a model)
Five local councils/municipalities
are connected geographically:
Bethlehem, Beit Sahour, Beit Jala,
Al-Doha, and Al-Khader.  Two were
recently established: Al-Doha
(1996) and Al-Khader (1997).
Boards that comprise 62 members
and mayors appointed by the
MOLG, including seven women,
none at Al-Doha, operate municipal
councils. The participation of
women in this district is noticeably
higher than in others, and the
councils are geographically
responsible, directly or indirectly,
for the refugee camps of Dheisheh
and Aida.
The municipal councils represent
political and tribal factions.
Nonetheless, there is a consensus
among the residents that decision-
making is still internal, and the
representatives of the political
factions and tribal groups play a
large role in affecting the nature and
work of the councils. There is as yet
no serious effort to involve the
community in decision-making,
with the exception of one or two
councils that coordinate with the
residents and community
In 1998, the
development
budget of Gaza
City reached $14
million
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The municipal
councils represent
political and
tribal factions
28. Interviews with mayors and a workshop attended by mayors or their representatives. Bethlehem, 10/07/2001
29. Workshop, previously cited reference.
Box(3 - 8): Selected results of a workshop with mayors and local council members 28
Cooperation and coordination among area municipalities is very limited, usually confined to consultation
on very specific issues that still require the approval of the MOLG and other concerned parties. The weak
levels of cooperation among municipalities are a result of the nature of the residential areas and the way in
which they are connected by vague geographic borders that blur the jurisdictional authority of the
municipalities. This geographical convergence leads to conflict because of the intertwining of authority
among the municipalities and with the responsibilities of UNRWA in refugee camps.
There was not enough coordination among the five municipalities to resolve their problems in the past.
However, conditions that emerged in the Intifada prompted the municipalities to renew efforts to coordinate
in order to overcome the siege imposed by Israeli authorities. As a result, the municipalities jointly established
a solid waste dump and are currently discussing the founding of a cooperative services council after realizing
the economic value of such a council and its importance in the provision of services. The project is currently
awaiting the completion of cost-profit analyses. Officials of the five municipalities who attended a workshop
in Bethlehem expressed interest in the idea of turning the five areas of jurisdiction into one contiguous
development area.
Available funding resources are clearly inadequate and cannot support the number and size of governmental
institutions providing services in each jurisdiction.
Various groups are engaged in development projects in the five municipalities, some local and some relying
on international support. Some of the most visible and active parties in the five areas are the Bethlehem
2000 Project, the Palestinian Economic Council for Development and Reconstruction (PECDAR), and
several ministries and NGOs. Joint ventures between the institutions are rare.  Municipal councils establish
their budgets individually, without conferring with one another.
Despite the interest expressed by workshop participants in preserving membership in the General Union of
Local Councils, most of them considered the achievements of the council limited and felt that the council
needed reinvigoration and should provide better representation of the interests of local councils.29
representatives before making
major decisions. Thus, the
relationship between council and
community varies from council to
council, and despite the presence of
many NGOs in the area, they do not
try to influence the policies and
programs of the councils.
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Third: recently-established
councils (Tammoun as a model)30
Tammoun is located in the
northern West Bank and is under
the administration of the Tobas
District, but it still relies on
scattered administrative and
service-related support from
Nablus, Jenin, and Tobas. The
original Israeli plan for the town
was 250 acres, but it has grown
well beyond those boundaries to its
present size of 1,412.5 acres. The
population stands at 11,000 and the
town contains 1,900 homes. The
Tammoun Municipality was
founded in 1997.
º Because of historical neglect of
Tammoun, the local council
received considerable attention
from official PNA representatives
as well as from donors, largely
because the local council proved
able to pressure them. Despite the
presence of representative at the
PLC, the representative visited the
town only once in four years, and
none of the town residents
occupies an influential post at the
PNA. Members of the local
council express dissatisfaction
with the council relationship with
the Ministry, believing that the
council heeds only the Minister,
not the entire Ministry, and that the
nature of the current relationship
hinders their ability to work.
º The council has held one meeting
with the residents in the past three
years inviting the “prominent“
members of the community. The
council established a services
committee made up of residents
and town institutions entrusted with
offering opinions about the
priorities established by the
council. However, the council did
not remain true to its agenda during
the past three years, and its
performance dispirited the
residents and convinced them that
the services committee was
founded at the behest of the donors,
not because of any intent to involve
them in decision-making. In short,
as is the case at many councils, the
Tammoun local council does not
see the involvement of the residents
as a priority at present, especially
in light of the lack of institutional
mechanisms to guarantee the
participation of the community in
local government and decision-
making. This situation can be
partially attributed to the newness
of the council and the lack of
awareness on the part of its
members of this issue.
º Eight NGOs operate in the town
with varying levels of productivity,
three of them women's groups.
Nevertheless, civil society
organizations in Tammoun endure
many problems, at the heart of
which is the sporadic activity of the
NGOs, their relative lack of
experience and democratic
organizational structure, the
ambiguous relationship between
The council has
held one meeting
with the residents
in the past three
years
30. Data obtained from a study prepared by Nader Said for the World Bank about poverty and
rural development (1999) and from Nasr Yaqoub and others (previously cited reference) and a
World Bank report (previously cited reference.)
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the NGOs and the PNA, and the
local council's ambivalent attitude
towards the NGOs.
º The council does not adequately
represent the majority of the town
citizens. Children, women and
youth are not represented in the
membership of the council,
although women are very active in
NGO activity.
º The council suffers from serious
financial problems, with revenue
of 603,865 shekels and debts
exceeding one million shekels
(approximately $250,000).
Fourth: village councils (Nouba
as a model)31
º The village of Nouba is one of
156 residential locales in the
Hebron District. Its population is
estimated at 4,000 (in 2000), and
it is bordered by the villages of
Kharas, Beit Oula and Khirbet
Hatta.
º The Nouba Village Council was
appointed in 1996 by the MOLG
and comprises seven members that
almost resigned at the time the
Development Studies Programme
was conducting fieldwork for this
study. The council director and the
members work as volunteers, and
the director does not receive a
salary, which renders him unable
to assume his tasks on a full-time
basis. The absence of an active
village council may have played
the biggest role in the deterioration
of conditions in the village, the
disorganization of programs, and
the lack of community
participation.
 º The absence of a local council
or any other institution appears in
the attempts to influence decision-
makers. Part of the negligence is
attributed to the isolation of the
village and the feeling among the
residents that they are neglected
because of the small size of their
village compared with others.
º The majority of the residents,
including the council members,
views the council as part of the
PNA and expects it only to provide
water and power and collect refuse.
º NGOs in Nouba play no
important role; there are only four
such organizations in the village,
mostly inactive. According to the
participants of a workshop held in
the village, negligence in this
regard is caused by the intervention
of the security apparatus in the
work of the NGOs and the refusal
to license them for political
reasons.
º Only the heads of families were
consulted when the council was
formed, and not the rest of the
residents.
º Women in Nouba do not
participate in public life and are not
represented at the council. Women
do not have an organization
tending to their affairs or
expressing their ambitions. There
are no health or education services
for women, with the exception of
very limited prenatal care. There
are also no institutions providing
31. Data and analysis from a study mentioned above (Nader Said, for the benefit of the World
Bank.)
The absence of an
active village
council may have
played the biggest
role in the
deterioration of
conditions in the
village
The majority of
the residents,
including the
council members,
views the council
as part of the PNA
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services for youth and children.
º There are two kindergartens in
Nouba; one operated by a
charitable organization and one a
private enterprise.
º Nouba representatives agreed to
form a service council to serve the
village and others nearby, but
implementing the idea was
difficult due to tribal conflict and
a lack of constructive ministry
involvement. However, there is a
level of cooperation with neighbor
villages in the area of refuse
collection services.
º Nouba does not attract local
attention or international funding;
it does not lie in the most
disadvantaged section of the
district (the south), it is not one of
the bigger cities that enjoy political
influence, and is not home to a
strong community capable of
placing pressure on decision-
makers.
Fifth: refugee camps (Al-Jalazoan
camp as a model)32
Refugee camps, with the exception
of a few in the central Gaza Strip,
have no councils affiliated with the
PNA, nor do they have internal
councils to lead community
efforts. Popular committees/
service committees are the semi-
representative bodies in refugee
camps, serving as the counterpart
to local councils in cities and
villages.
º  Al-Jalazoan camp was
established in 1950, northwest of
Ramallah. The 8,382 residents
(according to UNRWA resources in
2000) of the camp came from 36
villages destroyed in the war of
1948. There are approximately
2,040 families in the camp.
º The camp is run by a manager
appointed by UNRWA who
enforces the agency's decisions and
programs, upholds the law, and
examines the needs of the camp and
the concerns of the residents to
convey them to UNRWA in the
hopes of having them included in
the UNRWA annual budget.
º There are a few active NGOs in
the camp that in one way or another
follow UNRWA. There is the camp
manager's office (UNRWA
representative), the public
committee (or services committee,
which coordinates between
UNRWA and the PNA), a youth
center, a women‘s center, the Local
Committee for the Rehabilitation of
the Disabled, and the Friends of the
Elderly Committee.
º  The camp residents express
concern about the continuing
decline in the level of UNRWA
services in all fields. In the field of
education, the camp schools are in
dire need of renovation, suffering
congestion and lack of students'
supplies, such as stationery.
Another problem is the salary
cutbacks endured by new teachers.
Refugee camps,
with the exception
of a few in the
central Gaza
Strip, have no
councils affiliated
with the PNA
32. DSP meeting with the UNRWA office manager at the camp (Mahmoud Radhwan) on Saturday,
23 June 2001, and camp residents.
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º  The public committee33, or
services committee, operates in the
camp and is considered the
cornerstone of potential
municipalities or village councils.
The committee is comprised of
political groups and institutions
inside the camp and of prominent
residents (15 members, including
two women.) The popular
committee coordinates with
institutions inside and outside the
camp to provide services and
projects and collect donations to
improve the infrastructure.
UNRWA established guidelines to
organize interaction between the
two groups.  The guidelines dictate
that the camp manager cannot be
a member of the popular
committee. UNRWA employees
are permitted to join the committee
as long as it operates within its
jurisdictional boundaries. The
committee is not allowed to
interfere in UNRWA affairs.
UNRWA also demands that the
UNRWA-appointed manager and
his office are the primary
coordinators of interaction
between the committee and
institutions. The agency has
recognized the committee and
awarded it operating space inside
the camp, but the camp residents
feel UNRWA is trying to limit the
activity of the committee and other
institutions in the camp. Some
residents expressed concern about
possible abuse of power among
UNRWA employees and about
discrimination between camp
residents working at the agency
and non-residents, who hold
various positions, which has
created an atmosphere of distrust
between the residents and the
agency. Nonetheless, the
relationship is generally
cooperative and coordinated on the
matter of providing services for the
camp.
Section Six:
General conclusions
º  It is clear from the models above
that the conditions of local councils
vary according to the living
standards of the communities that
they serve and the ability of civil
society institutions to influence
funding sources and decision-
makers. There is also a disparity in
levels of experience, with some
councils enjoying long histories
while others have only limited
expertise as a result of a long period
of dormancy under occupation. In
addition, establishing a large
number of councils without
preparation or council member
training further widened the
performance gap between new
councils and older, more
experienced ones.
º The scope of public participation
in government generally and in
local government specifically is
narrow. This phenomenon is
detected at all levels of Palestinian
institutions. It is manifested in a
uniform lack of development
vision, failure to promote a
philosophy of involving the
The popular
committee
coordinates with
institutions inside
and outside the
camp to provide
services and
projects
33. Meeting with popular committees (the camp services committee). The meeting was with four
members of the committee, held by DSP on 26 June, 2001. The idea of popular committees
was formulated at a conference organized by the MOLG in cooperation with the Refugee
Affairs Department at Palestinian camps in Jericho in 1997.
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community in bearing the
responsibility for development and
reaping its rewards, and by the
prevalence of overly centralized,
ineffective work coordination
methods.
º Participation levels are linked to
the general political and economic
conditions, especially the spread of
poverty, which keeps most people
busy fending for themselves and
renders them often unable to pay
dues to local councils.
º Social and cultural restraints
dictate the level and nature of
participation. The role of women,
youth, children and the
disadvantaged in the development
process and in local government is
neglected.
º The centralization of authority
in a ministry or minister reinforces
the perception that local
government councils are obliged to
heed ministry officials, not the
people, which in turn bolsters the
influence of tribal and political
factions.
º Funding is one of the most
important challenges facing local
councils. The income of councils,
mostly from taxes and fees,
especially for smaller, newly
established ones, does not meet
their basic needs. The councils
suffer meager budgets and
insufficient tax revenue. Financial
difficulties are attributed to the
absence of steady support from the
Ministries of Finance and Local
Government. The loss of fuel taxes
(an important source of income)
and a decrease in the number of
citizens who paid their taxes further
reduced revenues. (The PNA failed
to enforce the law against citizens
who refused to pay taxes.)
Participants in a workshop about
local government held in
Bethlehem agreed that solving the
financial crisis could be achieved
by adopting the following three
measures34.
1. Ministry of Finance and MOLG
commitment to providing
budgets that would enable local
councils to provide services.
2. Restructuring tax collection
mechanisms and enforcement
measures.
3. Raising public awareness about
the importance of supporting
local councils considering their
role in providing services and
giving the public incentives for
community participation.
º The low level of authority
extended to local councils and the
meagerness of their financial
resources are reflected in the living
standards of residents. Statistics
and studies about the living
standards of residents reveal that
43% of the poor live in rural areas,
33% in cities, and 25% in refugee
camps.35 Poverty rates in the Jenin
area are nine times higher than in
Jerusalem and threefold the poverty
rates in Ramallah. In general, there
is direct correlation between local
councils‘ lack of empowerment and
paucity of financial resources on
the one hand, and the debilitated
Establishing a
large number of
councils without
preparation or
council member
training further
widened the gap
between new
councils and
older, more
experienced ones
Participation
levels are linked to
the general
political and
economic
conditions
Funding is one of
the most
important
challenges facing
local councils
34. Workshop; previously cited reference.
35.  See: National Commission for the Alleviation of Poverty; Palestine: Poverty Report, 1998
and data from t he PCBS, 2000.
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conditions of residents on the
other.
º The situation is different in
refugee camps from the prevailing
conditions in cities and towns.
Camps are locales established after
1948 inside the Palestinian
community in the West Bank and
Gaza Strip as temporary
settlements that in time became
permanent. Development, at the
planning, organization and
management levels, was therefore
random to a great degree.
Relationships between UNRWA
on the one hand and adjacent
municipalities and PNA
institutions on the other are defined
by agreements UNRWA signed
with the concerned parties. The
agreements provide that the
agency is the body responsible for
the affairs of the camp with the
exception of security and also that
the PNA becomes a host country,
not entitled to interfere in camp
affairs, except security, without
prior coordination with UNRWA.
Also, no person has the right to
intervene in camp affairs or visit it
without the consent of UNRWA,
even if the camp lies within
municipality jurisdiction.
 º  Coordination is needed between
the camps and adjacent
municipalities in several areas,
including environmental issues,
general rights, and emergency
programs to address the current
political situation. For example,
UNRWA and the Birzeit and Al-
Bireh Municipalities cooperated to
connect the sewage systems of
both cities and also coordinate
concerning real estate deeds and
the alleged boundaries of building
space outside the camp limits. In
addition, personal relations play a
major role in defining relations
between municipalities. However,
municipality support of camps
remains nominal, such as spraying
pesticides or periodically offering
fire department aid. However,
politics plays a role in determining
interaction with camps and their
institutions.
º Some camps in Gaza (Al-
Maghazi, Al-Bureij and Al-
Nuseirat) are marked for turning
into municipalities offering the full
scope of services expected of a city
municipality. There are camps
inside cities or adjacent to them and
others isolated or in rural areas,
which is expected to have an effect
on future elections in which camp
residents participate. It is unclear
whether the isolated camps would
be treated as separate entities or
part of the electoral process within
the city.
º  The strength of the local
community is connected with the
strength of the local council and its
ability to convey the needs of the
people to concerned authorities. It
was also noticed that the weight of
the local council is connected with
the weight of local institutions and
vice versa, because communities
that featured capable NGOs also
featured capable local councils.
º Achieving active community
participation in the development
process and local government
requires the fulfillment of five
basic requirements36:
There are camps
inside cities or
adjacent to them
and others
isolated or in rural
areas
36. Workshop; previously cited reference.
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1. Holding periodic PLC and local
council elections in a free
atmosphere.
2. Making the necessary reforms
to developing PNA institutions,
enabling them to cope with the
requisites of sustainable human
development. Such development
would also give rise to a central
authority that possesses the
confidence and the ability to
relegate authority to local
councils.
3. Encouraging local community
institutions to take on an active
role in raising public awareness
of the duties and rights of
citizenship.
4. Enacting laws and taking
Holding periodic
PLC and local
council elections
 Encouraging
local community
institutions to
take on an active
role in raising
public awareness
of the duties and
rights of
citizenship
measures to institutionalize
participation through periodic
meetings of local councils and
resident councils and activating
the supervisory role of NGOs and
the PLC over the work of local
councils.
5. Recruiting civil society to form
lobby groups to pressure
decision-makers in support of
NGOs and founding
neighborhood committees.
The following letter, written by
children from Gaza, and
recommendations, prepared by
children from Salfeet, expresses the
essence of activating participation
through local councils.
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37. The National Children‘s Secretariat has a group of 40 children and youth working closely
with local councils.
Box (3 - 9)  Recommendations of children regarding local councils
Sustainable human development requires the integration of the needs and
interests of children in planning and executing the work of local councils and
evaluating them. Several children from the Gaza Strip wrote the following letter
about their aspirations regarding the work of local councils concerning
participation and development.
“We the children of Palestine...come here, together, to support democracy and
women‘s rights and to bring joyful life to children where their dreams could
come true. We would like to achieve cooperation, solidarity and love. We strive
for a better life for all children, poor and rich, by consulting them in democracy
and in a community that respects children‘s rights.”
In workshops conducted by the children, they asked municipalities for the
following:
* Raising community awareness of the role of local councils.
* Reinforcing the sense of belonging, cordiality and cooperation among residents.
* Establishing mechanisms to develop ties between municipalities and the people.
* Establishing educational, cultural and recreational venues for children,
including playgrounds, clubs and kindergartens.
* Encouraging creativity among children by paying attention to artistic and
literary activities.
* Establishing programs to help poor children.
* Training municipality members and staff  to be more sensitive to the needs of
children and ways of dealing with them.
* Avoiding discrimination among residents37.
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A letter from a Palestinian child to the world:
 “Sir, I have a grandmother whose diary has collected layers
of dust and whose yellowed papers were eaten by moths, as if
they were trying to delete some of what my grandmother has
witnessed over the years. I riffled through the pages, my eyes
racing to read what her shaking hands wrote. While I flipped
the pages questions nibbled on my mind, “Why, why is my
grandmother Palestinian? Why is my father Arab? Why is that
man black? Why am I female? The repetition of the questions
made me feel grief for the discrimination that my grandmother
endured. The world seems to be in the hands of a great dictator,
saying to those not to his liking or from a different ethnicity or
color or religion, ‘Go to the valley, go the abyss and dive into
the depths of the world, for that is the place of servants,’ and
to his own people, ‘Ladies and gentlemen, climb onto the
magical carpet so I can take you to my palaces, for that is the
place of the masters.’ My God! Do you enjoy seeing
humiliation in the eyes of people or when you see civilizations
and cultures and peoples wither! All that to maintain your name
held high and known to all. What is the fault of an Arab created
by God as such or a Negro made black by God? What is the
fault of a woman created female? Are we not all from mud?
What if the scales of the world were turned and males became
female, whites black, and Arabs European? Perhaps after such
an inversion people‘s dignity would be restored and people
would feel human, or maybe the oppressed would seize the
chance to take revenge on those that oppressed them, and
history would cycle again. I see, Sir, that there is no answer to
the questions, or even to the problem of discrimination, unless
mercy and humanity defeated the love of domination and
humiliation and our vision became so acute as to see the insides
of people and their emotions and grow to respect them. Why
not instill this principle in our old before the young so that we
may be their example, and we could construct a safe
community whose personality is coined to shy away from war
and its destructive results.”
Nour Jihad, 15 year old
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Education is one
of the main pillars
of development
Globalization has
led to a deep
educational crisis
for countries with
limited income
1 . Parts of this chapter have been published in specialized journals by Ramzi Rihan, the principal
author, and forwarded to governmental and non-governmental organizations.
distinguishes a community from
others and connects communities
with one another.
Fourth: The increasing
connectivity of the various parts of
the world has created international
standards that no educational
system can ignore. There are deep
and intertwined circumstances
introduced by globalization and its
effects of economic and cultural
dominance; therefore, an
educational system must keep
abreast of rapid changes and
embrace modernization.
Fifth: Globalization has led to a
deep educational crisis for
countries with limited income, with
potentially catastrophic
implications. Such countries need
competent human resources to
achieve prosperity but lack the
basic foundations and practical
mechanisms to establish a
sustainable education system
capable of producing an educated
citizenry. The crisis is all the more
difficult to escape because the cost
of education, especially higher
education, has come to be
connected with the international
economy. The budgets that poor
countries can allocate to education
remain at the level of local
economy, far lower than the
international economic level.
Foreword1
The experiences of many nations
under various circumstances have
shown that education is one of the
main pillars of progress. The
connection between education and
human development depends on
the specificity of each nation, but
there are some general bases and
common denominators.
First: Education has become a
necessity, much like food, shelter,
health, and work. Therefore,
affording suitable education
opportunities has become a
community priority in which
governments, institutions, groups
and individuals cooperate.
Second: The availability of
qualified human resources is
important for economic
development in any community or
country.  It relies on the condition
of the country in terms of natural
resources, geographical location,
the relative competition in
economic sectors, and the heritage
and interests of the country.
Third: Education, in the inclusive
sense, shapes the identity and
culture of the community and
guarantees the protection of the
identity and the continuation of
culture. Culture is the element that
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Statistics indicate
that the
Palestinian
education sector
would continue to
be a huge one
requiring
attention
The educational
challenge in
Palestine is
qualitative and
quantitative
2 . See: Final Census Results, summary; Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics, 30 November
1998.
3 . Population in Palestinian Territories, 1997-2025; PCBS, September 1999.
4 . Previous reference.
human development are the low
average age of the population due
to high fertility rates and the
continuing migration of young
adults in search of employment.
Population between the ages 5-19
(school age) made up 39% of the
population in 1997 and the
percentage is expected to decrease
slowly to reach 38% in 2010 and
35% in 20254. Statistics indicate
that the Palestinian education
sector will assume enormous
dimensions, requiring the attention
of the state for at least a full
generation. The growth of the
education sector embodies the
population challenge in both its
aspects: providing the necessary
resources to educate such a large
population, and laying the basic
foundations for development and
prosperity by developing a modern
education system. Education is a
community investment in human
resources whose benefits are not
only economic, but also cultural
and social. The educational
challenge in Palestine is both
qualitative and quantitative.
The situation in Palestine is
complicated by a convergence of
several problems. The failure of
political negotiations after an entire
decade had discouraging effects on
the organizational and planning
activities of the Palestinians. The
long years of waiting dashed many
of the aspirations that Palestinians
had come to hold at the peak of the
first Intifada, which was a reaction
to attempts to destroy the
Palestinian existence through
Section One:
Education in the
Palestinian Context
The state of Palestine, regardless
of what its final borders will be, is
small and limited in natural assets.
Its people are its primary resource,
which renders demographic data
highly important. Accurate
information in that regard is now
available and forecasts have
become possible after the
population census was conducted
at the end of 1997. The results of
the census registered the
population of the West Bank,
including Jerusalem, and the Gaza
Strip at about 2.9 million.2 The
population is estimated to reach 4.9
million by 2010, 6.7 million by
2020, and 7.4 million by 2025.3
The predictions indicate that
increases in the population may be
among the top challenges facing
Palestine, but at the same time
indicate that the human resources
necessary for progress would be
available, provided that suitable
economic and social strategies are
implemented. Human beings are
simultaneously producers and
consumers. Reaching equilibrium
between production and
consumption is a vital precondition
for political stability based on a
firm economic and social
foundation that guarantees growth
and sustainability.
Among the population issues
directly connected to sustainable
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The intermingling
of interim and
permanent status
solutions,
intensified the
conflict between
meeting
immediate and
lory-term needs
occupation. The unstable
conditions, embodied in the
intermingling of interim and
permanent status solutions,
intensified the conflict between
meeting immediate needs and
working toward future goals.
The rise of unemployment is one
of the primary examples of the
contradiction of priorities. The
crisis was relieved to an extent by
broadening employment in the
public sector and by rising
enrollment in higher education
institutions. The first phenomenon
led to decreased productivity and
higher production costs in the
public sector, with salaries
consuming almost 60% of the PNA
budget, a burden that cannot be
borne in the long-run. As for the
second phenomenon of rising
university enrollments, it can lead
to deferred unemployment with
effects that may be far worse than
those of current unemployment
levels.
The Palestinian economy is a
problem that has evaded solution
for many years. For half a century
it has relied on external sources of
income, making it feeble and
highly prone to instability. At the
beginning of the 1950s, the UN
established the United Nations
Relief and Works Agency
(UNRWA). Soon after,
employment in the Gulf States
became available. With the Israeli
occupation of 1967, work in Israel
became a primary source of
income, and Arab aid provided via
the Jordanian - Palestinian
Committee supported many vital
projects. Other international aid
began to flow into Palestine after
the establishment of the PNA. The
PNA was entrusted with
responsibilities that outweighed its
abilities in many economic sectors.
The excessive reliance of the
Palestinian economy on the Israeli
economy made it structurally
unstable. Also, land confiscation
and control of water sources
deprived the Palestinians of a large
portion of the few natural resources
they possessed.
Section Two:
General Education
The primary education sector in
Palestine is relatively large and is
continually growing. The number
of students in the West Bank and
Gaza in the year 1967-68, the
beginning of occupation, was close
to 220,000. When the PNA
assumed responsibility for the
education sector at the beginning
of the scholastic year 1994-1995,
the number had climbed to
650,000, tripling in 27 years. The
number of students at present is
about one million, and is expected
to reach one and a half million in
ten years.5
Schools are categorized according
to the supervising body as
governmental, private, or UNRWA,
The situation is different in
Jerusalem, which has schools
The number of
students at present
is about one
million
5 . See: a) Statistical Abstract of Israel, 1968, No. 19, PCBS. b) Annual Statistics Education 1994-
1995; PCBS and Ministry of Education, September 1995.  c) Five-year Education Development
Plan, Palestinian Ministry of Education, September 2001. d) Predictions of General Education
in Palestine 1999-2000 to 2009-2010, PCBS, December 1999.
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officially operated by the Islamic
Waqf Directorate, although they are
connected with the Palestinian
Ministry of Education. Others are
operated by the Jerusalem
Municipality or the Israeli
Education Department. Some
private schools also operate
kindergartens, but demand is low
due to the fact that kindergarten lays
outside the official education sector,
although enrollment is constantly
rising. There are boys' schools, girls'
schools, and coed schools.
The continuing increase in the
number of students is attributable
to two factors: first, high fertility
rates and the resulting low average
age of the population, as
mentioned earlier; and second, the
constant increase in demand for
education.
In the 1970s, roughly half of all
children attended school through
basic education, and one-third
remained to complete secondary
level. Today, enrollment in the
middle years is almost at 100% and
more than half of Palestinian
children complete grade twelve.  In
ten years, 75% of all children are
expected to complete grade twelve.
It is worth mentioning that no
substantial discrepancies are
detected between the enrollment of
males and females of school age,
with male students making up
50.1% of the student base for the
scholastic year 2000-2001 and
female students 49.9%. The
number of female students
exceeded the number of male
students in the secondary level,
*    Primary level comprises grades one through ten; secondary level comprises
      grades 11 and 12.
** The number of kindergarten pupils increased to 77,402 in 1999-2000 then decreased the
following year due to security and economic reasons.
Source: The Palestine Annual Statistical Book (2) November 2001, PCBS.
Table (4-1): Number of students in schools and kindergartens according to area
      Schools
Area and school year Primary* Secondary Total
Palestinian territories
1994-1995 36,829 572,529 45,339 654,697
2000-2001 69,247** 830,765 76,363 976,375
West Bank
1994-1995 35,768 355,269 27,678 418,715
2000-2001 46,728 495,364 45,484 587,576
Gaza Strip
1994-1995 1,061 217,260 17,661 235,982
2000-2001 22,519 335,401 30,879 388,799
Kindergartens
In ten years, 75%
of all children are
expected to
complete grade
twelve
No substantial
discrepancies are
detected between
the enrollment of
males and females
of school age
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which is a worrisome indicator,
attributed partly to the trend of
school abandonment (dropping
out) among male students in the
secondary level (16 years and
older,) most probably in order to
accept menial jobs in light of the
economic crisis.
It is interesting to note the high rate
of kindergarten enrollment,
especially in Gaza.  It serves as a
potential indicator of radical social
changes in the development of
educational aspirations and
awareness in the family, the
regression of extended family,
which previously was a primary
source of childcare, and the
increasing number of working
mothers. The time is now for
kindergartens to be brought into
the core of official Palestinian
educational planning.
Undoubtedly, the growth in the size
of the primary education sector will
gradually decrease with a decrease
in fertility rates and total
enrollment of the school age
population, but both of these
elements will not come into play
before 2010. Therefore, contending
with the size of Palestinian
educational needs, which is a
problem and an opportunity at one
and the same time, will remain a
challenge for at least another
decade. In addition, the number of
returnees may not match the
prediction upon which assessments
were made, which poses an
unknown element that may confuse
expectations and impede
implementation of plans.
     Table (4- 2): Number of Kindergartens and Schools in 2000-2001
Schools
Area and school year Primary* Secondary    Total
Palestinian territories
1994-1995 436 1,141 333     1910
2000-2001 811  1,316 519    2,646
West Bank
1994-1995 423  842 294    1,559
2000-2001 596  967 448    2,011
Gaza Strip
1994-1995 13   299 39   351
2000-2001 215  349 71     635
  Source: The Palestine Annual Statistical Book (2) November 2001, PCBS.
Kindergartens
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This unprecedented demand for
education carries some negative
effects; overcrowding in schools is
much too high for a sound
education process to be
maintained. More than 100 schools
employ a two-shift system. There
are also a number of schools housed
in unsuitable buildings. This
situation is a leftover from
occupation, which did not tend to
   Table (4-3): Average Number of Students per Classroom
     Supervising body
Level          Government  UNRWA* Private       General average
Kindergarten
1994-1995  -          - 28.6      28.6
2000-2001 11**          - 25.0      25.0
Primary
1994-1995 35.9     43.6 27.8      37.1
2000-2001 36.1     46.1*** 25.6      37.3
Secondary
1994-1995 31.9          - 19.6      30.2
2000-2001 31.5           - 17.7      30.2
*     UNRWA schools offer only primary level education.
**   One governmental kindergarten.
*** The average number of students per classroom at UNRWA schools in
       1999-2001 reached 47.7.
Source: previously cited under table 1.
While conditions improved at
private schools, which require high
tuition, governmental schools
remained as is and conditions at
UNRWA schools worsened, with
congestion reaching levels
unacceptable under any set of
standards.
build schools or hire teachers.
Tables 2 and 3 show that the
number of schools, which
increases by 100 each year, has not
been able to cope with the
increasing number of students.
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    Table (4 - 4): Ratio of Students to Teachers
Kindergartens Schools* Total
Aggregate
1994-1995 1,211 19,843 21,054
2000-2001 2,743 32,502 35,245
Governmental
1994-1995    - 13,533 13,533
2000-2001    3 22,953 22,956
UNRWA
1994-1995    - 4,370 4,370
2000-2001    - 6,129 6,129
Private
1994-1995 1,211 1,940 3,151
2000-2001 2,740 3,420 6,160
   *Comprise grades one through twelve.
   Source:  The Palestine Annual Statistical Log (2) November 2001, PCBS.
and private and governmental
schools, but regressed to an extent
at UNRWA schools. There are
complaints among teachers
regarding low wages, especially at
governmental schools, where
salaries average $350 per month,
forcing many to take second jobs
to increase income.
The numbers of teachers and the
ratio of students to teachers portray
a better picture than the actual
conditions in overcrowded
classrooms. The situation
improved slightly in kindergartens
There are
complaints among
teachers regarding
low wages,
especially at
governmental
schools
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    Table 4-5: Ratio of Students to Teachers
Area and Gover UNRWA Private         Private      Total
school year          nmental kindergarten
Palestinian
territories
1994-1995 39.9  36.9 19.5 30.5      31.1
2000-2001 26.8  37.9* 17.3 25.2      27.7
West Bank
1994-1995 29.9  32.9  19.1 30.3      28.9
2000-2001 25.4   33.7   17.2  25.3      24.9
Gaza Strip
1994-1995 34.0    38.7    25.4  33.2      36.0
2000-2001 30.7    39.5  18.0   25.1      33.3
  The student -to-teacher ratio at UNRWA schools registered 39.5:1 in 1999-2000.
   Source: The Palestine Annual Statistical Log (2) November 2001, PCBS.
The conditions and trends
illustrated in these tables may
cause the education process to
become a passing or trivial matter
in the lives of students and
teachers. It is impossible to
predetermine the thin line between
marginal improvement and
collapse. The real danger may lie
in the direction that seems to enjoy
the widest backing on the political
front, which is to allow the quality
of the educational system to
deteriorate to an unsalvageable
level. Despite this grim possibility,
there are serious efforts underway
to improve education.
The handing of full responsibility
for maintenance of the education
sector to the Palestinians in August
1994 was a major turning point that
occurred with unexpected speed.
The Palestinians were informed
that the responsibility was in their
hands only a month before it was
handed over, and the 1994-1995
scholastic year began three days
after the transfer. The transfer was
pulled off without a hitch, although
the Israelis held back some
information and files. The entire
process came immediately on the
heels of the Intifada and its
disruption of attendance, which had
left the educational system in a state
of chaos. Added to that are the
results of negligence of the sector
by occupation authorities over
many years.
Palestinian curricula
West Bank schools used to employ
Jordanian school curricula and Gaza
schools featured Egyptian curricula.
It was important to eradicate the
duality and establish Palestinian
curricula designed to create a united
There are serious
efforts underway
to improve
education
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Palestinian identity and
distinguished culture, especially
with the return of many Palestinian
students of different ages, grades,
and educational backgrounds. The
issue was raised at a conference
held in 1990 under the auspices of
UNESCO, and The Palestinian
Curriculum Development Center
was established in 1995. The
curriculum plan was realized in
1995 and work is underway on
finishing details, composing
textbooks, and training teachers.6
New curricula were taught in the
first and sixth grades beginning in
the scholastic year 2000-2001 and
the second and seventh grades in
2001-2002. Implementation will
continue to include additional
grades every year until completion
in 2004-2005.
According to the Palestinian
curriculum plan, curricula will be
harmonized in all Palestinian
schools. The plan divides study
years into two parts: primary, from
first to tenth grades, and secondary,
which comprises grades 11 and 12.
The primary level is in turn divided
into two stages, lower primary,
grades one through four, and higher
primary, from fifth to tenth grades.
The three stages have been assigned
the titles preparation,
empowerment, and initiation,
respectively, which seem to be quite
expressive and suitable should their
implications be truly achieved.
As for the primary stage, the
National Education Committee
introduced the subject of social
sciences and created a subject called
national education for grades one
through nine. These are positive
developments that may help the
education system improve its
citizens' ability to push forward the
wheels of social progress.
Technology and applied sciences
are taught from the fifth grade until
the eleventh, which is an important
step in facilitating a trend toward
vocational and technical education,
which will be discussed later. Also,
one class period per week is
reserved for free activity, which
agrees with the evident tendency
toward decentralized management
in schools and allows students and
teachers an opportunity to be
creative. Arts and crafts are taught
in the primary level, focusing
attention on a field that has until
recently suffered utter neglect. One
elective subject is offered in the
empowerment stage (grades five
through ten,) which could be a third
language (English is taught in all
schools beginning in grade one),
home economics, health sciences or
environmental sciences. A variety
of technical classes are offered in
tenth grade from which the student
must choose two. The classes are
agronomy, industrial sciences,
management, and tourism sciences.
The methods of the plan seem
sound and its objectives positive,
because it expands and modernizes
study subjects and allows for a
degree of flexibility, but at the core
it relies on the traditional method
of rote memorization more than on
developing skills. This weakness
starts in the first grade, considered
the foundation.
6 . See: The First Palestinian Curriculum Plan; General Administration of Educational Curricula,
Ministry of Education, July 1999.
The Palestinian
Curriculum
Development
Center was
established in 1995
curricula will be
harmonized in all
Palestinian schools
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Box (4 - 1) First grade curriculum
The first grade curriculum contains 30 classes per week distributed as follows: Arabic
Language (eight classes), Mathematics (five), Islamic Teachings, English Language
and General Sciences (three each), Social Sciences and National Education, Arts
and Crafts, and Physical Education (two each), Civil Education and free activity
(one each). This curriculum was born from purely academic thinking that fails to
understand the nature of a child when he/she joins school. It neglects the student‘s
mental needs, abilities, and interests. It also fails to address the level of professional
competence with which the curriculum should be implemented.  Finally, it perpetuates
the deeply rooted traditional approach that considers a child an empty pot to be
filled with dictated information and tested on the ability to memorize information.
7 . This direction is presented with better detail in: Ramzi Rihan; Contemplation of Palestinian
Education in the 21st Century; The Inaugural Five-year Education Development Plan for the
Period 2000-2004, first edition, Ministry of Education, July 1999.
It is no longer
possible to deal
with children as
objects
It is important, then, to delve
deeper into the issue of education
and raise questions that have yet
to receive proper attention at the
official level in Palestine. The first
question concerns the educational
philosophy at the lower stages of
schooling, because everything that
follows relies on it. Social changes
have made children primary,
dynamic participants in the
education process, and it is no
longer possible to deal with
children as objects whose abilities
are limited to reaction, without the
capacity for action. This change
poses a challenge to educators and
parents and is the foundation on
which to raise a generation able to
handle changes.
The most important change
concerns the lower stages of
schooling and requires redefining
their mission from one of
conveying information to one of
personal development and social
upbringing of children. It means
that the learning and teaching
process must change from a
unilateral process in which the
teacher is the only party with direct
influence to a joint venture based
on the interaction of teacher and
pupil. While the change means
delaying the delivery of some
information to the child in the first
years of study, he or she will be
better equipped and more highly
motivated to learn in later years,
resulting in an information and skill
base at the end of schooling
superior to the one achieved at
present. Consequently, the
proposed change reorganizes
priorities in a manner that would
lead to a more effective investment
over the years of growth.7
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Box (4 - 2) The new curricula and discrimination against women
   Analysis of textbooks for the first and sixth grades, prepared by the Palestinian
Ministry of Education for the first time in the history of Palestine, revealed that
they are still models of discrimination  against women.
- Jobs held by women are extremely limited and considered secondary compared
to those reserved for men. The sixth-grade Arabic language book mentions one
job for women, besides that of being a mother, by mentioning educator Sameera
Azzam, and only once. Men are allotted more than 40 jobs, including educator,
inventor, discoverer, physician, athlete, governor, and farmer. The book mentions
no fewer than 70 "great" men.
- Activities and hobbies connected with women were connected with a woman's
place in the home. Women are said to make the food, clean, sew, knit, and supervise
the study of the children, while men are portrayed as politicians, presidents, artists,
and athletes. In Jordanian curricula, women are mentioned as part of the audience
at athletic events, while the Palestinian curricula omitted even that part, detaching
women from any sports activity or one connected with movement, even from a
strictly scientific perspective. Science books contain no pictures, examples, or
experiences connected with the matter.
- Women are shown with head cover and long gown, and nowhere do they appear
wearing anything different.
- The percentage of mentioning male personalities is far greater than that of
mentioning female personalities in all the books. Mathematics books were ranked
the worst in this regard, followed by science and Arabic language. Compared
with Jordanian textbooks, the percentage of mentioning male personalities is
much higher in Palestinian books.
- The Arabic language was adapted in some textbooks, such as Arabic language,
science, and civil education, to be used in a neutral manner that avoids
discrimination, using personal forms (we draw, I read, we think) or passive forms.
Other books, such as mathematics, technology, and arts continue to use masculine
imperative forms, indicating that discrimination still exists.8
As for the secondary stage plan,
one of its features is that it divides
the stage into two tracks,
academic, and vocational/
technical. The academic stage
contains basic requirements and
three science subjects (physics,
chemistry, and biology), of which
the student must choose two, and
three literary subjects (economics
and management, history, and
geography), of which the student
8 . From an unpublished study by Tafida Jarbawi about curricula and gender, 2001.
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must select two. The academic
track is completed with the
secondary school final
examinations, tawjihi, at the end
of 12th grade. The plan cancels the
division of the academic track into
scientific and literary tracks, which
is a positive development because
the division has become vertical
instead of horizontal and because
many considered the scientific
track superior. It should be
mentioned that only one-quarter of
students enroll in the scientific
track at present.
Box (4 - 3) Electives and the true freedom of choice
There are conditions that must be met to guarantee that students are able to choose
elective courses in the 11th and 12th grades in a manner that would not make the
philosophy backfire. Schools must be improved from the scientific and logistical
perspectives to accommodate many class branches according to the choices the
students make, and students must be properly counseled in 10th grade when they
are making the choices. As an example, it is expected that only a few students
would choose Physics, which means that an insufficient number of competent
educators would be available at the higher education level to teach Engineering,
Technology, and precise sciences. The result of advanced curricula would then be
regression in the human resources necessary for economic development in Palestine.
Also, the discrepancy in resources from one location to another may affect the
availability of resources necessary to allow students the freedom of choice, especially
in disadvantaged and neglected areas were qualified teachers are scarce, which
would further increase hierarchy in society.
The questions discussed above
have prompted reconsideration of
the Palestinian curriculum plan.
Work is now underway at the
Ministry to issue an addendum that
contains some changes to the
original plan. One of the main
changes expected is the return to
the system of scientific and artistic
tracks, which could be viewed as
a step in the wrong direction. This,
however, does not deny that the
plan was ambitious. The problem
lies not in the objectives of the
plan, but in determining the
timeframe required to implement
it. It has become clear that the
original plans, both qualitative and
Only one-quarter
of students enroll
in the scientific
track at present
quantitative, require far more time
than was initially calculated, for
three reasons: self-imposed
difficulties intrinsic in any radical
change process, limited human and
financial resources, and the
continually deteriorating conditions
since the original plan was
conceived.
At the same time, textbooks that
were used in the "curriculum
enrichment program" are improved
based on the remarks of teachers
who have used them. The first
edition of any book is considered a
first trial edition and the second a
second trial edition. Hence,
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textbooks will undergo two stages
of editing in addition to the vast
process of deliberation and review
that they enjoy when first
published.
Despite many justified criticisms
that could be targeted at curricula
and textbooks, they deserve
appreciation.  The reason is
twofold: first, the curricula and
books proved to be of good-not
excellent-quality, although they
were created in a short time and
with limited resources and
experience. Second, the curricula
and books could be seen from a
dynamic perspective in that they
continually interact with changes
instead of being rigid.
Vocational education and
training
Vocational and technical education
and training represents a
qualitative step forward in
Palestinian educational thinking.9
The Ministries of Education,
Labor, and Higher Education, and
other parties participated in
planning for this track.
Bureaucratic barriers were
overcome to shed needed light on
the issue, which enriched
discussion and achieved a
comprehensive vision. This track
comes as the natural result of the
size of the population and the
educational and economic
standing in Palestine. Population
growth and the increasing demand
for education make the steady
tendency toward the academic
track a cause for imbalance in
Palestinian society.  The centrality
of human resources and the
scarcity of natural assets in
Palestine position vocational and
technical skills as an integral part
of economic development.
Several characteristics distinguish
the vocational and technical
education and training plan.
Students join the track after
finishing 10th grade, and tutelage
is offered in the form of
complementary units, which allow
for flexibility and quick change
according to need, in addition to
encouraging rehabilitation when
needed. The curriculum offers
training based on a connection to
domestic industries, and students
receive a diploma when finishing
secondary school after two years
or two and a half. The track offers
closed programs that do not allow
for continuing official studies and
open ones that permit students to
go on to vocational and technical
colleges. A goal was set of raising
attendance in the vocational track
from the current rate of 3% to a rate
of 7% by 2004-2005.
The Five-year Education
Development Plan
The Ministry of Education
constructed a five-year
comprehensive development plan
that stretches from 2000-2001 to
2004-2005.10 The plan targeted five
main areas for development:
1. Raising enrollment to about 74%
in the secondary stage by the year
2004, building new schools, and
Despite many
justified criticisms
that could be
targeted at
curricula and
textbooks, they
deserve
appreciation
Vocational and
technical education
and training
represents a
qualitative step
forward in
Palestinian
educational
thinking
10 . Five-year Education Development Plan, 2000-2001 to 2004-2005, Ministry of Education,
October 1999.
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canceling the two-shift system.
2. Improving the quality of
education by implementing the
new curricula in full by 2004-
2005, increasing the number of
teachers, decreasing the number
of students per classroom, and
renewing school furniture and
equipment.
3. Developing formal and informal
education. This includes
enacting the education law,
developing technical and
administrative aspects of school
management, encouraging
preschool education, and
expanding vocational and
technical education.
4. Developing managerial skills,
which include planning,
management, finance, and
striving for a decentralized
educational system.
5. Developing human resources in
the education system by
improving programs to train
teachers before and during
service.
 The quantitative requirements of
the plan are enormous, although
the objectives are reasonable. In
the governmental sector alone,
without UNRWA and private
schools, the objectives mean that
the number of students from 1998-
1999 to 2004-2005 would increase
by 43%, and would require a 61%
increase in the number of teachers
and 67% more classrooms. Costs
for implementing the plan were
estimated at $1.9 billion, including
$1.4 billion in operating expenses,
mostly salaries, and the remaining
$0.5 billion for capital expenses,
Lack of necessary
resources is not the
only obstruction to
developing the
education sector
mostly buildings. This requires that
the Ministry of Education budget
for the year 1999-2000 be twice
what it was for the previous year
and doubled again for the year
2004-2005, reaching $480 million,
close to 10% of the GNP.
The plan was proposed and
discussed at an international
conference on education held in
Ramallah on 20-21 October 1999,
when it was determined that the
funding requirements of the plan
were impossible to achieve.
Therefore, the Ministry of
Education began reviewing and
reassessing the plan within the
framework of comprehensive
development. The reassessment
included examining all possible
alternatives and studying the cost-
benefit analysis of each element in
the immediate and long-term
ranges, and an amended plan was
published in September 2001. The
amended plan clung to the principal
bases and general guidelines of the
original but decreased the desired
percentage of enrollment in the
secondary level in 2004 to 68%,
ruled out the option of doing away
with the two-shift system, and
reduced some activities. The
necessary budget dropped to $1.5
billion, including $1.2 billion in
operating expenses. The amended
plan was slated to be unveiled at a
second international conference,
but the political situation did not
allow it, and the plan was
temporarily suspended.
The distinguished professionalism
that marked the planning process at
the Ministry of Education, be it in
The quantitative
requirements of the
plan are enormous
Human Development Report 2002 101
determining priorities, setting
goals, or calculating quantities,
deserves recognition and praise.
However, the deterioration of
economic conditions in Palestine,
with the rise in unemployment, the
spread of poverty, and the
destruction of infrastructure and
businesses, looms heavily over the
possibility of realizing the amended
plan. The conditions that have been
nothing less than abysmal for over
a year require enormous resources
for rebuilding and will increase the
competition between meeting
immediate needs and achieving
educational goals. The education
sector, by virtue of its size, is the
first candidate among sectors that
will not receive development
funding at the current stage.
The education sector has suffered
directly from the lack of security
in Palestinian daily life. One
hundred fifty schoolchildren have
been killed and 148 school
buildings hit with Israeli rockets.
It has become extremely difficult
and dangerous for students and
teachers to reach school on a daily
basis due to the hundreds of
military checkpoints on roads. In
1994, the Palestinians constructed
a strategic plan to rebuild and
develop the education sector as
well as many other sectors, but the
current crisis dealt that plan a
severe blow, jolting it backwards
it many respects. Consequently,
preventing further deterioration
and reconstruction of the sector
have become critical priorities,
which will necessarily delay
further development.
Lack of necessary resources is not
the only obstruction to developing
the education sector in Palestine.
The human factor is no less
significant, as it is the focal point
of any radical change. The
education outlook prevalent in
Palestine is characterized by
traditional ways of thinking. The
Ministry of Education is engaged
in several endeavors, including
preparing curricula, training
teachers, and building schools, and
has recently been very active in
training teachers and other
educators, to improve their
professional skills. However, the
Palestinian education system is still
blemished by authoritarianism in a
community controlled by
hierarchical relationships, with
team-based, interactive
relationships still noticeably weak.
The Palestinian educational system
desperately needs a clear vision
that can adapt to the current
situation and meet the challenges
of a new century.
Section Three
Higher Education and
Development11
The Palestinian higher education
sector has grown at a very high rate
during the past two decades,
particularly in the past five years.
Statistics compiled at the end of
September 199712 indicate that
41% of people with baccalaureate
degrees obtained them from
Palestinian universities, 46% from
11. In 2002, the Ministry of Higher Education formally became an integral part of the Ministry of
Education.
12 . See final results of the census; Summary, PCBS, 30 November 1998.
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other Arab universities, and 13%
from international universities.
Statistics also show that 18% of
people age 25-44 have finished
high school and that about 36% of
those who finished high school are
specialized in scientific fields (6%
of the total age group in question).
An indicator of the trend towards
enrollment in literary and human-
interest fields, just as in the case
of high school, is that only one-
quarter of students at Palestinian
universities major in scientific
fields. In recent years, overall
enrollment levels in higher
education in Palestine have
noticeably increased.
Important achievements for
the Palestinian higher
education sector:
Establishing universities in the
shadow of occupation speaks to the
ability of the Palestinians to
succeed under the most taxing of
conditions.  This raises their self-
esteem, contributes to producing
political, social and economic
leaders, and attracts human and
financial resources to the West
Bank and Gaza Strip. The biggest
accomplishment was graduating
students on a scale that exceeded
expectations. According to the
results of the general census in the
West Bank and Gaza, conducted in
December 1997, the numbers of
people obtaining post-secondary
degrees were as follows
(Jerusalem excluded)13:
  Diploma degrees (two years
college): 72,000, including
51,000 (71%) from Palestinian
institutions.
 Bachelor Degrees: 66,000,
including 27,000 (41%) from
Palestinian institutions.
 Graduate education degrees:
6,100, including 1,000 (14%)
from Palestinian institutions.
Clearly, Palestinian institutions
have supplied the Palestinian
community with a substantial
percentage of university graduates.
It is not an exaggeration to say that
without an educated citizenry, the
Palestinian economy, with its
public, private, and civic sectors,
could not have faced the situation
that arose after the inception of the
PNA nor successfully managed the
responsibilities and opportunities
that emerged. There is no doubt that
the percentage of people choosing
to pursue higher education locally
compared to those who choose to
go abroad is increasing, which
means Palestine is steadily stepping
in the direction of developed or
moderately developed countries,
where most students enroll in local
institutions. This positive change
increases the status of Palestinian
higher learning institutions and
posits on them the responsibility of
upholding international educational
standards of vision, content, and
quality.
As for females, the number of
higher education degrees awarded,
regardless of the place of study,
equals 58% of those awarded to
men, but the gender gap rate is
decreasing among younger
segments of the population (under
13 . Previous source
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age 30) and will perhaps disappear
entirely in time. Undoubtedly, the
greater availability of local higher
education opportunities
encouraged more women to
continue their studies. The
distribution of graduates among
the various fields of study reveals
some imbalance, with less than
one-third of higher education
graduates specializing in scientific
fields (natural sciences,
mathematics, computer sciences,
medical professions, engineering
and agronomy).  Palestinian higher
education institutions have
contributed to increasing the
number of graduates in social
sciences and other art fields due to
the ease of establishing these
programs compared with scientific
programs. Perhaps the biggest gap
in the Palestinian higher education
sector is the overall lack of
technical education opportunities,
which remain extremely limited.
Students are still choosing
Palestinian universities in growing
numbers. Annual increases in the
numbers of matriculating students
average 8,000, and the aggregate
number of university students
jumped from 28,000 in 1994-1995
to more than 75,000 in 2000-2001,
expected to top 130,000 by 2009-
2010 if growth holds steady. The
general impression among many
professionals in the higher
education field is that rapid and
sustained enrollment increases
have negatively affected the sector.
By comparison, the number of
students at community colleges
rose slightly in the same period,
from 4,000 to 5,000.
Box (4 - 4) Multiple universities and poor coordination
There are ten universities operating in Palestine, and the low levels of coordination
among them is attributed to four factors: the persistence of unnecessary and
counterproductive competitive attitudes instilled during occupation, the undue
emphasis on political considerations as opposed to organizational considerations
at the PNA, limited management capabilities of the education ministry and its
affiliated groups, and a lack of revenue streams for higher education institutions,
which forced them to cover deficits using any means, without regard for
consequences.
The gender gap
rate is decreasing
among younger
segments of the
population
The biggest gap in
the Palestinian
higher education
sector is the
overall lack of
technical
education
opportunities
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Higher education as an
investment in human
development
Higher education is considered a
socioeconomic activity designed
to meet the needs of the
community as well as respond to
the desires of individuals.
Economic growth and cultural
development are achieved through
skills and abilities that individuals
acquire. Higher education can be
viewed as an investment with
dividends manifested in increases
to the gross national income by
raising the productivity of
educated people. However, the
goals of higher education go
beyond the economic dimension to
include social advancement and
scientific and cultural productivity
in all its forms. Scientific
advancement was preceded for
centuries by political and
economic globalization, and it is
difficult to separate any scientific
activity (in the broad definition of
science) from what is happening
across the world. Informational
globalization has increased the
degree of competition in this
regard, and all these points deserve
study.
Determining the needs of a
community for high levels of
professional competence is a very
difficult task under the best of
conditions, and is all the more
difficult in the Palestinian
situation, considering the volatility
of its political and economic
condition. The current students of
Palestinian universities will work
well into the middle of the current
century, and no one can predict
what the conditions of the state of
Palestine will be then. Therefore,
rigid centralized planning for
education is both impossible and
inadvisable. The Palestinian
educational system must cultivate
the ability to calculate the effects
of and adapt to an ongoing process
of rapid and cumulative change.
Students choose a major field of
study based on self-determined
goals and external factors. Students
have certain preferences and
aspirations with regard to the
quality of their lives and will
necessarily pursue different paths
to realize their dreams. Just as
decision-makers cannot always
accurately predict the needs of the
population, individual students
may not always be able to quantify
their goals.
Reconciling the needs of the
community to its abilities and
helping individuals develop their
own abilities to achieve their goals
are core responsibilities of the state,
but the higher education
environment in Palestine is highly
sensitive. Human resources are the
main pillars of the Palestinian
economy due to the lack of natural
resources, and making those
resources available qualitatively
and quantitatively will be the
strategic determinant of the
Palestinian economy. Considering
the weakness of the Palestinian
economy at present, there is a
pressing need to spend wisely on
higher education. In the eight years
of the PNA's tenure, expectations
were that matters would be handled
better than before due greater
latitude in internal governance.
The goals of higher
education go
beyond the
economic
dimension
Rigid centralized
planning for
education is both
impossible and
inadvisable
Human resources
are main pillars of
the Palestinian
economy due to
lack of natural
resources
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This expectation was accompanied
by the perception that Palestinian
socio-economic policies would be
clearly defined over a long time
horizon, and were therefore
granted great weight.
The difficult period that the
Palestinian people have endured
for almost two years could be
considered a lesson for higher
education. The sector emerged
under occupation and was able to
develop in spite of the difficulties
imposed by the first Intifada. The
difference is that the current
situation, despite the presence of
the PNA and the Ministry of
Higher Education and Scientific
Research, poses a challenge more
serious than before. The increases
in the number of higher education
institutions and students, increases
in required human and financial
resources, and heightened
competition for those limited
resources has vastly complicated
the planning and development
process, rendering traditional
approaches obsolete. Development
of the sector requires a double-
pronged strategy: unified
acceptance of the national strategy
at the Ministry of Education in
conjunction with other ministries
and the various segments of
society, and a decentralized and
comprehensive execution of the
strategy by all affiliated
educational institutions.
Management skills in the higher
education sector must mature and
develop to achieve positive
coordination and to avoid
suffocating rigidity on the one
hand and lack of structure and
discipline on the other.
The economics of the
Palestinian higher education
sector
When discussing the economics of
higher education, focus was placed
on the financial crisis suffered by
Palestinian universities, especially
tuition and the official support
allocated by the government
budget. This attention, however,
remains superficial, failing to delve
into the foundations of the
economics of higher education. The
quantitative and technical details of
the economics of education are
beyond the scope of the PHDR, but
several summary points must be
made.
The primary indicator of the health
of an educational system is the
amount of total spending, public
and private, on the education sector
as a percentage of GNP and which
is low in Palestine compared to
other countries.   Justification exists
for increasing spending on
education on the condition that the
education system will be judged by
its future dividends. The second
indicator is government spending
on education as a percentage of the
national budget; here, too,
disparities exist, with the
Palestinian figures low compared
to those of other countries. Another
indicator is the ratio of public to
private spending on education
within the context of an analogous
economic policy. An analogous
system is one in which tax increases
translate into higher spending on
education and lower tuition costs,
and where decreased tax revenues
translate into lower levels of
support for education and higher
tuitions (free market economy).
Management skills
in the higher
education sector
must be promoted
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However, the call for increasing
spending on education,
particularly higher education, must
be accompanied by fulfillment of
the necessary conditions.
Continuing increases in the
demand for quality higher
education at the current rate would
certainly require more financial
resources than the national
economy can provide through its
public and private sectors.   In this
situation, quality of education will
eventually drop below minimum
requirements, rendering spending
on higher education useless.
There are also questions about the
ability of the Palestinian higher
education sector to survive. For a
quarter of a century, this vital
sector relied on external aid,
beginning with Arab assistance
and then European. The financial
crisis appeared immediately after
aid ceased. Sustainability of the
Palestinian higher education sector
requires the fulfillment of two
conditions: spending must be
within levels that the national
economy can afford, and economic
growth resulting from increasing
levels of competencies through
higher education must be at a level
that can sustain future spending.
Although external aid could be
relied upon to cover
developmental needs for a time,
the previous two conditions must
be met at least to cover operating
expenses, which necessitates a
strategic direction, political will,
and competent management for
execution.
Organizing the Palestinian
higher education sector
The model of a higher education
ministry was chosen to organize
higher education in Palestine
without considering other
organizational options to determine
the model most suitable for the
local condition. Several models
rely on councils, governmental or
non-governmental bodies, or
independent entities rather than
ministries. The justification for
forming the ministry was the failure
of the Palestinian Higher Education
Council, established in 1977, to
coordinate among universities and
guide the development of higher
education. However, the
performance of the ministry so far
suggests that the causes of failure
or success do not depend only on
the organizational model, but on
other factors as well, such as the
lack of political will.
Higher education in Palestine
embraced the model of multiple
independent institutions when it
was established. There is a
perception that the number of
Palestinian universities is large
compared with the population,
while vocational and technical
colleges are scarce.  The success of
the Ministry in encouraging the
growth of vocational colleges and
halting the establishment of new
universities is considered an
indication of the success of the
chosen organizational model.
There is a
perception that
the number of
Palestinian
universities is
large compared
with the
population
There are also
questions about the
ability of the
Palestinian higher
education sector to
survive
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Attracting students to vocational
education requires awareness and
a different set of incentives. It is
possible, for example, to transfer
a large portion of aid allotted to
higher education to the students
rather than institutions by
establishing a national scholarship
fund that offers financial assistance
to deserving students who choose
to major in fields of study
encouraged by the higher
education sector. Also, tuition may
be raised in fields of study with
surplus numbers of students and
lowered for majors in which
student numbers are scant. It
should be noted that the system
employed in the Palestinian higher
education sector has been the
opposite of the recommendations
above from the start, with tuition
determined as a percentage of the
estimated cost of the program.
Therefore, tuition in scientific
fields, which are in need of student
encouragement, is much higher
than tuition in literary fields, where
students are abundant. As
mentioned earlier, central planning
of community needs must not be
overemphasized, but it is possible
to guide and direct the process of
higher education without
jeopardizing the people's right to
choose the type of education they
desire.
The Ministry of Higher Education,
in addition to being the supervisor
of higher education, may assume
other constructive roles, such as
the role of mediator nurturing the
spirit of cooperation among
universities. Also, the entire higher
education sector, represented by
the Ministry and the universities,
may face social and political
pressures to achieve equilibrium
among the size of the sector, the
size of spending it receives, and the
quality of its production. It should
be noted that the Ministry of
Higher Education became the
Ministry of Higher Education and
Scientific Research in 2001.
Higher education: between
law and reality
Enactment of the higher education
law in December 1998 did not
clarify the confusion within the
education sector. The law defined
the objectives of higher education
and the authorities and
responsibilities of the Ministry.  It
also guaranteed academic freedom
and the independence of
institutions and maintained the
sanctity of the university campus.
It categorized institutions as
governmental, operated by the
ministry; public-non-profit
institutions operating with PNA
financial support, -and private,
institutions operated by companies.
There was a compelling need to
enact a law to organize the function
of the higher education sector, but
several remarks could be made
about the law that was enacted. The
law adopted the model of a higher
education ministry without
considering the alternatives, and
granted the ministry some
authorities in supervising
institutions that at times cross over
into interference. There is also a
question about including private
Palestinian universities in the
sector, which already suffers from
an inordinately large number of
Attracting students
to vocational
education requires
awareness and a
different set of
incentives
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institutions. In addition, the law did
not determine special objectives
that warrant the establishment of
governmental institutions and did
not address the historical situation
of higher education in Palestine,
nor did it analyze the chief factors
affecting it. In the end, the law
functioned as another bureaucratic
framework layered on top of
others. Implementation of the law
has been impeded because not all
the necessary regulations and
instructions for it have been issued.
The quality of higher
education
The quality of Palestinian higher
education receives enormous
attention, especially due to the
widespread perception that its
quality has declined in recent
years. Higher education relies on
primary school education, which
suffers lack of resources necessary
to keep abreast of the rapid
quantitative growth. It must be
kept in mind that controlling
enrollment rates in primary
schools is impossible, whereas it
is possible at the university level.
The financial crisis at the higher
education level appears
insignificant in light of the
potential crisis that may occur if
population growth continues at the
current rate, which exceeds growth
rates in the national income.
Despite improvements in curricula
and venues, the school system has
not changed much. The
authoritarian system continues to
Most graduates
could be described
as educated, but
not aware
thrive, relying on dictation and rote
memorization without attention to
the importance of nurturing
character, integrity and the
development of interpersonal skills.
Implementing radical reforms in
educational methods will take
several years. Therefore, the impact
of primary school education on
higher education will remain
unchanged for the immediate
future.
Higher education must bear
additional responsibilities toward
students, especially in the first
stages of their tenure. Among the
responsibilities is to counsel
students socially and academically,
broaden their horizons,
encouraging them to excel and be
creative, and raise their linguistic
skills, especially in the Arabic
language. What happened in
Palestinian universities was the
exact opposite; there is more
attention on core subjects in the
major field of study than on basic
skills, general education, and
development of personality. As a
result, higher education also
embraced the dictation and rote
memorization methods, and was
forced to do so due to the limited
abilities of the students. Therefore,
most graduates could be described
as educated, but not aware. This
description applies at the
baccalaureate level in addition to
the higher education level, and
although the situation is similar in
many other countries, this is no
excuse for failing to correct the
Palestinian situation.
The financial
crisis at the higher
education level
appears
insignificant in
light of the
potential crisis
that may occur
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In May 1997, the Ministry of
Higher Education issued the
"Rationalization Plan for Higher
Education 1997-2001"14 . The plan
comprised many provisions, some
of which have been implemented.
It was followed by the “Proposed
Direction for Palestinian Higher
Education,” issued in October
199715. Work on a "Palestinian
Strategy for Higher Education"
was underway but was delayed
because of the situation. Until now,
the basic structural problems of the
sector have not been remedied.
Education professionals agree that
raising the quality level of the
product of higher education
without considering the poor
quality of ingredients is an
impossible task. At the same time,
there seems to be a pervasive
reluctance to address the problem
openly and to treat it radically,
which may be attributed to the
social pressures to expand
university education in the absence
of necessary funding. It could also
be attributed to competition among
universities to introduce new
programs, which is one of the
factors that led to erosion of the
priorities of higher education.
Section Four:
Conclusion
The current stage may represent a
rare opportunity to raise the quality
of education in Palestine despite
the magnitude of problems
inherited from forced regression
under occupation. Handing
Palestinians responsibility for
education, the attention given to the
issue by official and civic groups,
external aid, the limited size of the
Palestinian education sector and
the availability of education
development experts  form a strong
foundation for progress.
Progress requires following two
different paths simultaneously; the
first is immediate action despite the
situation, which includes most of
the accomplishments made to date.
The second path requires
implementation of cumulative
radical change in the entire
education sector. This path begins
in the first grade and continues
gradually year after year. It cannot
be expected to pay dividends
before 15-20 years at the primary
school level and 20-25 years at the
university level. Continuing
immediate improvement is
important, but pursuit of short-term
solutions in the absence of a
comprehensive vision for the
future is not helpful, leading in the
long-run to further regression in the
education process.
Implementing the two-path system
is based on two requirements: first,
the bases of radical change must
be determined in accordance with
the current situation and modern
educational methods, while
considering that the bases
themselves are constantly
changing. Second, calculated
balance must be maintained at
14.   Rationalization Plan for the Higher Education Sector (1997-2001) Ministry of Higher
Education, May 1997.
15 .   Proposed Direction for Palestinian Higher Education: A Vision for the Future; Ministry of
Higher Education, October 1997.
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every stage between the
requirements of development and
the requisites of reform within the
limits of available resources,
human or financial. The following
is a brief analysis of some of the
basic areas of needed reform,
which should later be examined in
detail by experts and working
groups to assure the integrity of the
recommendations as well as the
plans needed to implement them.
Genuine reform necessitates
changing perceptions and
attitudes, which in turn will require
the reeducation of professionals at
every level of the system. This
long-term reeducation effort will
require more financial resources
than those needed by the program
of short-term improvements
currently in place.  However, the
difference in levels of financial
resources required for the two
paths is minimal and should not
represent the decisive factor. The
need to expand and improve
school buildings and equip them,
supply textbooks and teaching
aids, and train teachers all exist
whether the path of radical reform
has been chosen or not.
Spending on radical reform is a
more useful investment than
spending on immediate
improvement. It eventually leads
to a more productive population
from the economic standpoint, in
addition to making them more
advanced on humanitarian, social
and cultural levels. The issue of
securing adequate funding must
also take into consideration
difficulties in implementation. The
process of changing attitudes and
perceptions is not a simple task and
requires a long-time horizon in
order to be fully achieved.  The
primary shortcoming of the current
educational system is that
objectives remain mostly
academic.   In the past, students
were praised for simply
“memorizing the lesson,” while all
other potential benefits of
education are theoretically and
practically ignored. Developing a
clear vision derived from a modern
educational philosophy is essential,
especially at the current stage, in
which foundations are laid for a
new future free from the burdens
of the past.
The Palestinian education strategy
should be based on the following
basic concepts.  First, a student is a
human being with free will and is
at the center of the education
process. Second, education is
interaction between the students
and their surroundings. The teacher
is a very important factor in this
equation, but not the only one.
Third, the goal of education is to
develop the capabilities of student,
and while academic knowledge is
one of those abilities, there are
others no less important. Among
those abilities are use of
knowledge, integrity and decency,
psychological and emotional
development, interactive skills, and
dedication to a robust work ethic.
Efforts to modify the course of our
current educational path should be
based on harnessing the strengths
of the Palestinians and steering
them towards the desired objective.
Genuine reform at
the core means
changing
perceptions and
attitudes
The primary
shortcoming of the
current
educational
system is that its
objectives remain
mostly academic
Education is to
develop the
capabilities of
student
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Those strengths will enable us to
realize our objectives, if the
political will is present.
The small size of our land and
population makes the educational
development requirements in
Palestine modest compared to
international standards.
Development can be achieved by
formulating a realistic strategy that
concentrates on quality instead of
quantity and focuses on content,
not form. The Palestinians, inside
and abroad, possess a bounty of
human and financial resources that
have not yet been properly utilized
for the benefit of the national
welfare. Palestinians can
potentially derive much more
benefit from the enormous levels
of international attention and
external aid they are given.
Although there are hidden agendas
behind the aid, Palestine could
avoid the extremes of submission
and rejection and could handle the
situation more wisely. Success in
this struggle depends on clarity of
objective, reasonability of plans,
seriousness in execution, and
honest assessment of progress.
Undoubtedly, the Palestinians are
ready at this stage to accept
genuine changes to their
conditions, and are in fact eager to
participate in new beginnings after
a generation of occupation. This
resilience of spirit is an important
element for development that
should not be disregarded. A
philosophy that clings to the status
quo is no longer acceptable. We
must reach for and embrace a
policy of “new beginnings.”
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1. The DSP assigned 18 research teams the task of formulating
recommendations for every sector that were presented at the
conference launching the PHDR and are available upon request.
Forward
Continuing Israeli incursions into the Palestinian
territories have destroyed the infrastructure of the
Palestinian community and its institutions. The practice
of isolating cities and districts from one another has
made interaction difficult and at times, impossible.   A
comprehensive sustainable human development plan is
needed to provide guidance and a framework for
progress during these trying times, and for the future.
This plan must be flexible enough to adapt readily to
political change. It must be consistent with realities on
the ground. Finally, it must further the Palestinians‘
pursuit of the rights that are enjoyed by citizens of the
world‘s free nations.
The PHDR does not offer detailed recommendations;
rather, it suggests a variety of mechanisms that will help
to develop recommendations for the various sectors
according to general principles.1 The PHDR stresses
the need to organize the Palestinian community along
the lines of an institutional and legal framework that
will lead to the emancipation and complete sovereignty
of the Palestinian territories.  In addition, as we prepare
for the future, we must lay the foundation for a state
committed to the principles of democracy, and equality,
and to the effectiveness of our governing institutions.
These efforts will require radical changes to the
sustainable human development process.
This chapter reiterates many of the points mentioned in
previous sections of the PHDR and presents them in a
comprehensive context. It does not provide a strategy
or working plan or detailed program. Those tasks are
the responsibilities of the leadership of the development
process in the community, concerned PNA institutions,
civil community organizations, and financiers of
development. The PHDR does, however, suggest a
vision and framework for development and
emancipation. Concerned institutions, official and non-
official, must internalize these concepts and translate
The PHDR,
suggests a vision
and framework
for development
and emancipation
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  them into clear and finite policies and programs.  New
policies should both sustain and complement the work of
other institutions and continue to advance the development
process until national goals are achieved. The
internalization process could be realized by employing
several steps, including:
* Holding community discussions about the results of the
PHDR. Its recommendations should be shared with the
leadership of all concerned institutions, with the intent to
incorporate them into a comprehensive sustainable human
development strategy.
* Raising awareness about the priorities and agendas of
concerned institutions and the effects of those priorities at
the official and community levels.
* Convincing concerned Palestinian ministries to adopt
comprehensive development strategies and prompting
international groups operating in Palestine to adopt a
perspective in that is in accordance with those strategies
through community participation at all levels.
* Legislative, executive and judiciary institutions must
integrate the concepts and methodologies of sustainable
human development, as spelled out in this report, into their
policies and legislation.
* Embracing the concept of emancipatory human
development in all Palestinian governmental and civic
organizations. This will require clear leadership directives
to train personnel to fully understand the concept and the
means by which it is advanced.
* Achieving emancipatory human development requires that
laws, plans, programs and projects connect 1) political
objectives with development objectives, 2) social goals
with economic goals, and 3) immediate relief with long-
term development
* Achieving sustainable human development is a multi-
faceted process with multiple stages including design,
planning, execution, and assessment.
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Box ( 5 - 1) Human development as a means to transcend the crisis
“If we contemplate our social condition and the various forms of Israeli
aggression to which we are subjected, we would find that we suffer weakness
in judicial performance, in terms of the failure of the judicial system to realize
respect and effectiveness, weak public awareness of the importance of the law
in the lives of communities, and the problems arising from negligence of the
law. I believe that human development activities must be directed at caring for
women and concentrating on school and kindergarten teachers. I also believe
that efforts should be made to adopt a full development scheme that strives to
hone the personality of the Palestinian people, rendering them qualified to build
a community based on law and respect of human rights, in addition to confirming
organization as the means to achieving goals and limiting personal interests for
the benefit of the greater good.”
Haidar Abdul-Shafi
PLC memebr
Section One:
Adopting and
Implementing the
Concept of
Emancipatory Human
Development
The pillars of emancipatory
human development
Sustainable human development
equally and properly integrates the
goals of liberation and human
development, viewing them as a
united entity whose elements rely
on one another. Emancipatory
human development posits the
welfare of human beings at the
center of political, social and
economic decisions.  Human
rights, such as the right to
development and the right to self-
determination, cannot be separated
from the concept of human
liberation.
PHDR recommendations
concentrate on three elements that
would enable the Palestinian
community to continue its pursuit
of national objectives and realize
its development goals under all
political conditions. The first of the
elements is concentration on
human welfare as the axis on which
all development efforts revolve. It
acknowledges the relationship
between development and social
and economic perseverance, be it
“under occupation” through the
“rebuilding process” or under an
“independent state.” The second
element is community participation
and systematic decentralization,
and the third is investment in
education. While these elements do
not comprise all the elements of the
development process in totality,
they do lay the foundation for
action within the Palestinian
community.
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institutional levels do not fluctuate
in their choice of direction and they
develop clear strategies  to guide
them through difficult times.
3. Activating human resources:
Adopting the concept of
emancipatory human development
is a call to action at all levels. The
resources of the Palestinian people
have not been fully engaged, and
institutions, governmental and
non-governmental, are urged to
mobilize all resources at their
disposal as well as the power of
individuals and local communities
within a united framework.
4. Increasing efforts: The PHDR
calls for a heightened effort on the
part of Palestinian institutions.
Coping with widespread
destruction within the Palestinian
community requires resolve and
the gathering of efforts and
resources. Preserving the
Palestinian will to achieve requires
solidarity at the psychological and
emotional levels and cannot be
accomplished in an atmosphere of
pessimism.  Our suffering cannot
be used as an excuse for inaction.
5. The importance of social and
economic programs:
Emancipatory human development
means the integration of the
political process with economic
and social development goals.
Therefore, leading Palestinian
institutions must formulate
comprehensive, forward-reaching
social and economic programs at
every stage, and the PLC must
assume a leadership role and
shoulder its tasks fully. Having the
PLC and other PNA institutions
work exclusively toward
The implementation of
emancipatory human
development, as outlined in the
PHDR, involves the following:
1. Adoption of a comprehensive
development framework: A
comprehensive development
framework will minimize the long-
term losses that jeopardize human
development, threaten
sustainability, and do injustice to
coming generations by denying
them improved opportunities. In
this regard, it is important to avoid
contradiction between striving for
sustainable human development
and working to realize political
goals. Heightened focus on
community participation and
social services spending will
increase the chances for self-
determination, for both individuals
and the nation as a whole.
2. Full integration of resistance
and development concepts:
 The PHDR emphasizes that these
are unified as well as parallel
concepts. Resistance efforts can
only succeed in a community that
possesses the awareness and
ability to participate. The
community must also provide
acceptable living standards and
healthy internal relationships. The
PHDR stresses that people cannot
achieve sustainable human
development in the absence of
their right to self-determination. It
also urges the Palestinian
community not to succumb to
external forces that strive to
destroy its abilities, and to dedicate
themselves to action as well as
appropriate reaction.
Communities based on
emancipation at the individual and
Adopting the
concept of
emancipatory
human
development is a
call to action at all
levels
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national, social or economic rights
of coming generations. Among the
defined policies that protect the
rights of future generations are
those concerned with balanced
population distribution. Fertility
rates in the West Bank and Gaza
are still among the highest in the
world, and if the trend is not treated
immediately in accordance with the
concepts of sustainable human
development, coming generations
will pay the price in a greatly
deteriorated living standard and
further exhaustion of limited
Palestinian natural resources. The
effects will also be manifested in
rising unemployment, deteriorating
health and education conditions,
and a sharp increase in poverty
rates. Further deterioration in these
areas will have disastrous
implications for the future of the
Palestinian community. Preserving
the rights of coming generations
requires balanced environmental
policies that limit pollution and
guard against overuse of resources.
It also necessitates working to
achieve economic self-reliance by
adopting polices designed to
decrease dependence and by
lessening the number and size of
loans that will have to be paid off
by future generations.
9. Enabling Palestinian women:
This is one of the most important
elements of emancipatory human
development. Palestinian women
are citizens with full rights under
the law and the law must treat them
as equal to men in all aspects. Also,
the Palestinians are bound by
international protocols that provide
for equal rights for men and
women. Raising the legal marriage
age, educating women, considering
One of the most
important elements
of emancipatory
human
development is the
preservation of the
rights of future
generations
development under any
circumstance is the way to ensure
that the Palestinian community is
able to persevere in the face of
current and future obstacles.
6. Developing PNA institutions
to empower them in all
conditions: To empower our
institutions, we must help them to
build strong foundations based
upon the professional
recommendations of  local and
international experts in community
work that would place the right
person in the right place and ensure
active community participation.
7. Bolstering social spending:
Concentration on development,
with its institutional, social,
economic and organizational
ramifications, requires increased
focus on social spending, which
includes the health, education,
social welfare, and housing
sectors. Our limited resources must
be distributed according to a
comprehensive budget which
supports the national and
community agendas through
proper allocation of tax revenues
and encouragement of the private
sector. The chance for success is
greatly expanded if the other
elements of the framework,
education and community
participation, are also realized.
8. Preserving the rights of future
generations: One of the most
important elements of
emancipatory human development
is the preservation of the rights of
future generations, heeding their
interests when making decisions in
the present and planning for the
future. The current generation is
not entitled to jeopardize the
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their needs and perspectives in
decision-making, formulating
plans that contribute to
strengthening the Palestinian
community, and enacting family
laws based on human rights and
equality will preserve the rights of
women and protect the Palestinian
family.
10. Activating the rule of law:
Respect for human rights and the
rule of law forms the basis for all
modern legal, educational and
governmental systems.
Strengthening the Palestinian
judicial system and guiding the
work of our security forces is a
critical first step in the
advancement of this principle. The
rule of law has an educational
dimension that seeks to decrease
traditional influences such as tribal
law in state institutions. The
Palestinian electoral process still
draws a disproportionate number
of its national and local leaders
from a specific social echelon.  Our
government still neglects basic
laws, ignores rules and regulations,
employs the policy of execution,
including public executions,
arrests without trial, and stifles the
natural activism of Palestinian
universities and selected
individuals. These practices have
contributed to chaotic conditions,
reintroduced a system of tribal
favoritism, and placed the personal
interests of certain individuals
above the community interest.
Respect for human
rights and the rule
of law forms the
basis  for modern
legal, educational
and governmental
systems
Box (5 - 2) The importance of investing in social development
Progressive social attitudes greatly influence long-term social and human development. Regression in social
attitudes has been noted in Palestine recently. The deteriorating economic, social and legal status of women is a
primary indicator. Concurrently, despite the pressing need to improve education and increase levels of participation
in local government, there is still no education minister (although the efforts of the ministry personnel deserve
commendation). The Minister of Local Government is busy with his responsibilities as the chief Palestinian
negotiator. Other indicators of regression include the descent of small towns and villages into social and
organizational chaos. Their isolation due to the lack of balanced development policies has returned the “social
contract“ to its traditional definition, which places little value on the economic and cultural welfare of small
towns and villages. In addition, the rise of an “informal“ or underground economy does not contribute to the
foundations of a developmental economy, albeit it is the only alternative for many. This clear regression in
several key areas requires a clear policy that embraces and protects our small towns and villages guarantees
equilibrium between private interests and the greater good.
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Building
centralized and
decentralized
institutions based
on community
participation.
Section Two:
 Institutionalization and
Organization of
Community
Participation and Local
Government
The second pillar of emancipatory
human development concerns
community participation, the
ability to influence government,
and the building of centralized and
decentralized institutions through
community participation. National
government must delegate legal,
financial and administrative
authority to local councils. Proper
delegation of authority allows
them to independently handle their
affairs. It also encourages them to
contribute to the advancement of
sustainable human development at
the national level within the
framework of emancipatory
human development. Local
institutions must serve as the
catalysts for the Palestinian
community‘s efforts to build a
modern democratic state. The
current Intifada and its
consequences have highlighted the
need for strengthening community
participation. Effective local
government institutions will shore
up the foundations of the PNA
within a framework of mutual
respect and faith in the importance
of joint participation. Effective
local government will revitalize
the relationship between the
central authority and the local
community.
Active participation in the
development process requires the
involvement the community in
developmental decision-making.
Local communities must
participate in the creation of
flexible development vision that
responds to changes determined by
progress within and around the
community and in the world at
large. All participants must be
welcomed without discrimination
on the part of local government
officials, whether it be based on
gender, religious or political
beliefs, family, or place of
residence. In addition, active
participation allows the community
to help supervise execution of
strategy and to question decisions
through democratic practice.
Developmental decision-making
carefully considers the philosophy,
strategies, policies and programs
that affect all aspects of human life.
The PNA is facing many challenges
to its leadership of the Palestinian
community. In addition to the
pressure of occupation, the PNA
must address immediate needs
while creating a long-term
development vision.  The PNA
must meet high performance
expectations nurtured by the
Palestinians since 1967 with very
limited resources. Undoubtedly, the
PNA faces an array of obstacles,
among them geographic dislocation
and the division of the Palestinian
territories into isolated cantons, as
well as checkpoints and barricades
that  serve as daily reminders of the
military occupation. If the status
quo is allowed to persist, relations
between the Palestinian local
community and the PNA will
disintegrate. This outcome is more
likely if local councils are forced
to continue without a development
The PNA PNA
must address
immediate needs
while creating a
long-term
development
vision
121Human Development Report 2002
2. Such as the report published by the Palestinian Legislative Council, the Rokar Report, reports
of the Independent Commission for Human Rights, and previous PHDRs.
plan, adequate authority or
appropriate levels of funding. The
sense of initiative cultivated over
more than three decades is not
enough to sustain them in such
adverse conditions.
Institutionalization and
organization of community
participation and local government
must be rebuilt on new
foundations. The critical areas of
needed change are:
1. Honest assessment of
institutional performance: The
many weaknesses of existing
institutions were revealed under
the pressures of the Intifada and the
burdens of the siege. These
institutions must now make honest
and responsible assessment of their
visions and work mechanisms. It
should be noted that the
ineffectiveness of some Palestinian
institutions predated the Intifada.
In some cases, poor management
strategy and inefficient work
systems had been in place for
years.
2. Administrative reform:
Community participation is also
integrally connected with the
administrative reforms that are
being recommended by many local
and international institutions2.
Reform attempts stopped at the
outset of the Intifada.  Ironically,
the Intifada‘s progression further
exposed and underscored the need
for administrative and legal reform
that would ensure participation,
professionalism, and technical
standards in institutional work.
Matters were made worse by
regression of the performance of
several key institutions, at a time
when the Palestinian community
desperately needed its institutions
and the services they provided.
Some used the Intifada to justify
substandard performance and
others to hide their incompetence,
all to the detriment of resistance
and development efforts. The PNA
demonstrated administrative and
financial inadequacies that shook
the community‘s confidence in its
ability to stop further deterioration.
Local councils relied heavily on
donors and tended to accept their
conditions without proper
oversight by the central authority.
NGOs followed the same pattern,
furthering threatening the status of
the central authority.
3. Building trust between citizens
and the PNA: the PNA has done
little to stem the loss of public
confidence in its capabilities. Its
efforts to establish a sound
government based on the rule of
law are still weak. The PNA still
fails to connect the political
process, development, and active
community participation. It
purports to possess a development
vision, but the absence of the rule
of law in a widely institutionalized
framework guarantees its failure of
that vision. The lack of a legally
supportable development vision
will yield the same result, because
the relationship between
development and sustainability and
the rule of law cannot be
disregarded. The current PNA
stance toward NGOs and their role
in the community is unjustifiable,
even if concerns with some of their
operational strategies are valid.
Institutionalization
and organization
of community
participation and
local government
as the basis for
development
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Mechanisms to
increase levels of
coordination
between NGOs
and PNA
institutions must
be improved
4. The failure of centralization:
Centralized decision-making has
undergone a difficult test, and the
results are discouraging. The
Palestinian people must be
engaged in community
administration to help it surmount
obstacles on the path of achieving
national objectives. NGOs must
adopt a standardized development
vision embraced by all NGOs,
official institutions, and donors and
to which they may be held
accountable. Funding sources
should be monitored according to
established legal parameters.  It is
recommended that the PNA
coordinate with NGOs in the
service of development rather than
isolate them. Mechanisms to
increase levels of coordination
between NGOs and PNA
institutions; and facilitate
networking, cooperation, and
consultation among NGOs and
with the PNA must be developed.
5. Local government and active
participation: The true meanings
of these concepts require that local
councils and NGOs be allowed to
participate in decision-making and
to question authority. A legal
framework governing the activities
of local councils and NGOs must
be established.  The following
steps will help to establish this
framework:
º Understanding the community
process and the needs of the
community under fluctuating
political conditions and
integrating comprehensive
community thinking into the
decisions and plans of
concerned institutions.
º  Working in every way to remove
the sense of alienation wherever
it exists; between Palestinians
and the PNA, its institutions, or
with other individuals.
º  Working to hold PLC elections
based on inclusive practices and
the principles of freedom and
democracy and according to an
electoral system that considers
past experience.
º Holding local council elections
to encourage delegation of
authority.
º Addressing the issue of refugee
camps and its relationship,
present and future, with the
functions of local government.
º Expanding community
participation in resolving
disputes within the boundaries of
local councils in non-violent
ways.
º  Including in the agendas of local
councils and community
institutions the needs of youth,
children and the underprivileged.
º Integrating women into local
councils and expanding their role.
º  Providing incentives to donate
land and money necessary to
establish operating venues within
the jurisdictional areas of local
councils.
º Encouraging local councils to
cooperate with NGOs and local
communities by increasing the
number of public meetings,
possibly making them
institutionally required and
governed by clear rules of
operation and function.
º  Empowering and encouraging
NGOs to spread awareness of the
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Providing
governmental
financial support
for local councils
is needed
Help the private
sector to establish
local projects
community‘s need to interact
with and monitor the functions
of local councils;
º  Encouraging unions and student
bodies in schools and
universities to resume their
proactive roles.
º  Encouraging the educated and
affluent segments of Palestinian
society to bear their
responsibilities toward the larger
community.
º  Expanding the authorities of
local councils in the broader
sense by inviting them to
participate in planning, enacting
laws, execution, monitoring,
evaluation, and directing the
educational process, health care
provision, social affairs, and
other human welfare matters.
º  Reenacting the Law of Local
Councils and holding them
responsible for participating in
formulating the development
vision and following up on
execution, in addition to
employing the law with a
positive spirit.
º  Lending local councils the
needed skills to perform their
duties toward citizens and
participate in human
development with emphasis on
sustainability, and facilitate the
exchange of expertise with
internal and external groups.
 º Providing government  financial
support for local councils to
undertake projects within their
geographical boundaries,
remanding property taxes and
redistributing fuel taxes to the
councils.
 º Expanding the construction of
joint service centers to serve
local councils in close proximity
and empower them to supervise
the execution of human
development strategy in their
areas.
 º Forming joint city councils from
local councils with geographical
connections, as in the case of the
Bethlehem District and the
Ramallah and Al-Bireh areas, to
facilitate the formation of
complementary agendas .
 º Pressuring donors to unify
procedures for donating and
transferring funds, monitoring,
simplifying reporting and
presentation requirements,
paying attention to developing
local levels of technical
expertise, and supporting
Palestinian priorities within the
jurisdictional areas of local
councils.
º Promoting the role of the Finance
Ministry as a general coordinator
to direct financial support in
accordance with Palestinian
human development strategy.
 º Help the private sector to initiate
local projects and encourage the
private sector to contribute to
community development.
Section Three:
 Toward a Developmental
Education System
The third pillar of emancipatory
human development is connected
with the importance of education
from the qualitative and
quantitative perspectives. Investing
in education was and still is the
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Institutions must
push forward the
wheel of
educational
development
Encouraging
kindergartens is
vital
primary catalyst that will enable
the Palestinian community to
persevere and progress at all levels.
Therefore, the PHDR proposes an
inclusive, developmentally
oriented educational model as one
of the top priorities of sustainable
human development.  This
educational model is one of the
most effective methods to realize
the objectives of the Palestinian
people and protect the future of
their children.
For Palestinian education to be in
harmony with the principles of
emancipatory human
development, and to advance the
objectives of the Palestinian
educational system, several
directions must be considered.
They are:
1. Early childhood and
preliminary education: The
preliminary education stage is the
foundation on which subsequent
stages rely.  It also serves as the
starting point for any radical
change in the education system. It
therefore deserves detailed
examination of many of its aspects.
 º Encouraging kindergartens to
define their curricula.  Due to the
rapid rise in levels of
kindergarten attendance, the
Ministry of Education must
define both the curricula and
goals for this important
educational stage. The Ministry
licenses kindergartens that meet
certain staff and facilities
criteria. The Ministry also offers
a guide to aid directors of
kindergartens, but direct
ministry oversight of
kindergarten operations is almost
nonexistent.
  Kindergartens are beginning to
compete with first grades and
even second grades in the
teaching of reading and writing,
arithmetic, and English.
However, socialization issues are
sorely neglected, as schools and
parents alike are unaware of their
importance. In this environment,
it becomes important for the
Ministry to adjust the focus of
kindergarten education and to
educate schools and parents
about the real objectives of
kindergartens.
   Helping children to develop
personality and character.
Without a doubt, the home is the
first place to achieve this, but
schooling plays a tremendous
role in shaping and broadening
the world of a child. Schools
must work to instill self-
assurance in all children instead
of nurturing a weak or distraught
personality, which leads to
adaptation difficulties, decreased
productivity, and violent
behavior.
   Getting children accustomed to
dealing with their peers as
equals. Children at home deal
with people older than they are
or younger, and a difference of
one year in children‘s ages is
considerable in terms of ability
and cognizance. At school, a
child encounters many age-
mates, and treating them as
equals is an important part of
social upbringing. “The
authoritarian personality“ is
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Schooling plays a
tremendous role in
shaping and
broadening the
world of a child
 Educating
children on the
importance of
citizenship
Integrating the
concept of gender
in education
greatly adept at dealing with
superiors, mainly through
adulation, and with inferiors, by
oppression, but dealing with an
equal proves very difficult. This
particular personality type
occurs frequently in our society.
It is a personality type that views
human relations exclusively
from the perspective of a power
and authority hierarchy.  Our
collective tendency toward this
type of behavior may have
played a large role in the realities
of our political history.
 º Educating children on the
importance of citizenship and
the value of public or common
interests, both tangible and
moral. Wide segments of the
Arab nation were raised on the
highly individualistic and
defensive concept, “this is mine,
that is yours,” while "this is ours,
that is theirs" seems to be more
important and appropriate.
Undoubtedly, this way of
thinking hinders progress and
can only be overcome by
educating children about the
value of public interest.
 º Nurturing moral values and
behavioral traits in children,
including work ethics, because
although honesty and decency
are appreciated values,
dedication and readiness to work
must be encouraged and
developed. Our standing in the
modern world depends heavily
on developing the work ethic in
our community.
 º Integrating the concept of
gender in education when
planning, executing and
evaluating the education
process. This includes
presenting positive pictures of
Palestinian women in the labor
force, including traditional,
political work and modern
professions, such as medicine
and engineering, and other
positive and effective models.
We must also present male role
models that support gender
equality and man's familial
duties. A developmental
education system provides the
basis for mutual respect among
children of both genders at
school. It also requires special
attention to practical and
strategic needs of students and
workers in the education sector.
Suitable facilities must be built
and technical resources
distributed equitably, including
laboratories, computers and
teachers. Special attention must
be give to existing disparities
between boys‘ schools and girls'
schools.
 º The world has become a
connected unit, and each
community now has to deal with
all others. We must instill the
basic values of tolerance in our
children. Tolerance does not
necessarily imply agreement.
Tolerance means granting others
the rights we expect to enjoy
ourselves. We must mutually
respect our differences and
resolve conflict through
discussion and non-violent
means. The authoritative nature
of our traditional community
does not lend itself easily to the
principles of tolerance. Respect
for others begins with self-
respect.  Adults must respect
children, which is not common
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Encouraging
Mutual respect of
differences and
understanding
based on
discussion and
non-violent
treatment.
The higher stages
of education still
employ rote-
learning
methodologies
in our upbringing. One of the
tasks of the coming period is to
move from specificity to
generality, because harping on
the Palestinian specificity may
turn into an excuse for
negligence and a narrow horizon
and consequently a cause for
failure. Overemphasis of the
Palestinian identity in our
children‘s upbringing belies a
defensive attitude and may lead
to an undermining of the
importance of universal issues.
This requires more attention to
the issues of human rights and
the environment.
2. Secondary education: In an
environment that embraces the
concepts described above,
academic tutelage takes a backseat
to psychological and social
objectives, which are introduced in
the early stages of education and
should gradually assume a wider
role in later years.
The higher stages of education still
employ rote - learning
methodologies and limit the
knowledge and skills of students
to what is available in textbooks.
The concept of instilling self-
motivation in students is often
neglected, and the teacher is still
viewed as the central figure in the
educational process, rather than the
student. Therefore, higher
education has not yet arrived at the
stages of ‘empowerment‘ and
‘motivation‘ mentioned in the
Palestinian curriculum plan. It is
likely that radical changes cannot
be achieved in the higher years of
education unless they are based on
radical changes in the early stages.
These are long-term objectives that
may require more than a decade to
be realized.
The main problem in higher
education may be the clear
contradiction between its
objectives and content, both of
which were defined more than 50
years ago. At that time, higher
education was reserved for a very
limited segment of society.  Today,
higher education must serve a much
broader range of students from
many different socioeconomic
backgrounds. The school system is
marked by three inter-connected
shortcomings: congestion, limited
objectives, and low standards.
Broadening objectives is at least
part of the solution, and expanding
opportunities for vocational
education in schools may help to
achieve that goal.
3. Possible changes:
 º Clearly, achieving the
aforementioned objectives
requires radical changes in
school atmosphere and teaching
methods. Perhaps the entire
educational process needs to be
redefined, including school
management and the structure of
the educational system itself. The
school must be transformed from
a conflict arena to a cooperative
haven for administrators,
teachers and students. Teachers
must treat students as the center
of free thought and will, not as
empty pots to be filled without
regard for individual personality.
The transformation must be
considered a top priority as we
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The quality of
educational and
psychological
counseling at
schools is low
Simple measures
would vastly
improve the
atmosphere of
existing schools
seek to redefine education, for
it is the primary element of a
modern education system. From
this base, we can work to
achieve our community‘s social
and economic goals. The
prospects of securing the
financial resources necessary to
implement this change are very
disheartening. Most of these
changes require revamping the
training programs of teachers
and supervisors to include pre-
employment as well as in-
service training programs. A
reexamination of teacher
performance evaluation at the
university level should also be
undertaken. It is important to
note, however, that realizing
radical change requires reducing
the size of classrooms, which is
considered one of the priorities
of the Palestinian education
sector.
   It must be noted here that the
hostile, authoritative
atmosphere of most Palestinian
schools is also found in many
Palestinian families. Schools
will not be able to make the
necessary reforms if the family
atmosphere remains unchanged.
Therefore, improving the
relationship between school and
the home becomes a significant
element.
º Palestinian universities and
colleges graduate large numbers
of education students every year
in various areas of specialty.
However, the Ministry of
Education has yet to define the
minimum required course load
and level of practical experience
for schoolteachers. Developing
the quality of our teachers in
Palestine is impossible under
these conditions. Reconciling
educational curricula
requirements with ministry
regulations will take several
years. Defining minimum
standards for teacher
certification must be a priority
of that process.
º Developing vocational and
technical education heads the list
of Palestinian educational
objectives for late primary and
higher education. However,
execution is moving very slowly
due to several interrelated
reasons. The Palestinian
community does not value
vocational and technical
training. Official emphasis is
placed on the needs of academic
study programs at the expense of
vocational and technical studies.
Few resources are available to
develop vocational training.
Changing this situation requires
that educational leaders  direct
more attention and resources to
vocational training, even at the
expense of academic education
programs. Increased
opportunities to pursue
vocational training would
encourage more students to
enroll. Primary education
should, however, remain
available to all.
 º Developing the role of
educational counseling. The
quality of educational and
psychological counseling at
schools is low. A qualitative leap
forward is required in the way
of content, human resources, and
methodology. Educational
counseling plays an important
role in ensuring the success of
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An allocation of
7%-8% of GDP for
Education may be
sufficient
the newly-introduced vocational
track. Students will initially face
social pressure to avoid
vocational education and will
need encouragement to
overcome that obstacle. If the
vocational track is to succeed,
we must promote the fact that
all educational tracks are equal,
and are not arranged from best
to worst. The vocational
education plan proposed for the
higher education level includes
the possibility of transferring
from the vocational track to the
academic.  However, the
converse is not true, which
suggests that the vertical
categorization of tracks is still
influencing the attitudes of those
who proposed it. In addition,
encouraging transfer from the
vocational to the academic track
may have undesirable
consequences further down the
road that will limit the
effectiveness of the track itself.
º Buildings and school facilities
comprise the physical
infrastructure of the education
process. Schools truly function
as a student‘s “second home.”
However, many buildings look
more like prisons than schools,
with their long hallways,
multiple identically configured
classrooms, uncomfortable
furniture, and neglected
courtyards. The situation could
be radically changed in older
buildings using various aesthetic
measures, including applying
colorful paint, planting trees and
shrubs in courtyards, and
choosing better furniture. Such
simple measures would vastly
improve the atmosphere of
existing schools, which probably
require more attention and
awareness than money. As for
newer schools, it is important to
consider their architectural and
social attributes in addition to
their function.
º  The Palestinian education budget
should consider additional
sources of income. First, external
aid for expansion and
development projects should be
pursued.  Second, income
generated from tuition, book
sales and other means, which,
although small at the primary
school level, is a substantial
source of income at the higher
education level. Third, the
general budget allocation must
contain a fixed amount for
education. A common method
for determining the general
education budget  ties it to a
percentage of GDP. If external
aid is available, an allocation of
7%-8% of GDP for education
may be sufficient in Palestine.
Currently, educational
expenditures account for less
than 5 percent of GDP.
º Enacting the Palestinian
education law.  A comprehensive
law on education does not
currently exist, although the
higher education law was
enacted in 1998. The PNA may
be averse to enacting the law
because of the financial
obligations it implies for the
state.  However, further delay of
its enactment may have long-
term negative consequences for
educational development.
Therefore, the law should be
enacted as soon as possible while
granting the government some
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 Necessary steps
1. Ending Israeli
occupation
2. Creating a
flexible
development
vision
3. Adopting a
democratic
framework
financial flexibility.
4. Higher education: Higher
education will contribute to
sustainable human development
needs in Palestine by:
º  Striving  to prepare students to
face the new challenges of the
21st century.
º  Intensifying efforts to organize
higher education and supply it
with the necessary human
resources.
º Studying the “economics of
higher education“ to develop an
understanding of the capabilities
of higher education in Palestine
and distributing funding fairly
and in a manner that guarantees
stability and sustainability.
º Continuing to concentrate on
modern technical and scientific
fields.
º Addressing the problem of
unemployment radically instead
of using higher education to
mask it.
Section Four:
Toward Emancipatory
Human Development
Much of the Palestinian journey
toward achieving emancipatory
human development still lies
before them, although great strides
have been made in recent years.
The span of years between 1994
and 2000 represented a historic
turning point for the Palestinians.
It was an era in which the
establishment of a modern,
independent state moved close to
realization. Discussion in all
matters heated up, laws were
enacted, institutions built, NGOs
set to work, education rates
increased, and certain aspects of
health care and environmental
protection improved.
Three chief objectives should be
established in order to fully activate
Palestinian resources and to engage
the entire community in efforts to
overcome the challenges we face.
First, we must end the Israeli
occupation that continues to hinder
sustainable human development,
drains the resources of the
Palestinian community and
deprives it of its basic rights to self-
determination and development.
The perseverance of the
Palestinians and their continuing
resistance confirms their
commitment to the realization of
those rights.
Second, we must create a flexible
development vision that paves the
way for the future and which can
handle states of uncertainty.  This
development vision will form a
national standard endorsed by
Palestinian official institutions,
NGOs and donors. In the context
of this vision, conditions of funding
and their monitoring will be
defined according to the law.
Palestinian resources must be
activated and engaged to their
fullest limits. Palestinians must
create an atmosphere that
reconciles the goals of politics and
development. We must engage in
our entire community in a
discussion that identifies the rights
of individuals and the community
at the political and developmental
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5. Enacting laws
to organize the
function of
security forces
4. Establishing a
“development
council“ at the
highest possible
level
3. The Independent Commission for Human Rights; “The State of Palestinian Citizens‘ Rights;
Sixth Annual Report“, Ramallah, 2001.
levels.   We must also seek to
realize that which is possible under
the current circumstances and
establish mechanisms that allow
change to be introduced to
development plans and policies as
needed. Flexibility must be
inherent in the planning and
execution of any sustainable
development program, and
especially so in the Palestinian
context, which faces the added
burdens of the pressures and
changes brought to bear by the
Israeli occupation.
Third, we must adopt a democratic
framework created and
implemented through the
provisions of enforceable
legislation. The framework must
allow for delegation of authority.
Local councils must function as
representative local governments
with independent revenue streams
as well as financial support from
the central government through an
approved development plan. Such
a policy would liberate the
dormant resources of the
community, provide structure and
organization for their capabilities,
and increase in the value of their
contribution to the development
process. Palestinians in the
occupied territories have grown
accustomed to developing their
resistance and development
methods to meet the challenges
continually imposed by Israel.
In addition, there are five general
steps that require examination and
consideration. They are:
1.Generate support for the
enactment of a basic law that
organizes relationships and
creates equilibrium between the
legislative, executive and judicial
authorities and allows citizens to
practice their rights freely within
the boundaries of the law. In
addition, we must encourage the
establishment of the rule of law
and create an independent
judicial authority capable of
overseeing its application.
2. Promote transparency to increase
trust between citizens and the
PNA and raise awareness in the
Palestinian people; revealing to
them existing problems,
clarifying their dimensions, and
preparing people
psychologically to face them.
This requires activating the
general monitoring authority to
supervise budget distribution,
government agencies and
monopolies and the production
of reports to guarantee legal and
administrative accountability.3
3.Establishing a “development
council“ at the highest possible
level in which official
institutions and the civil and
private sectors would participate
and whose responsibilities would
be to define the path of
development and follow-up on
development policies and
performance.
4. Bolstering the role of official
institutions, such as ministries,
especially the Ministries of Local
Government, Planning and
International Cooperation,
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Palestinians must
pursue their vision
within clear and
professional
managerial
standards
Finance, and Justice, NGOs, and
the private sector, as well as
individuals involved in
decision-making and execution.
Delegating authority would
achieve this correctly, especially
at the highest levels,
accompanied by effective
accountability and feedback
mechanisms. This requires
establishing proper structures
for PNA institutions and
clarifying the expertise and
boundaries of authority of each
governmental body in a manner
that would minimize duplication
of effort among government
agencies, specifically ministries.
5. Enacting laws to organize the
function of security forces and
grant them legitimacy in order
to protect the rights of citizens
and guarantee the security of the
community.
The establishment of the PNA
should not be considered the end
of our journey; instead, it should
be regarded as a real chance to
begin serious and effective
handling of accumulated basic
problems. As soon as an acceptable
political settlement is reached, the
state of Palestine, from the first
moment of its birth, will face “the
double whammy“ of a growing
population and a weak economy.
Thus, one of the top priorities for
state leadership will be to
formulate long-term social and
economic strategies that consider
that international aid may be
available for some time but not
forever and not at the same levels.
It may be difficult for the
leadership to execute some
policies that do not meet public
expectations of their new state of
independence.
In conclusion, flexibility is a
necessary requirement of the
proposed Palestinian development
vision. Healthy strides must be
taken to overcome political
obstacles and serious efforts made
to maintain equilibrium in our
progress. At all levels, Palestinians
must pursue their vision within
clear and professional managerial
standards and mechanisms of
accountability and transparency.
Resistance in the cause of
liberation and sustainable human
development can no longer be
separated. Sustainable human
development must balance its
social, economic, and institutional
requirements with the needs and
abilities of the public in order to
engage dormant human resources
in bearing the burden of
developmental emancipation as
well as to share with them the fruits
of the development process.
Integrating the notion of human
development into the institutions of
the community will serve the
liberation process in the most
inclusive sense. A sustainable
human development vision will not
be realized until the Palestinian
community is granted its right to
self-determination.
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Definition of terms 
  
                                                 
 
. Definitions of terms were adopted from international statistical definitions 
used by the UNDP Human Development Reports, or those used by the 
PCBS. Where definitions were not available from these sources, experts 
were consulted 
The economy 
 
x  Gross National Product (GNP): The 
market value of all the final goods and 
services produced during a specific period of 
time (usually one year). 
 
x  Net payments from abroad: Payments to 
foreign factors of production used locally 
minus payments for Palestinian factors of 
production used abroad. 
 
x  Gross Domestic Product (GDP): Gross 
National Product minus net transfer 
payments. 
 
x  Real per capita GDP in dollars according 
to Purchasing Power Parity: Per capita 
GDP of a country converted to US dollars to 
equalize purchasing power to the currency of 
a country. The UNDP has used Purchasing 
Power Parity for international GDP 
comparisons. These comparisons will be 
more accurate than comparisons based on 
exchange rates which are extremely unstable. 
 
x  Real per capita GDP: Real GDP for a 
given year divided by the population of the 
country during that year. 
 
x  Rate of inflation: Measured by the growth 
rate of the GDP implicit deflator for each 
given period of time. 
 
x  Trade balance deficit: Occurs when 
imports of goods and services exceed export 
of goods and services. 
 
x  Purchasing power: The quantity of goods 
and services that an amount of money can 
purchase. 
 
x  Remittances: Funds that workers abroad 
send to their families living in the WBGS. 
 
x  Labor force: Total number of people aged 
DQGRYHUDQGEHORZWKHDJHRIZKRDUH
able and willing to work (both the employed 
and the unemployed). 
 
x  The employed: :KRHYHU LV DJHG  DQG
over, and who has worked for a wage for at 
least one hour during the week prior to the 
survey, or who has worked for no wages in a 
family establishment or in a voluntary 
institution. 
 
x  The unemployed (or job-seekers): Those 
DJHGDQGRYHUZKRGRQRWKDYHZRUNDQG
are actively searching for jobs. 
 
x Official employment in Israel: Palestinian 
workers who are working in Israel with 
permits. 
 
x  Unofficial employment in Israel: 
Palestinian workers who are working in 
Israel without permits. 
 
x  Government expenditure: The expenditure 
of all central and other government offices, 
administrations and institutions. It includes 
current expenditure and capital or 
developmental expenditure, but does not 
include regional, domestic or private 
expenditure. 
 
x  Public sector: Includes all productive 
activities and services provided by all 
branches and at all levels of government 
(central government, and local councils). 
 
x  Gross capital formation: (or what is known 
as investment) is the combination of the 
following three components: Gross fixed 
capital formation, change in deposits, and net 
holdings in valuables; investment is 
measured by the purchasing price, as is the 
case in measuring consumption. 
 
+XPDQ'HYHORSPHQW5HSRUW   
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x  Final consumption expenditure: The final 
consumption of families (made up of 
expenditure on all goods and services, with 
the exception of expenditure on construction 
of housing); the final consumption of the 
government and non-profit institutions 
(measured by the value of production minus 
the value of payments from sales). 
 
x Average consumption: Total individual 
monthly consumption of the following 
items: 
0RQH\ VSHQW RQ SXUFKDVH RI JRRGV DQG
services for daily consumption. 
9DOXH RI JRRGV DQG VHUYLFHV WKDW WKH
family receives from the household 
wage-earner, and which is used for the 
consumption of the family. 
Goods that are consumed during a 
specific period of time, and that are 
produced by the family. 
 (VWLPDWHG KRXVH YDOXH LQ WKH HYHQW RI
ownership). 
 
x Average expenditure: Total individual 
monthly expenditure on the following 
items: 
. Money spent on purchase of goods and 
services for daily consumption. 
. Value of goods and services that the 
family receives from the household 
wage-earner, and which is used for the 
consumption of the family. 
. Expenditure on fees and taxes (non-
investment), charity (Zakat), donations, 
gifts, interest payments on debts, and 
other non-consumption items. 
 
x  Consumption of food as a percentage of 
total family consumption: Consumption 
calculated from the details of GDP 
(expenditure at market prices at the national 
level) specified in United Nations System of 
National Accounts, mostly included in the 
IRXUWK  DQG ILIWK  VWDJHV RI WKH
International Comparison Programme. 
 
x Percentage of poor families: Percentage of 
poor families from the population. 
 
x Abject poverty: As estimated in the 
Palestine Poverty Report IRU D -member 
KRXVHKROGIRUWKH\HDU 
 
x Severity of poverty: A mean indicator for 
total consumption deficit. 
 
x Poverty gap: The percentage of decrease in 
the average income of the poor from the 
poverty line. 
 
Education 
 
x  Literacy: A person is considered literate if 
he/she can read and understand a short and 
simple paragraph on his/her daily life. 
 
x  Basic education: The foundation of 
education and the basis upon which other 
stages of education are based. Its duration is 
\HDUVDJH- 
 
x  Secondary education: Scholastic education 
which follows basic education. Its duration is 
\HDUVDJH- 
 
x Higher education: Education provided in 
universities and community colleges. The 
prerequisite to enroll in higher education is 
completion of the secondary stage, or its 
equivalent, and obtaining the General 
Secondary Education Certificate (Tawjihi), 
or its equivalent. It is considered to be for the 
DJHJURXSRI-VFKRODVWLF\HDUV 
 
 
x Total enrollment rate: Number of students 
enrolled in any educational level, whether or 
not they belong to the appropriate age group, 
as a percentage of the population who come 
under the appropriate age group. 
 
 
Health 
 
x Crude birth rate: Number of live and still 
ELUWKVSHUHYHU\RIWKHSRSXODWLRQIRUD
given period of time. 
 
x Crude death rate: Annual number of deaths 
SHUHYHU\RIWKHSRSXODWLRQ 
 
x Infant mortality rate: Annual number of 
LQIDQWXQGHU\HDURIDJHGHDWKVSHUHYHU\
RIWKHSRSXODWLRQ 
 
x Child mortality rate: Annual average 
number of FKLOG GHDWKV EHORZ WKH DJH RI 
SHU HYHU\RI WKHSRSXODWLRQZKRZHUH
born live during the past five years. (the 
probability of death during the period 
between birth and the fifth birthday). 
 
x Life expectancy at birth: Number of years 
that a newborn child is expected to live, 
+XPDQ'HYHORSPHQW5HSRUW   
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under the prevailing mortality patterns at the 
time of his/her birth. 
 
x Fertility: Actual reproductive (childbearing) 
performance of an individual, couple, group, 
population or society. (The actual number of 
births a woman had during her reproductive 
life). 
 
x Total fertility rate: Average number of live 
births a woman has during her life, if she 
could reproduce at each age period according 
to the fertility rates prevailing for all stages 
of life. 
 
Miscellaneous definitions 
 
x Rest of the West Bank: The West Bank, 
excluding East Jerusalem. 
 
x East Jerusalem: The eastern part of the city 
of Jerusalem (the part that was under 
Jordanian rule) occupied by Israel in June 
DQGDQQH[HGRQ-XQH 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
x Zakat committees: Voluntary institutions 
that collect the Islamic alms tax (Zakat) and 
donations from those able to contribute, and 
distribute the alms to those in need according 
to a specific social survey mechanism. 
 
x Occupancy rate: Average number of 
persons per room living in a house. It is 
calculated by dividing the number of people 
living in a house over the number of rooms. 
 
x Dependency rate: Average number of 
persons supported by a person who works, or 
is able to work. 
 
x Gender: A term that indicates social 
differences between males and females. 
 
x Percentage of women to men (gender 
gap): It measures the gap separating what 
has been achieved by men and women in the 
same field. The participation rate in the labor 
force (the percentage of women to men) is 
Zhich means that in order to achieve 
equality, women should accomplish 
DFKLHYHPHQWV DW D UDWH RI  WR FDWFK XS
with the achievements of men. 
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List of Case Studies 
 
 
 
. Poverty cases: 
- Unemployed head of household 
- $KHDGRIKRXVHKROGZKRORVWZRUNLQ,VUDHOFDVHV 
- $KHDGRIKRXVHKROGZKRORVWZRUNLQWKH3DOHVWLQLDQSULYDWHVHFWRUFDVHV 
- Low-paid worker 
- An extended family under the poverty line 
- Poor family from a village 
. A female headed household 
. The impact of the latest events on a small business 
. The impact of roadblocks on a youth searching for work and trying to his interview in a different region  
. A student who left the university because of roadblocks and poverty 
. The environment in a village 
. A girl who got married at a young age 
. A Bedouin family 
. An innovative small project in response to economic hardship 
. A farmer who lost his land because of settlement activities 
. A farmer who witnessed the destruction of his farm 
. Fishers in Gaza 
. A Gaza student separated from her family for years because of the closure 
. A day in the life of an ambulance driver 
. A family that had to flee its home because of continuos shelling 
. A disabled child who was hit by an Israeli bullet 
. A family lost home because of demolition by the Israeli forces 
. Children in a refugee camps (Dheisheh) 
. Living conditions in a refugee camp (Jalazoun) 
. Local councils in various regions 
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. University of Maryland  
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Workshops with community leaders, unions, and NGOs 
 
 
Group- West Bank In cooperation with 
Political groups Fateh Headquarters 
Academics Department of Sociology & Institute of Gender Studies 
Youth organizations Youth Union/Ministry of Youth 
Women’s organizations General Union of Women/ Women’s Affairs Technical Committees 
NGOs NGOs Network & Union of Charitable Organizations 
Human rights 
Organizations 
Independent Commission for Citizens Rights & Human Rights 
Organizations Council 
Media institutions -------- 
Children’s institutions National Secretariat for Children 
Local councils Union of Local Councils 
Private sector Paltrade 
Group/Gaza Strip 
 
Academics ------- 
Women WATC 
Environment Ministry of Environment 
Political groups -------- 
NGOs NGOs Network 
Refugee organizations Local Refugee Committees 
Human rights 
organizations Independent Commission for Citizens Rights 
Labor unions General Union of Workers 
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Ministerial Committee Members 
 
 

MOPIC, coordinator Moh’d Ghadeyeh 
Ministry of Health Ghaleb abu baker, Faisal Abu shahla 
Ministry of Justice Hanna Issa, Moh’d Abu shawish 
Ministry of Education Said Assaf, Haifa’ Al-Aghah 
Ministry of Agriculture Adel Breghet, Mahnoud Abu Samra 
Ministry of Social Affairs Abdullah Hourani, Hani Saba 
Ministry of Sports and Youth Rabiha Deiab, Jamileh Abu Samhadaneh 
Ministry of Industry Osama Al Teybi, Sami Abu Zareefa 
Ministry of Public Works Majdy Abu Ghareebeh 
Ministry of Housing Afnan Ayesh, Abedel Karim Abdeen 
Ministry of Local Government Hani Al-Horob, Hasan Abu Samhadaneh 
Ministry of Finance Nabhan Othman, Issa El Danaq 
Ministry of Awqaf  Moh’d Al-Qawasmi, Mahmoud Al-Nayreb 
Ministry of Culture Issam Al-Batran, Yousef Sha’ban 
Ministry of Economy and Trade Maha Abu Issa, Ghazi Al-Sourani 
Ministry of Labor Ghazi Al-Khalili, Abedel Aziz Qudih 
Ministry of Interior Sajeda Tareq Zaki 
Ministry of Higher Education Ribhi Abu Snina 

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National Conference on Human Development –-XQH 
 
About the Conference  
 
A Palestinian team of researchers and practitioners has completed work on the preparation for the 
Palestinian Human Development Report (PHDR) –7KH3+'5LVWKHRXWFRPHRf a long process 
of quantitative and qualitative research, where data from various local and international sources were 
utilized. Focus groups, case studies, intensive interviews were utilized. Young people and children 
have also participated through providing their perspective on development issues.  
 
The PHDR provides an indigenous Palestinian perspective on development, and best means to move 
beyond the current crises. The PHDR offers an approach to the organization of Palestinian Society and 
directions for future action.  
 
The National Conference on Human Development (Toward A Viable State) provides an opportunity 
for informed and focused debate on the most salient elements in the reconstruction period and in way 
of state building. The Conference has the following objectives: 
 
. 3UHVHQWDWLRQRIWKHNH\DUJXPHQWVDQGGDWDLQWKH3+'5 
. Presentation of a Palestinian perspective on human development, rebuilding, and future action 
. Dissemination of a human development approach that is tailored for Palestinian needs 
. Facilitation of an informed debate among local governmental and non-governmental 
institutions based on objective analyses of development approaches 
. Provision of an opportunity for international donor governmental and non-governmental 
organizations to become more familiar with Palestinian points of views and  to discuss these 
views 
. Relating the human development approach to the current debate on institutional development 
. Making available specific recommendations and courses of action concerning overVHFWRUV 
. Merging the points of views of Palestinians in both Gaza and the West Bank in a coherent form.  
 
The Conference will include presentations in a number of areas including: 
 
. Political, economic, social, and institutional implications of the human development approach 
proposed in the PHDR. 
. A gender analysis of the PHDR. 
. Palestinian institutions with a focus on Ministries, the PLC, the Judiciary, Security Agencies, 
local councils, election law, and the role of communities in governance. 
. Economic development (economic policies, private sector, and international governmental and 
non-governmental funding). 
. Social development (education, health, environment, and the role of women in development). 
. Palestinian civil society (NGOs, political groups, and professional and workers’ unions) 
. The role of the media. 
 
Preparations for the Conference included the organization of scores of workshops with experts, 
FRPPXQLW\OHDGHUVDQGUHSUHVHQWDWLYHVRIYDULRXVPDUJLQDODQGLQWHUHVWJURXSV2YHUEDFNJURXQG
papers ZHUH SUHSDUHG $QRWKHU  UHFRPPHQGDWLRQ SDSHUV ZLOO DOVR EH PDGH DYDLODEOH IRU WKH
conference attendants. The proceeding of the Conference will be made available shortly after the 
presentations are completed through our homepage. The PHDR will be finalized after the 
recommendations of the participants are considered.  
 
The Conference is being organized through a number of specialized committees: a committee of 
sponsors, a media committee, an advisory committee, an administrative committee, an information 
committee, and a technical committee. The proceedings of the Conference will be covered by various 
media outlets; and the PHDR itself is currently being the subject of  debate through the local media. 
 
(Appendix  

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Invited to the conference are representatives of governmental and non-governmental institutions, local 
and international. Decision-makers and other staff members of various institutions, PLC members, 
NGOs are also invited. Young people will also participate. 
 
The Conference will be simultaneously held in both the West Bank (Ramallah) and Gaza Strip (Gaza 
City). The recommendations resulting from both conferences will be integrated.   
 
The following documents will be distributed during the Conference: 
- A summary of the PHDR. 
- EDFNJURXQGSDSHUV 
- 2YHUUHFRPPHndation papers form the West Bank and Gaza. 
- DSP’s publications. 
- The publications of other relevant research centers. 
- A poster on human development in Palestine. 
- 7KH'63$FWLYLW\5HSRUWIRU- 
- The DSP latest opinion poll – survey. 
 
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Development Studies Programme 
National Conference on Human 
Development 
(Toward A Viable State) 
 
 
 
6XQGD\-XQH Speakers 
Time Title West Bank & Gaza 
 
– 
 
 
Opening Session 
 
 His Excellency President Yaser Arafat 
 Birzeit University 
 MOPIC 
 UNDP 
 Technical Advisory Group 
 Summary of the PHDR 
 
Moderators:  
Albert Aghazerian & Itimad Muhana 
– Break 
– Session One: Implications of  the PHDR Gaza West Bank 
  Political Implications - Ghazi Sourni - Bassam Salhi 
  Economic Implications - Mariam Abu Daqa - Islah Jad 
  Social Implications - Moein Rajab - Naser Abdel Karim 
  Institutional Implications - Nahed Al Rayes - Ramzi Rihan 
  The PHDR from a Gender Perspective 
 
- Nahda Younes - Zaheera kamal 
 Moderators - Sami Abu Zarifa - Zuhair Sabbagh 
– Lunch Break 
– Session Two: Roundtables – working groups to discuss proposed sector recommendations  
- Session Three:  
Issues in social development 
 Education 
 Environment  
 Health 
 Social Spending  
 
 
 
- Moh’d  Zeyada 
- Dima Zomor 
- Moh’d  Zeinelden 
- Andalib Odwan 
 
 
 
- Tafeeda Jarbawi 
- Moh’d Said 
- Fathi Abu Moghli 
- Cairo Arafat 
 
 Commentators - Itemad Mohana - Khalid Nakhleh 
 Moderators  - Kamal Astal - Jihad Mishal 
 
 
* Each Session will be followed by discussion, question-answer period.
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0RQGD\-XQH Speakers 
Time Title Gaza West Bank 
– Session Four:  
Economic Policies & Funding Practices  
 
 
 
  Economic Development  
 The role of the privet sector 
 International & Arab Funding 
 The role of international NGO’ s 
- Gazi Sourani  
(Mahmoud Ja’ fari paper) 
- Moein Rajab 
- Basem Khaldi 
- Rajy Sourani 
- Mahoumd Ja’ fari 
- Samir Abdallah 
- Moh’ d Shadid 
- Izzat Abdelhadi 
 Commentators - Ali Sha’ th  - Moh’ d Ishtaieh  
 Moderators  - Omar Sha’ ban - Moh’ d Ghadeieh 
– Break 
 
- 
 
Session Five: Palestinian Civil Society 
 Political groups  
 NGO’ s 
 Professional & Workers’  Unions   
    
 
 
- Khalid Khatib 
- Tayseer Mhaisen 
- Talal Okal 
 
 
 
- Tayseer Arouri 
- Randa Sanyora 
- Na’ em Naser 
 Commentators - Ramzi Rabah  - Jamil Hilal 
 Moderators - Issam Younis - Majdi Malki 
– Lunch Break 
 
– 
 
Session Six: Community Participation 
 Community participation in local 
governance 
 Palestinian Elections 
 The role of the media in participatory 
development   
 
 
- Ibrahim Khashan 
 
- Ziad Abu Amr 
- Hani Habib 
 
 
 
- Fadia Salfiti 
 
- Adnan Odeh 
- Samih Shibib 
 Commentators - Ismai’ l Abu Shamala - Saleh Abdeljawad 
 Moderators  - Ahmad Abu Shawish - Sufian Musha’ sha 
– Break 
 
– 
 
Seventh Session: PNA institutions 
 Ministries 
 PLC 
 The Judiciary  
 
 Security Agencies 
 
 
- Hasan Kashef 
- Hamdi Shaqora 
- AbdelRahman Abu 
Elnaser 
- Sobheyeh Jom’ ah 
 
 
- Ahmad Majdalani 
- Azmi Shua’ ibi 
- Ali Safarini 
 
- Ali Jarbawi 
 Commentators - Reyad Al Hasan - Ghanya Malhees 
 Moderators  - Jamila Sydam - Liza Traki 
– Closing Remarks 
 
 
